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PREFACE 
Satire has proved enormously difficult to define. From the early 
etymological confusions with the mythological "satyr" to the numerous 
books and articles of modern scholars, the one problem which has probably 
taken up most space is that of definition. If there is any consensus at 
all among students of satire, it is that satire is perilously difficult 
to define. Warren Tallman observes that "Attempts to define satire as a 
form are sure to fail if only because English literature has always been 
'magnificently disheveled.'"1 Robert C. Elliott concurs: 
No strict definition can encompass the complexity of a word which 
signifies, on one hand, a kind of literature, and on the other, a 
spirit or tone which expresses itself in many literary genres.2 
Even the formal verse satires of Horace, Juvenal and Persius furnish 
. 1. . 3 except1ons to every genera 1zat1on. It is no wonder, then, that a 
sound, full lexical definition of the word has been hard to come by. 
Elliott concludes that "Clearly, the concept 'satire' is what Wittgen-
4 
stein calls 'a concept with blurred edges.'" 
1 
"Swift's Fool: A Comment upon Satire in Gulliver's Travels," 
Dalhousie Review, 40 (1961), 475. 
2 
"The Definition of Satire: A Note on Method," Yearbook of 
Comparative and General Literature, 11 (1962), 19. 
3 Elliott, p. 20. 
4 Elliott, p. 23. 
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Elliott goes on to propose a method of identifying satire. First, 
we must look at a number of satires about which there is no question, 
then decide whether work x has resemblances enough to them to warrant 
being included in the category of satire. This is not a factual 
question, he says, but a question of decision: "are the resemblances of 
this work to various kinds of satire sufficient so that we are warranted 
in including it in the category?--or in extending the category to take 
-ft • ..s 
... ~n. 
In "Satire: The Inadequacy of Recent Definitions," Leonard Feinberg 
shares Elliott's reluctant conclusion about the definition of satire: we 
can only familiarize ourselves with the canon of satires and examine new 
works to see if they fit. 6 I would add that, of course, such an activity 
would be much easier to perform if that canon were clearly and suffi-
ciently categorized, its various components isolated and identified. 
There is, naturally, danger attendant upon such attempts to classify, 
as Feinberg points out: 
31. 
There is genuine psychological pleasure in making--or seeing--
categories. One gets the illusion of order, simplicity, neatness. 
There is no such gratification in admitting that satire is often 
(as its name originally implied) a mixture of heterogeneous, 
incongruous, overlapping elements, in form and content. This 
fact happens to be true, but the acknowledgement of it is dis-
concerting.7 
5 Elliott, p. 23. 
6 
"Satire: The Inadequacy of Recent Definitions," Genre, 1 (1968), 
7 Feinberg, p. 36. 
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Satire, he adds, "is not a pure genre or mode and it cannot be forced 
into any precise category. Satire often mixes materials and forms."8 
While this is certainly true, we should still attempt to isolate and 
analyze its component parts. In other words, we should not be quite so 
ready to shrug our shoulders or throw up our hands in dismay. Philip 
Pinkus and Howard Weinbrot, in both precept and example, offer some 
tempered hope. 
In a review of his Introduction ~ Satire, Feinberg is taken to 
task by Philip Pinkus for his failure to demonstrate a definition: "Mr. 
Feinberg writes 274 pages to demonstrate the Protean nature of satire 
without defining precisely what satire is. The result is an Introduc-
~ to Satire that successfully buries all distinction between satire 
and other genres."9 Pinkus adds the following: 
His point is that satire appears in such a variety of forms that 
ther~ is no characteristic shape or framework to warrant precise 
definition. He rightly gives the example of Alvin Kernan's recent 
book, The Plot of Satire, as an attempt at precise definition that 
failed. But it could be argued that we are more justified today 
in trying to define satire than tragedy. Satire is here and now. 
It is a living part of our literary world, so much so that when we 
use the term we do not look over our shoulder self-consciously at 
some Aristotelian fiat to see if we are using the term correctly. 
It is our term.lO 
In a couple of significant articles, which I'll comment on later, Pinkus 
offers his own definition of satire. 
8 Feinberg, p. 36. 
9 
"An Impossible Task," Satire Newsletter, 5 (Spring 1968), 164. 
10 Pinkus, p. 124. 
v 
Howard Weinbrot favors an attempt at classifying satire but from 
a slightly different angle than most recent scholars have taken. He 
offers a summary of recent "definitions" of satire: 
Uany recent discussions of satire imply that satire is a mono-
lithic genre, one that can be characterized by means of a capsule-
description or mini-definition. These generally tell us that 
there are 'standard procedures of satire'; or that 'satire consists 
of' certain traits; or 'satire is a work so organized that' 
specified things happen; or 'satire is the genre most preoccupied 
with' a few selected themes; or, 'the satiric form is anything 11 that' includes what the critic observes that it should include. 
Weinbrot disagrees with the whole approach of these: 
Such comments, however, are unfaithful to the complexity of 
satiric forms from, say, 1660 to 1750. It would be more 
'Augustan' to abandon a synoptic view of satire in favor of the 
discrimination of Augustan satires.l2 
What he is calling for, then, is a discrimination among various kinds 
or types of satire. The conclusion of Weinbrot's essay will suffice to 
indicate the broad types he considers: 
These rough discriminations between comic and punitive, apoca-
lyptic or revelatory, and satiric and epistolary formal verse 
satires can only be a beginning for more intense inquiry into the 
varied Augustan modes of satire. I hope that it will also con-
tribute to ·the decline of the largely unhistorical synoptic 
definition.l3 
In the following study, I will not attempt to formulate an all-inclusive 
definition of satire. Instead, I will attempt a discrimination of one 
kind or type of satire, one small segment of satire: the satire on 
mankind. Satirizing mankind is but one satiric activity. My purpose 
11 
"On the Discrimination of Augustan Satires," in Proceedings of 
the Modern Language Association Neoclassicism Conferences, 1967-68, ed. 
Paul J. Korshin (New York: AMS Press, 1970), p. 5. 
12 Weinbrot, p. 5. 
13 Weinbrot, p. 9. 
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here is to delimit "satire on mankind." 
Terminology surrounding satire has proliferated. Recent critical 
literature reveals numerous kinds of satire. There are social and moral 
satire, political satire, heroic, particular, personal, revelatory, and 
apocalyptic satire, Christian and religious satire, satire of infusion, 
satire per ~' epigrammatic satire, and possibility satire, to name only 
a few. The list could easily be extended. This profusion has probably 
done more to confuse than to clarify the issues. ~ will be creating no 
new terminology. The term "satire on mankind" already exists. I hope 
that as a result of the following discussion we will be able to use 
that term with more precision. 
Once we have a good idea of what exactly a satire on mankind is, 
we may, following Elliott's procedure, examine other works to determine 
if they rightfully should be labeled as such, if they belong in the 
category. 
The firm establishment of what satire on mankind is and the 
acknowledgement I am seeking for it here may also make some small con-
tribution towards an eventual definition of "satire" itself--if such an 
elusive construct is in fact possible. Satires on mankind exist, they 
are satire, and they do need to be reckoned with. They need to be taken 
account of in any attempt at an overall, full-scale definition of satire. 
Many proclamations about satire simply do not take the satire on mankind 
into consideration; and, as a result, such definitions must perforce be 
incomplete. 
vii 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION TO A LITERARY TYPE 
During the mid-seventeenth and through the early part of the 
eighteenth century, a subgenre, kind or mode of satire enjoyed a slight 
rise in popularity, that is, came to be employed more frequently. I 
refer to what in this study will generally be called the satire on man-
kind.1 Though the activity of satirizing mankind has probably been with 
us from the time man first emerged as a sentient creature with certain 
critical abilities, and though it appears within our very earliest 
literature and has continued up through the first eighty years in the 
twentieth century, it was not until the latter part of the seventeenth 
century that it received any particular attention as a distinct literary 
activity. To this date, there still has been no comprehensive study of 
satires on mankind and, particularly, little or no discussion of them as 
literary artifices or constructs, that is, as literature. 
Indeed, one critic maintains that there can be no such thing as a 
true literary satire on mankind, for that would be entering the realm of 
"philosophy."2 For now, I will just say that there are reasons for 
1This label has the advantage of being slightly shorter than 
"satire against mankind" and, wqile perhaps still not acceptable to 
those who would prefer the feminist "genkind," does have historical 
justification in that it was used. It obviously includes both men and 
women whereas "satire on man" might be mistaken as merely the counter-
part to certain extant satires on women. 
2 Edward \.J. Rosenheim, Jr., Swift and the Satirist's Art (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1963), p. 30. --
1 
2 
satires on mankind often not looking like literature, or even satire. 
They may seem unduly straightforward or even beyond the bounds of what 
some scholars would like to call satire. This may help to account for 
the relatively little critical attention they have received. Neverthe-
less, literary works which call themselves satires on mankind are 
extant. There is a fairly substantial body of literary works by both 
major and minor satirists (as well as a few by writers we do not 
customarily think of as satirists) which shares a number of characteris-
tics that enable us legitimately and conveniently to label them as 
satires on mankind. Such satires may differ among themselves in tone, 
in philosophical input, bias or background, and in emphases; and yet 
they do maintain sufficient crucial resemblances to enable us to see 
that they are in fact members of a single type, group, or class. 
Labeling is, of course, not an end in itself. Several advantages may 
accrue from locating and identifying the characteristics of satire on 
mankind, not the least of which might be, as I have said, some minor 
adjustments in our attempts at defining that elusive entity "satire" 
itself. 
Several facets of the tradition have been studied, notably by 
A.O. Lovejoy who, naturally, is interested in the range of ideas con-
tained within them; by George Boas, who isolates for careful inspection 
one of the major strategies; and by Bertrand Goldgar, who analyzes the 
3 
angry responses that satires on mankind provoked. In an article on 
3 George Boas, The Happy Beast in French Thought ~ the Seven-
teenth Century (1933; rpt. New York: Octagon Books, 1966). Bertrand 
Goldgar, "Satires on ~1an and 'The Dignity of Human Nature,"' P~A, 80 
(1965) 535-41. 
3 
Swift, Ernest Tuveson discusses a crucial rhetorical implication of the 
4 
satire on mankind: the attack on the reader. Dustin H. Griffin's 
Satires Against Man is basically a study of Rochester's canon of poems, 
though it does provide valuable information on the religious and philo-
sophical backgrounds of the tradition as well as a lengthy reading of 
Rochester's "Satyr Against Mankind."5 In recent years, articles have 
appeared which have labeled specific works as satires on mankind (Part 
I of Hudibras, ~Fable of the Bees, and Gulliver's Travels for 
example), and yet there has been no detailed study of this strain of 
satire. The purpose of this study, then, is to delimit the satire on 
mankind, to remark its characteristics and strategies, to observe how 
it manifests itself in various genres, to examine some of the theoreti-
cal issues involved in satirizing all mankind, to discuss it as litera-
ture, and to chart its persistence and its modifications right up to 
our own day. 
A.O. Lovejoy, in his Reflections ~ Human Nature, fits satires on 
mankind into the general history of attitudes towards human nature. 
Speaking of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Lovejoy comments 
as follows: 
4 
"Swift: The View from within the Satire," in The Satirist's Art, 
ed. H. James Jensen and Malvin R. Zirker, Jr. (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1972), pp. 55-85. 
5 Satires Against Man: the Poems of Rochester (Berkeley: Univer-
sity of California Press, 1973). See especially chapters four and five. 
Griffin offers, for example, an enlightening discussion of the "long 
tradition of human self-disparagement." (158) He discovers, as back-
grounds to Rochester's poem, "three heterodox traditions of abasement, 
with classical roots, that flowered in the late Renaissance and seven-
teenth century as skepticism, theriophily, and sensationalism" (162). 
He includes not just philosophical and satirical but religious denuncia-
tions of man as well. 
4 
The earlier part of this period was the time in which the unfavor-
able general appraisal of man may be said to have reached, if not 
its climax, at any rate its most frequent and most notable expres-
sion outside the writings of theologians. The theologians, Pro-
testant and Catholic, continued, of course, to dilate upon the 
theme; and their writings were probably more copious, and pretty 
certainly were read by a larger fraction of the public, than in 
any previous period. But the theme of man's irrationality and 
especially of his inner corruption was no longer a speciality of 
divines; it became for a time one of the favorite topics of secu-
lar literature. For the late seventeenth and early eighteenth 
centuries, were, among other things, the great age of satire; and 
many of the examples of this genre were by implication, and some 
of them explicitly, satires on man in general, not merely on 
peculiar individuals or exceptional types.6 
Lovejoy cites Boileau's Eighth satire as typical and then provides a 
small list of practitioners: 
This general vein of satire, earlier exemplified by Machiavelli in 
his Asino d'Oro, is continued by La Rochefoucauld, La Bruyere, 
Oldham, Mme. Deshouli~es, Pope, Swift, Gay, Francis Fawkes, 
Robert Gould, the Earl of Rochester, Henry Brooke, Shenstone, and 
Goldsmith.7 
• 
Lovejoy's list is but a partial one, as will be indicated in the follow-
ing survey and even more in my third chapter. 
Before I attempt a definition of this petit genre and discuss some 
of the theoretical issues involved, it might prove helpful to examine 
several specimens as an introduction to the type. This will show the 
reader the literary type we are dealing with, remind him of those satires 
on mankind he may already have encountered and perhaps introduce him to 
some unfamiliar ones. This will be an abbreviated glance at the canon, 
but it should prove sufficient to serve as a basis of my discussion. 
Not all of those I will be outlining here call themselves satires on 
mankind, but all are solid, though not necessarily homogeneous examples 
6Reflections on Human Nature (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1961), p, 
15. 
7L . 16 oveJoy, p. • 
5 
of the type. 
Boileau's Satire VIII (De l'homme) and Rochester's "Satyr Against 
Hankind" are the best known examples. Their notoriety is slightly 
ironic, and reveals the lack of critical attention given to the genre, 
since among the works I will be dealing with, the observations which 
Boileau and Rochester make about the human race seem relatively mild. 
The first thing we must note about Boileau's Eighth satire (1668) 
is that it is in the form af an epistle written to one Dr. Morel of the 
Sorbonne. Boileau summons up imaginary objections to his own position, 
not merely from the doctor but also from some other speakers about whom 
we are not given much information. Boileau dispatches these objections 
quickly. Through Boileau's skillful manipulation of these imaginary 
speakers, the impression evoked, at least on the surface, is that a 
dialogue or even a symposium is going on, that serious intellectual give 
and take is occurring, with Boileau's own position obviously coming out 
on top. But we have to remember that Boileau is doing all the dealing 
here and is not above performing sleight of words. 
The thrust of Boileau's Eighth satire, and of numerous satires on 
mankind after his, is apparent in the first four lines: 
De tous les animaux qui s'el~vent dans l'air, 
Qui marchent sur la terre, ou nagent dans la mer, 
De Paris au Perou, du Japan jusqu'a Rome, 8 Le plus sot animal, a mon avis, c'est l'homme. 
There are a couple things to note about this startling opening. First 
of all, if we are to have a satire on mankind, there must be some 
8oeuvres I: Satires, le lutrin (Paris: Garnier-Flammarion, 1969), 
pp. 83-90. All~uture citations are to this edition. 
6 
indication that all men are being satirized. Here, in four lines, 
Boileau supplies two such indications. "L'honnne" obviously refers to 
~ genre humain; and, in addition, he creates a panoramic effect by his 
global references to geography in line three. The English reader 
immediately thinks of Dr. Johnson's opening of "The Vanity of Human 
'·lishes," "Let observation with extensive view I Survey mankind from 
China to Peru." 
It is also apparent in these first lines that Boileau is going to 
be employing a strategy which George Boas has called theriophily. 9 This 
is a strategy in which man is compared and contrasted with animals, and, 
in spite of his claim to reason, comes out the worse. Here, Boileau 
asserts, man is not worse than just one or two animals, but worse than 
those that fly, that walk on land and those that reside in the sea--that 
is, for all practical purposes, all animals. And the remainder of the 
poem is devoted to proving the assertion of line four. 
But the Doctor will argue that 
L'homme de la nature est le chef et le roi: 
Bois, pres, champs, animaux, tout est pour son usage, 
Et lui seul a, dis tu, la raison en partage. 
Today, on the evidence of the first two lines here, we might convict the 
Doctor of speciesism, "a prejudice or attitude of bias toward the in-
terests of members of one's own species and against those of members of 
h . 10 ot er spec~es. At the very least, there are two points of interest 
9 Boas, p. 1. I will be discussing this strategy in more detail 
in chapter three. 
10 Peter Singer, Animal Liberation: ! New Ethics for Our Treatment 
of Animals (New York: New York Review Book, 1975), p. 7. Singer acknow-
ledges his indebtedness for the term to Richard Ryder. 
7 
here, two characteristic approaches. Man's pride is brought out, his 
self-centeredness, his anthropocentrism, his feeling that all exists 
solely for his use. In addition, the Doctor puts forth the traditional 
argument we will encounter again and again that man, after all, has 
reason and is automatically superior. For the time being, Boileau im-
plicitly concedes the first two lines of this passage by not commenting 
on them. But he's not going to forget them, not going to let the Doctor 
(or man) get away with that, as becomes apparent fifty lines later in 
the poem. Making a concession to mankind and then rudely or abruptly 
taking it away becomes a standard strategy in many satires on mankind. 
Boileau, in fact, employs it immediately. The Doctor has put forth 
the customary argument that man alone has reason. In the next line, the 
narrator or Boileau concedes that "Il est vrai de tout temps, la raison 
• 
fut son lot." But here there is no delay before the concession is 
snatched away, for the very next line takes another startling turn, 
"Mais de la je conclus que l'homme est le plus sot." Here Boileau sets 
the tone for future answers to man's claim of rationality. Considering 
the evidence, what man does to his own kind for example, man is even 
more culpable since he has reason to assist him. 
The Doctor will probably consider all these assertions as merely 
ridiculous remarks designed to startle the reader into laughing. Surely, 
the Doctor will think, the narrator is being hyperbolic here; one could 
not seriously propose these things: 
Ce propos, diras-tu, sont bans dans la satire, 
Pour ~gayer d'abord un lecteur qui veut rire: 
Mais il faut les prouver. 
And, of course, proving them is exactly what Boileau sets about doing. 
8 
In documenting his case, Boileau presents a catalogue of the evils 
indigenous to man: he is flighty, fickle, doesn't know what is good for 
him and is contradictory. Boileau asks the rhetorical question, what is 
wisdom? The reader is sure by now, however, that whatever his answer, 
the quality will not be found in men. The definition provided is that 
wisdom is "une egalite d'ame I Que rienne peut troubler, qu'aucun d'sir 
n'enflamme, I Qui marche en ses conseils ~ pas plus mesur~s I Qu'un 
doyen au palais ne monte les degr~s." For illustration, Boileau again 
resorts to an animal comparison, citing the constant and prudent ants 
who know when to gather and store their necessities and when to relax. 
One never finds them "Paresseuse au printemps, en hiver diligente •••• " 
But, and this is the qualification the reader knows is coming, men are 
not like the ants at a·ll: 
Mais l'homme, sans arr~t dans sa course insensee, 
Voltige incessamment de pensee en pensee: 
Son coeur, toujours flottant entre mille embarras, 
Ne sait ni ce qu'il veut ni ce qu'il ne veut pas. 
Despite all his vacillation, man deludes himself into thinking that 
Lui seul de la nature est la base et l'appui, 
Et le dixieme ciel ne tourne que pour lui. 
De tous les animaux, il est, dit-il, le maitre.--
Qui pourrait le nier, poursuis-tu. 
"Moi, peut-~tre," Boileau is quick to respond. Those who would make 
such assertions do so without examining whether it is the bear who fears 
the human passing by his cave or if it is the other way around and with-
out checking to see if lions would respect an edict put out by herdsmen 
demanding that they settle elsewhere. Boileau goes to extremes here to 
make it apparent that man's influence in the animal sphere is not what 
he supposes it to be. This, of course, is Boileau's delayed response to 
9 
the lines cited earlier to the effect that man is the master, commander, 
king of all nature, including animals, and that all exist solely for his 
use. 
This sham would-be master, this "king of the animals," how many 
masters does he have? Boileau's answer merely adds items to the growing 
catalogue of man's evils: 
L'ambition, l'amour, l'avarice, ou la haine, 
' Tiennent comme un forcat son esprit a la chaine. 
I 
But maybe, says Boileau, we should look at man in his best light. He is, 
for example, the only social animal: 
Lui seul, vivant, dit-on, dans l'enceinte des villes, 
Fait voir d'honn~tes moeurs, des coutumes civiles, 
Se fait des gouverneurs, des magistrats, des rois, 
Observe une police, ob~it a des lois. 
As the reader suspects, however, this best light will not shine brightly 
or for long. Boileau concedes, "Il est vrai," but again quickly reneges 
and turns it against man. Animals excel man even here; they live with-
out noise, debates, court cases. They live in peace with one another 
"sous les pures lois de la simple equit~." One does not find bears 
warring with bears, lions against lions. The faults enumerated against 
man earlier are relatively harmless if we consider what this contrast 
with the animal kingdom brings forth: 
L'homme seul, l'homme seul, en sa fureur extr~me, 
Met un brutal honneur a s'egorger soi-meme. 
This, too, is an argument repeatedly encountered in satires on mankind. 
Man is paradoxically the brute; he is the only animal to kill wantonly 
his fellow kind, to prey on his own kind. 
But is not man's learning something to be proud of? Man's in-
genuity has allowed him to measure the skies; his learning embraces all 
10 
things. Boileau is not above putting a ridiculous question in the mouth 
of his imaginary objector: do animals have universities? The answer is 
that naturally they do not have formal education; but, then, they don't 
have some of the corruptions which come from the educated professions. 
They do not, for example, have to put up with a doctor among them who 
will poison the woods with "son art assassin." Besides, Boileau asks, 
is knowledge really the criterion we use to judge human beings by? 
The answer to this question is equally obvious to the reader and 
is provided by yet another imaginary character the narrator inserts into 
his letter to the Doctor. A father advises his son on how to get ahead 
in the world, and the advice has nothing whatsoever to do with formal 
education. It is, of course, to acquire money in any way one can, even 
if one has to be cruel to others to do so: "Va par tes cruaut~s m~riter 
la fortune." Money, you see, has a transforming power, for 
Quiconque est riche est tout: sans sagesse il est sage; 
Il a, sans rien savoir, la science en partage; 
Il a !'esprit, le coeur, le merite, le rang, 
La vertu, la valeur, la dignite, le sang; 
Il est aim~ des grands, il est ch~ri des belles. 
It can even turn ugliness into beauty, so great is its power; but, 
likewise, poverty can turn everything ugly or frightful: "L'or m~me a 
la laideur donne un teint de beaute: I Mais tout devient affreux avec 
la pauvrete." 
Since the world operates on principles like these, Doctor Morel, 
who was a Dean of Theology, need not expect to be rewarded for working 
arduously on the Bible, for attempting to clear up difficult passages. 
At most, he can expect only a "Thank you." The best advice Boileau has 
for the good Doctor is as follows: 
• 
Mets-toi chez un banquier, ou bien chez un notaire: 
Laisse la saint Thomas s'accorder avec Scot; 
Et conclus avec moi qu'un docteur n'est qu'un sot. 
Following this direct attack on the Doctor, Boileau allows him to 
appear, at least for a minute, as more rational than Boileau himself. 
The Doctor is tempted to respond in kind, to strike back by attacking 
the poet's profession, but he refuses to pursue that and wants to get 
back to the heart of the discussion: 
Mais, sans perdre en discours le temps hors de saison, 
L'homme, venez au fait, n'a-t-il pas la raison? 
N'est-ce pas son flambeau, son pilate fidele? 
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And the "yes, but" formula is operative again. Yes, Boileau concedes, 
all this may be true, but it is not of much assistance to man. An Ass, 
who by the way will have the last word, is much better off than man: 
Un ~ne, pour le moins, instruit par la nature; 
A !'instinct qui le guide obeit sans murmure. 
And "Sans avoir la raison, il marche sur sa route," but man, the only 
creature who has reason to assist and to enlighten him, "dans tout ce 
qu'il fait n'a ni raison ni sens." In addition, man's mind or moods 
vacillate wildly. This is another charge that will recur often in 
satires on mankind. Fear is yet another part of the indictment. Men 
are "afraid of their own shadows," afraid of what their own imaginations 
conceive. Animals, on the other hand, aren't superstitious and don't 
worship idols the way man does. 
Boileau cleverly has the imaginary interlocutor sum up what 
Boileau himself has been saying: 
Quoi! me prouverez-vous par ce discours profane 
Que l'homme, qu'un docteur est au-dessous d'un ~ne? 
Un ~ne, le jouet de taus les animaux, 
Un stupide animal, sujet a mille maux; 
Dont le nom seul en soi comprend une satire! 
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Oc course, this will just reinforce Boileau's own point, make it that 
much more outrageous. Man is not just worse than some animals but worse 
than one of the reputedly lowest animals, whose very name alone com-
prises a satire. In his own response to the imagined Doctor's response, 
Boileau tries to force us to look at things from a different perspective: 
--Oui, d'un fne: et qu'a-t-il qui nous excite ~ rire? 
Nous nous moquons de lui: mais s'il ~ouvait un jour, 
Docteur, sur nos defauts s'exprimer a son tour; 
Si, pour nous reformer, le ciel prudent et sage 
De la parole enfin lui permettait l'usage; 
Qu'il put dire tout haut ce qu'il se dit tout bas; 
Ah! docteur, entre nous, que ne dirait-il pas? 
Boileau may be claiming here rather covertly that his statements about 
mankind are intended to help reform man. The implication is that know-
ing the truth about itself might help mankind to change. Note that 
Boileau says "pour nous reformer," for the satirist on mankind speaking 
in his own human voice can hardly claim exemption from the status of 
being a member of mankind. In the "Avertissement de l'edition de 1668" 
entitled "Le Libraire Au Lecteur," which prefaces the Ninth satire, we 
find the following: 
L ' ' . / . 1 h / / 1 auteur, apres avo1r ecr1t contre tous es ommes en genera , a 
cru qu'il ne pouvait mieux finir qu'en ecrivant contre lui-m~me, 
et que c'etait le plus beau champ de satire qu'il put trouver. 
(p. 91) 
The forced inclusion of the author's self in a satire on mankind, as 
well as this statement, may take the edge off those assertions of the 
superior, supercilious satirist looking down on others and judging from 
his pedestal. The satirist still claims to know the truth, but that is 
not much consolation since he is a member of the offending race, and he 
might almost be happier not knowing. He is definitely not a fool among 
knaves. 
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At any rate, what would this Ass say if he landed in the middle of 
Paris and were to see all the goings on there, the tumult, the insanity, 
the injustice of it all? It is easy to infer what his conclusion would 
be. Boileau gives the Ass the last word: 
Oh! que si l'~ne alors, a bon droit misanthrope, 
Pouvait trouver la voix qu'il eut au temps d'Esope; 
~ ~ De tous cotes, docteur, voyant les hommes fous, 
Qu'il dirait de bon coeur, sans en etre jaloux, 
Content de ses chardons, et secouant la tete: 
Ma foi, non plus que nous, l'homme n'est qu'une bete! 
Here we see from the animal perspective. The impartial observer, the 
animal, is not jealous of man, for he is content with his own lot. 
Nonetheless, he rightfully hates mankind. The equation of the last 
line, that man is paradoxically nothing but a beast, is one that we will 
encounter repeatedly in satires on mankind. So ends Boileau's extensive 
satire on mankind. 
John Oldham's imitation of Boileau's Eighth appeared fourteen 
years later in 1682. 11 "The Eighth Satire of Monsieur Boileau, 
Imitated" anglicizes many of the particular references to persons and 
places of the original but maintains its essential arguments and con-
elusions. The animal comparison, the panoramic statement and the basic 
arguments are apparent from the very start. Oldham's loose translation 
begins with the same startling opening: 
Of all the creatures in the world that be, 
Beast, fish, or fowl, that go, or swim, or fly 
Throughout the globe from London to Japan, 
The arrantest fool in my opinion's man. 
11 Poems of John Oldham, ed. Bonamy Dobree (London: Centaur Press, 
1960), pp. 203-15.~1 citations are to this edition. 
The imaginary i~terlocutor again puts forth the standard claims for 
mankind: 
'Man is,' you cry, 'Lord of the Universe; 
For him was this fair frame of nature made, 
And all the creatures for his use and aid; 
To him alone, of all the living kind, 
Has bounteous Heaven the reasoning gift assigned.' 
But the narrator replies with the typical response: 
True, sir, that reason ever was his lot, 
But thence I argue man the greater sot. 
Reason is a "false guide," and man's mind vacillates wildly: 
Tossed by a thousand gusts of wavering doubt, 
His restless mind still rolls from thought to thought. 
Oldham retains Boileau's insistence that man see himself accurately. 
Here he used direct denigration by flat, outright assertion, and he 
includes himself by using the pronoun "our": 
This is our image just: such is that vain, 
That foolish, fickle, motley creature, man. 
Once again, man's pride and anthropocentrism are subjected to attack: 
Yet, pleased with idle whimsies of his brain, 
And puffed with pride, this haughty thing would fain 
Be thought himself the only stay and prop, 
That holds the mighty frame of nature up; 
The skies and stars his properties must seem, 
And turnspit angels tread the spheres for him; 
Of all the creatures he's the lord, he cries. 
Of course, this "boasted monarch of the world" does not receive 
much respect from the fiercer animals, and in fact he is the one who 
fears them. Man is not only a master, he is a subject. To what? 
Lust for money and power, love, hate "and twenty passions more" en-
slave him. 
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As in Boileau, the narrator says, let's consider man in his best 
light. He is the social animal, but this leads to the predictable 
response that man is the only animal to prey on his own kind: 
Whoever saw the wolves, that he can say, 
Like more inhuman us, so bent on prey, 
To rob their fellow wolves upon the way? 
Whoever saw church and fanatic bear, 
Like savage mankind one another tear? 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
'Tis man, 'tis man alone, that worst of brutes, 
Who first brought up the trade of cutting throats, 
Did honour first, that barbarous term, devise, 
Unknown to all the gentler savages. 
Again, we see the wordplay. Humans are more "inhuman" and the "worst 
of brutes," while animals are "the gentler savages." 
Man's pretensions to knowledge are quickly deflated, and the 
formula for getting on in the world is simply: "Boggle at nothing to 
increase thy store." The narrator rejects the claim that reason is 
anything special: 
The ass, whom nature reason has denied, 
Content with instinct for his surer guide, 
Still follows that, and wiselier does proceed. 
Of reason void, he sees, and gains his end, 
While man, who does to that false light pretend, 
Wildly gropes on, and in broad day is blind. 
Men, unlike animals, fear "Chimeras of their own devising," and "With 
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scaring phantoms pall the sweets of life." In addition, men are super-
stitious and worship idols. 
Oldham's conclusion follows that of Boileau. Despite all the 
limitations listed above, the imaginary objector is still unable to see 
how one can say that man is beneath an Ass, "Whose very name all satire 
does comprise?" If Heaven should give this Ass, the lowest of animals, 
the power of speech "to check proud man," what might it say after 
spending an hour or so in Fleet-street or the Strand and observing the 
antic behavior of the "two-legged herd?" The ass would no doubt reach 
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the same inescapable conclusion, though not as powerfully stated as in 
Boileau, that "Good faith, man is a beast as much as we." 
The Earl of Rochester's "A Satyr again Reason and Mankind" (1676) 
is the single best known satire on mankind. Boileau's lines are deli-
cate in places and the flow of his verse may seem to meliorate what he 
has to say; but in fact his assertions are ultimately more strongly 
negative than those of the notorious Rochester, though at first glance 
it does not appear as if this will be the case. Rochester's poem also 
begins with what is obviously designed to be a startling statement: 
Were I (who to my cost already am 
One of those strange, prodigious creatures, man) 
A spirit free to choose, for my own share, 
What case of flesh and blood I pleased to wear, 
I'd be a dog, a monkey, or a bear, 
Or anything but that vain animal 12 Who is so proud of being rational. 
Already we see the use of animals and the attack on pride and reason. 
The narrator wishes he were "anything" rather than a man. As the title 
suggests, Rochester intends to attack man's claim to reason. }~n prides 
himself on being reasonable at the cost of shunning a surer guide: 
And before certain instinct, will prefer 
Reason, which fifty times for one does err. 
Reason, that honorific attribute which man has traditionally used to 
distinguish himself from the rest of creation, is but "an ignis fatuus 
in the mind •••• " Man's mind, which should be a consolation to him, 
is anything but that to the misguided follower of reason: 
12 The Complete Poems of John Wilmot, Earl of Rochester, ed. 
David H. Vieth (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 94-101. 
All citations are to this edition. 
Whilst the misguided follower climbs with pain 
Mountains of whimseys, heaped in his own brain; 
Stumbling from thought to thought, falls headlong down 
Into doubt's boundless sea, where, like to drown, 
Books bear him up awhile, and make him try 
To swim with bladders of philosophy. 
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The individual chasing this elusive reason comes to understand through 
age and experience that "all his life he has been in the wrong." 
Rochester leaves him in a dramatic posture: 
Huddled in dirt the reasoning engine lies, 
Who was so proud, so witty, and so wise. 
Man might have had happiness and enjoyment, but 
His wisdom did his happiness destroy, 
Aiming to know that world he should enjoy. 
Rather than being a consolation, then, reason becomes a hindrance to man. 
Rochester tries to give the appearance, as did Boileau, that a 
logical debate is taking place! He, too, makes use of an imaginary 
opponent who has come to take him to task. Rochester places a direct 
attack on himself into the mouth of his imaginary opponent. One has to 
have a "degenerate" mind to even write a satire on mankind: 
What rage ferments in your degenerate mind 
To make you rail at reason and mankind? 
The interlocutor then launches his own defense of man: 
Blest, glorious man! to whom alone kind heaven 
An everlasting soul has freely given, 
Whom his great Maker took such care to make 
And this fair frame in shining reason dressed 
To dignify his nature above beast. 
Man is the only creature with a soul and the only one made in God's 
image and likeness; and God gave man reason "to dignify his nature 
above beast." Such statements, the reader knows, will not go long un-
challenged, but for now the imaginary interlocutor goes on to elaborate 
some of the properties of reason: 
Reason, by whose aspiring influence 
We take a flight beyond material sense, 
Dive into mysteries, then soaring pierce 
The flaming limits of the universe, 
Search heaven and hell, find out what's acted there, 
And give the world true grounds of hope and fear. 
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At this point an incensed Rochester, able to take no more of this pre-
sumption, interrupts. The fact that he is writing satire on mankind 
does not preclude the insertion of personal satire into his composition 
as well (as I will argue later, particular satire and satire on mankind 
are not necessarily antipathetic). So, he tells the intruder that we 
have read all this drivel in the works of Ingelo, Partrick and Sibbes. 
Now that he has good reason to be furious, Rochester can counter-
attack mercilessly, which he does. First, he offers his own descrip-
tion of reason: 
This supernatural gift, that makes a mite 
Think he's the image of the infinite, 
Comparing his short life, void of all rest, 
To the eternal and the ever blest. 
Hidden in the midst of this attack on reason and man's overweening pride 
is some additional material that will be used in numerous satires on 
mankind: the charge that man's lifespan is ephemeral and the assertion 
that this brief life is "void of all rest." Rochester also diminishes 
man directly here by calling him a "mite." 
While Rochester has said some harsh things about reason and noted 
some of its undesirable consequences, he still does not engage in an 
all-out attack on it. He qualifies his earlier remarks, seemingly backs 
off from his earlier position. Not all reason is bad. It need not be 
a burden on man, and man is apparently capable of it: 
Thus, whilst against false reasoning I inveigh, 
I own right reason, which I would obey. 
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Right reason "distinguishes by sense,"13 "gives us rules of good and ill 
from thence," and "bounds desires with a reforming will I To keep 'em 
more in vigor, not to kill." Finally, he tells the reverend intruder, 
"Your reason hinders, mine helps to enjoy." 
Realizing he has backed off considerably from his earlier position 
on reason, Rochester, nonetheless, insists he will remain adamant in 
his attitude towards mankind: 
Thus I think reason righted, but for man, 
I'll ne'er recant; defend him if you can. 
For all his pride and his philosophy, 
'Tis evident beasts are, in their degree, 
As wise at least, and better far than he. 
Again, the satirist has resorted to an animal comparison, but Rochester 
has no romanticized attitude towards animals, as does, for example, Mme 
Deshoulieres in a couple of poems I will be discussing later. Beasts 
are "in their degree" better than man. Still, Rochester does not argue 
that their degree is equal to or higher than that of man. 
Rochester has two basic arguments as evidence for this assertion. 
First, man has decidedly less wisdom. A yardstick is provided for 
measuring this wisdom: 
Those creatures are the wisest who attain 
By surest means, the ends at which they aim. 
Thus, the dog that finds and kills his food better than the politician 
13 Rochester's sensory-based "right reason" represents a radical 
departure from earlier definitions. See Robert Hoopes, Right Reason in 
the English Renaissance (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962). 
(he mentions Sir Thomas Meres as a particular example) performs his 
political functions is in fact wiser. From this single example, he 
concludes ironically, "You see how far man's wisdom here extends." 
If man lacks wisdom, perhaps human nature in some way makes up 
for it: 
Look next if human nature makes amends: 
Whose principles most generous are, and just, 
And to whose morals you would sooner trust. 
Be judge yourself, I'll bring it to the test. 
His not very scientific test brings forth the result that animals are 
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"better far" than man, the second argument mentioned above. I'll show 
you, Rochester says, how "generous" and "just" those principles of 
human nature are: 
Which is the basest creature, man or beast? 
Birds feed on birds, beasts on each other prey, 
But savage man alone does man betray. 
Rochester knows that man is not the only animal to prey on his own kind. 
Birds do it. There is a difference, however. Animals have to kill for 
food; and, at least, they do it openly, being armed by nature for just 
such a task: 
Pressed by necessity, they kill for food; 
Man undoes man to do himself no good. 
With teeth and claws by nature armed, they hunt 
Nature's allowance, to supply their want. 
But man, with smiles, embraces, friendship, praise, 
Inhumanly his fellow's life betrays; 
~-lith voluntary pains works his distress, 
Not through necessity, but wantonness. 
Man's act is one of betrayal; humans "inhumanly" (read "humanly") their 
fellow's lives betray, and they do this wantonly. In the next twenty 
lines or so, Rochester explains to us why man acts so savagely. 
~1an's motivation for these human deeds, and even the source of 
• 
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many of those deeds he may pride himself on, those acts which make him 
appear human, is Fear. Animals are not so basely motivated: 
For hunger or for love they fight and tear, 
Whilst wretched man is still in arms for fear. 
For fear he arms, and is of arms afraid, 
By fear to fear successively betrayed. 
Many of man's most cherished qualities and traits have fear as their 
underlying source: 
Base fear, the source whence his best passions came: 
His boasted honor, and his dear-bought fame; 
That lust of power, to which he's such a slave 
And for the which alone he dares be brave. 
It is not only these aggressive qualities which spring from fear but the 
gentler ones as well: his generosity, affability and kindness. 
Look to the bottom of his vast design, 
~Vherein man's wisdom, power, and glory JO~n: 
The good he acts, the ill he does endure, 
'Tis all from Fear, to make himself secure • 
Even what good man does proceeds from fear. Fear naturally leads one 
into dishonesty, for to be honest requires bravery--or stupidity. 
Rochester tells what the individual must do to survive in this world: 
And honesty's against all common sense: 
Men must be knaves, 'tis in their own defence. 
Mankind's dishonest; if you think it fair 
Amongst known cheats to play upon the square, 
You'll be undone. 
Nor can weak truth your reputation save: 
The knaves will all agree to call you knave. 
Wronged shall he live, insulted o'er oppressed, 
Who dares be less a villain than the rest. 
Fools among knaves, as Swift was well aware, do not have a particularly 
high survival rate. Now if this is the best way to survive in society, 
possibly the only way, the system seems to perpetuate itself. Evil 
causes evil. The violent do bear it away; and a good offense (in every 
sense of that word) is the best defense. The quality of life, and 
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therefore its value, are markedly diminished here. I will be discussing 
the contribution such material makes in satirizing mankind in chapter 
three. 
Rochester closes this section of his argument on human nature by 
asserting that "most men" (not all, that is) "are cowards, all men 
should be knaves." The only difference among men that he can see is in 
their degree of infamy or villainy: 
The difference lies, as far as I can see, 
Not in the thing itself, but the degree, 
And all the subject matter of debate 
Is only: Who's a knave of the first rate? 
All men are similar, then, in that they are all knaves, but some are 
more proficient in knavery than others. 
But, to show the reader I'm not too fanatical, says the narrator, 
if you can show me any one of the following three, I'll take it all 
back: a just man in court, an upright statesman, a churchman who "on 
God relies." 
If upon earth there dwell such God-like men, 
I'll here recant my paradox to them, 
Adore those shrines of virtue, homage pay, 
And, with the rabble world, their laws obey. 
He implies, of course, that we will not find such exemplars; but he adds 
that even if we can, we still have to concede that men are not far from 
beasts: 
If such there be, yet grant me this at least: 
Man differs more from man, than man from beast. 
Hence, men are not all alike, or depicted as being uniformly evil or 
dull or stupid or knavish (which, as we will see, is the procedure for 
most satirists on mankind). If there are God-like men, then there is 
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still a greater difference between them and the rabble than there is 
between man and animal. Even in the unlikely event that such paragons 
exist, men are still not all that far from the beasts, are not so 
superior as they like to imagine. Dustin H. Griffin, however, thinks 
the following a more likely reading: 
the difference between (1) God-like men and (3) the rabble is 
greater than the difference between (1) God-like men and (2) 
beasts; in other words, that beasts--generous, just, trustworthy, 
wise in their humble way--come closer to the ideal of God-like 
man than does the rabble.l4 
Griffin adds the following: 
This more radical reading sharpens the satirical point. Rochester 
embarrasses proud man by showing how the beasts, traditionally 
man's irrational inferior, in fact measure up to man's own pro-
fessed moral ideals better than he himself does.l5 
But Griffin does not take into consideration here the similarity in 
wording between Rochester's concluding lines and certain passages in 
Montaigne and Charron. While discussing the ingenuity of various 
animals in Raymond Sebond, Montaigne writes of an elephant: 
But this beast hath in many other effects, such affinity with 
man's sufficiency, that would I particularly trace out what ex-
perience hath taught, I should easily get an affirmation of what 
I so ordinarily maintaine, which is, that there is more difference 
found betweene such and such a man, than betweene such a beast 
and such a man.l6 
Charron claims that animals possess most of the faculties of man, though 
to a lesser degree: 
14 Griffin, 243. p. 
15 Griffin, 243. p. 
16 Essa1s, trans. John Florio (London: J.M. Dent, 1910), II, 159. 
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we must confesse that beasts doe reason, have the use of discourse 
and judgement, but more weakly and imperfectly than man; they are 
inferiour unto men in this, not because they have no part therein 
at all; they are inferiour unto men, as amongst men some are in-
feriour unto others; and even so amongst beasts there is such a 
difference: but yet there is a greater difference betweene men; 
for (as shall be said hereafter) there is a greater distance be-
tweene a man and a man, than a man and a beast.l7 
Charron repeats his assertion and expands upon it tellingly a bit later: 
In the soules of men there is a farre greater difference, for it 
is not only greater without comparison betwixt a man and a man, 
than betwixt a beast and a beast: but there is a greater differ-
ence betwixt a man and a man, than a man and a beast; for an ex-
cellent beast comes neerer to a man of the basest sort and degree, 
than that man to another great and excellent personage.l8 
I see no reason to assume that Rochester was offering any more than the 
more conventional sentiment as formulated here by Charron. 
That all men are not alike suggests that some are better than 
others, some are possessed of less knavery than others. In relation to 
• 
the interlocutor, Rochester obviously places himself in the superior 
category throughout the poem. He concedes right reason to himself and 
the possibility of it presumably to others but attacks wrong reason in 
his opponent, the defender of mankind. The fact that Rochester places 
himself in the superior category and dissociates himself from the 
onerous one may in part account for what is presumed to be the bitter-
ness of his statements here. But that he admits the possibility of 
right reason mitigates this tone somewhat. 
There are other suggestions that Rochester is not writing a satire 
17 Of Wisdom, trans. Samson Leonard (c. 1606; Amsterdam: Da Capo 
Press, 19ll), p. 108. 
18 Charron, p. 162. 
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on mankind of the harshest variety. In general, satires on mankind are 
uncompromising. Yet, Rochester admits of the possibility, however 
slight, of finding a paragon in one of the three professions he had 
listed. Griffin comments on this: 
Rochester clearly expects the conditions for his recantation to 
go unfulfilled, but we should recognize that the ostensible 
conditionality fits into the pattern of consistent refusal to 
make definitive moral statements without some subsequent qualifi-
cation, retraction, or partial contradiction.l9 
Furthermore, doubt, which is the only intelligent response to the 
universe in many satires on mankind, is depicted as a negative trait 
here (the misguided follower of reason "falls headlong down I Into 
doubt's boundless sea ••• "). Happiness and enjoyment are also 
possible in the world of the poem, provided pride in reason does not 
turn the individual into a wretch: "His wisdom did his happiness de-
stroy, I Aiming to know that world he should enjoy." In addition, 
Mother Nature is nurturing and provides what man requires. And we 
should remember that placing man in close propinquity to the beasts, as 
Rochester does in the concluding assertion, is not, within the frame of 
the poem, all that harsh a position for man, since animals have been 
depicted earlier in the poem as acting in accordance with the precepts 
of nature; and this, in Rochester's own definition, means that they 
live wisely. 
Thus, despite his harsh opening, Rochester seems to back off from 
that extreme position and sobers in his conclusion to an assertion that 
19 G "ff" r~ ~n, p. 241. 
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in spite of its pa~adoxical nature is not in fact radical at all. 
Having failed to confess his own culpability or his own participation 
in mankind, Rochester is unable to continue with his sweeping denuncia-
tions of mankind. As a result, his conclusion, while more logical than 
his opening, of necessity appears rather lame. He has, in essence, 
reduced the force of his attack. 
That readers have failed to note this is due, no doubt, to the 
notorious personal character of Rochester himself, to hyperactive, ever-
alert defense sensors which magnify any threat to the reader's self 
esteem, to a reaction to the harsh tone and hyperbole early in the poem, 
or simply to a lack of familiarity with the genre. Nonetheless, viewed 
within the range of other satires on man, from the context of like 
satires, Rochester's does not loom so darkly, does not seem so arro-
gantly misanthropic, so blasphemously passionate in its denunciation of 
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mankind as has been previously thought. 
These three poems, the eponymous satires on mankind by Boileau and 
Rochester plus Oldham's imitation, are lengthy verse satires, but 
satires on man come in assorted shapes and sizes. Not all satirists on 
mankind construct imaginary "logical" debates about the issues, nor 
expatiate to the extent that Boileau and Rochester do. A glance at 
several shorter examples of the type will allow us to see how the same 
spirit and the same basic charges against man are managed in miniature 
20 For an opposing view, note Griffin's final remarks on the poem, 
which, he says, will continue to be read for "its unbridled vehemence 
and energy, its unsettling pessimism about the possibilities for know-
ledge and virtue, its presentation of a mind unable to establish for 
itself a firm and secure place in the universe.(p. 245) 
form, to see how the satirist handles the self-imposed assignment of 
attacking the species in less space. The next four poems to be dis-
cussed are sonnets, but there are shorter verse forms, as well, of 
course, as prose satires on mankind of various lengths. We will be 
examining some of these in chapter three. 
In an article on Rochester, S.F. Crocker notes that "Striking 
expressions of the leading idea of the 'Satire on Mankind' are to be 
21 found in three extremely significant sonnets by Des Barreaux." 
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Jacques Vallee, Seigneur Des Barreaux (1599-1673) wrote satires on man-
kind of an emphatic sort, close in tone to that we have come to associ-
ate with Rochester. 
The first two sonnets Crocker refers to bear a relevant epigraph 
from Pliny, "Homine Nullum Animal Aut Miserius Aut Superbius."22 The 
first sonnet begins by pointing out some of the pleasant things man 
believes about himself. As numerous satirists on mankind have enjoyed 
pointing out, man likes to think he is the master of the world and of 
its creatures. Man's very appearance, he thinks, gives forth a burst 
of glory and dignity: 
Maistre sans contredit de ce globe habit~, 
Ayant assujetty toute autre creature, 
C'est l'Homme qui fait voir, en sa noble figure, 
Un pr~cieux eclat de gloire et dignite. 
But wait a minute, says Des Barreaux, let's not flatter ourselves. For 
21 
"Rochester's Satire Against Mankind," VJest Virginia University 
Philological Papers, 3 (1937), 71. 
22 Compared to man, no animal is either as wretched or as proud. 
Frederic Lachevre, Disciples et Successeurs de Theophile de Viau 
(Geneve: Slatkine Reprints, 1968), p. 243. 
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once, let's try to tell the truth about ourselves. What is this thing 
called man, this well-formed animal, this little king of all nature, 
this chef-d'oeuvre of God, made in his own image and possessed of 
reason? 
Hais ne nous flattens point et disons verite, 
Cet animal forme d'admirable structure, 
Ce petit Roytelet de toute la nature, 
Ce chef-d'oeuvre dernier de la Divinite, 
Que fait cet Homme ayant la raison pour partage, 
Et qui du Dieu vivant est la vivante image? 
The final four lines mark a significant change in tone. Des Barreaux 
forces man to confront some of the unpleasant physical facts of man's 
existence. These must be included in an overall picture of man, and 
they are generally left out of discussion of what man is. The tone is 
such that Des Barreaux seems to relish discomfiting his audience. He 
is aware, though, that he too falls into the category attacked, for he 
includes himself and his reader in the word "nous" in line five. Des 
Barreaux gladly fills in the missing parts in the composite picture of 
man: 
Toujours moucher, cracher, eternuer, tousser, 
Se lever, se coucher, dormir, manger et boire, 
Et puis rater, dormir, peter, chier, pisser: 
Oh! le brave animal que l'Homme, S voire, voire. 
Look at him, look at him, he repeats. See him as he is! Des Barreaux 
attacks any unduly optimistic or idealistic depictions of man. He 
satirizes man's pretensions to being such a glorious creation by 
balancing some of the positive things, rather undercutting them, by 
dramatic assertions of some of his more earthly traits. The attack on 
man's presumption, his anthropocentrism, his reason, his pride, by 
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calling forth his lower physical nature becomes a standard tactic for 
satires on mankind. Man's pride in spite of his wretchedness (as the 
epigraph here has announced) is a source of constant bewilderment to 
the satirist. 
The second sonnet, also from the 1667 collection, does not sur-
prise the reader by withholding its attack until the concluding sestet 
but lets him know immediately that man is being attacked: 
L'Homme a dit en son coeur sot et audacieux, 
Je suis maistre absolu de la terre habitable, 
Des plus fiers animaux je suis victorieux, 23 Et ma raison sur tous me rend consid~rable. 
Once again man proclaims himself master of the world, boasts of his 
conquest of even the fierce animals, and claims that his reason gives 
him preeminence. The reader, however, is certain that such assertions 
will not be allowed to stand. Man is not looking at himself very accu-
rately, is not seeing himself clearly. Des Barreaux is not so much 
interested in denying those traditional claims of, for example, man's 
mastery of the natural world and the rest of creation, as numerous 
satirists on man have done; rather, he insists that man be acutely aware 
of his ills and the negative things about him in-his overall estimation 
of himself. Generally, this involves reducing what the satirist sees 
as man's pride in either his physical or intellectual self or both. As 
in the first sonnet, Des Barreaux says, just look at yourself: 
Que pour te regarder tu prens de mauvais yeux, 
Animal fasteux autant que mis~rable! 
Connois les propres maux, et plus judicieux 
Ne te vante point tant d'estre si raisonnable. 
23 Lachevre, p. 244. 
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Be more judicious in your assessments of yourself; this is essentially 
what all satirists on mankind are asking. Know your ills, Des Barreaux 
says, and do not pride yourself on being so reasonable, for reason 
brings us numerous stresses and unhappy thoughts. Though Des Barreaux 
does not employ an animal comparison at this point, he easily could 
have, because the negative concomitants of reason that he lists here are 
often used by the satirists as part of man's lot which the other animals 
do not have to contend with. The rest of the animal kingdom are not 
bothered by the following "gifts" of reason: 
Le regret du passe, la peur de l'avenir, 
Le chagrin du pr~sent, penser qu'il faut finir, 
Qui nous livre en-vivant les assauts le plus rudes, 
Les crimes que commet le fer et le poison, 
Les larmes, les soupirs, et les inqui~tudes, 
Ce sent les beaux pr~sents que te fait la raison. 
Reason is nothing to be proud of, then, for it brings more ill than 
good. Reason is attacked further in the third sonnet Lachevre includes, 
the epigraph of which is "La Raison Fait Le Malheur De L'Homme." 
This third sonnet (1653), which antedates the other two, leaves 
no doubt what the subject is to be. Man's lot is not what it is reputed 
to be: 
Ce n'est qu'un vent furtif que le bien de nos jours, 
Qu'une fumee en l'air, un songe peu durable; 
Nostre vie est un rien, a un point comparable, 
Si nous considerons ce qui dure toujours.24 
The good in our lives is insignificant, smoke in the air, a dream which 
doesn't last. Our life is nothing and lasts but briefly, especially 
when considered sub specie aeternitatis. Furthermore, man adds to the 
24 Lachevre, p. 245. 
list of his miseries by manufacturing some of his own, in addition to 
those presumably built into the human condition by the creator. Man 
himself is responsible for many of his problems: 
L'Homme se rend encor luy mesme miserable, 
' Ce peu de temps duquel il abrege ses jours 
Par mille passions, par mille vains discours, 
Tant la sotte raison le rend irraisonnable. 
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Again reason is denigrated; paradoxically, it renders man unreasonable. 
The final six lines reveal a change in tactics from the more 
direct attack on man. Des Barreaux employs the traditional animal com-
parison: 
Plus heureuses cent fois sont les bestes sauvages, 
Cent fois sont plus heureux les oyscaux aux bocages 
Qui vivent pour le moins leur age doucement. 
Better to have been born one of these savage beasts or birds, who sur-
vive quite well without discourse and reason: 
Ha! que naistre comme eux ne nous fait la Nature, 
Sans discours ny raison, vivant a l'avanture, 
Nostre mal ne nous vient que de l'entendement. 
All our ills, all the bad that happens to us (or at least that part for 
which we are responsible) come to us from the understanding. Our one 
major attribute, which we boast about as our distinguishing trait that 
elevates us over the rest of creation, brings us nothing but pain and 
discomfort. 
Lachevre located a sonnet by Saint-Evremond similar to the one by 
Des Barreaux just discussed: "Ce sonnet est ~ rapprocher de celui de 
Saint-Evremond, Ce dernier est moins brutal que Des Barreaux, rnais ce 
25 
n'est qu'une nuance." Saint-Evremond's sonnet addresses Nature 
directly, points out the insufficiency of man's middle state, and makes 
25 Lachevre, p. 330. 
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a request for either of two possible ways to ameliorate man's problems. 
First he asks Nature why man's state is such as it is: 
Nature, enseigne-moi par quel bizarre effort, 
Notre ame hors de nous est quelquefois ravie? 
Dis-nous comme a nos corps elle-m~me asservie 
S'agite, s'assoupit, se reveille, s'endort. 
In the second stanza Saint-Evremond introduces a comparison with ani-
mals. Even the least or lowest animals are happier in their lot than 
man: 
Les moindres animaux, plus heureux dans leur sort, 
Vivent innocemment sans crainte et sar.s envie; 
Exempts de mille soins qui traversent la vie, 
Et de mille frayeurs que nous donne la mort. 
Animals are not subject to the passions and cares which plague mankind. 
Man, on the other hand, occupies a middling and unenviable position. 
He has too little wisdom and intelligence to achieve the clarity of 
insight that the angels possess but yet has too much mental turmoil to 
enjoy life as animals do. Saint-Evremond's depiction of the pastoral 
life of the animals is not accurate, but the reader is not expected to 
pay any attention to real animals since the assertions are presented 
only for their impact on man. 
As Des Barreaux wanted man to see himself clearly and exactly as 
he is, so Saint-Evremond displays an interest in man knowing himself and 
what is good and bad for him: 
Un melange incertain d'esprit et de mati~re, 
Nous fait vivre avec trop, ou trop peu de lumiere, 
Pour savoir justement et nos biens et nos maux. 
Saint-Evremond requests, essentially, a change in man's position in the 
great chain of being. He pictures man in an untenable middle state and 
asks of Nature a transfer either up or down on the scale. Either is 
preferable to the current position of mankind: 
Change l'etat douteux dans lequel tu nous ranges, 
~1' ' ; Nature, e eve-nous a la clarte des Anges, 
Ou nous abaisse au sens des simples animaux. 
such is the unsatisfactory nature of man, then, according to Saint-
Evremond. 
Samuel Butler also engaged in a direct attack on mankind in 
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"Satire upon the Weakness and Misery of Man." In this poem man is 
evil almost by instinct: 
Our universal Inclination 
Tends to the worst of our Creation, 
As if the Stars conspir'd t' imprint 
In our whole Species, by Instinct, 
A fatal Brand, and Signature 
Of nothing else, but the Impure. 
Man seems to be constituted "Of nothing else, but the Impure." 
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Butler does not compare man to animals; man is instead compared to 
earlier man: 
So, being born and bred up near 
Our earthy gross Relations here, 
Far from the ancient nobler Place 
Of all our high paternal Race, 
We now degenerate, and grow 
As barbarous, and mean, and low, 
As modern Grecians are, and worse, 
To their brave nobler Ancestors. 
Yet, as no Barbarousness beside 
Is half so barbarous as Pride, 
Nor any prouder Insolence 
Than that, which has the least Pretence, 
He are so wretched, to profess 
A Glory in our Wretchedness. 
The offense is, again, pride. Butler, though, is not attacking all men 
26 Satires and Miscellaneous Poetrv and Prose, ed. Rene Lamar 
(Cambridge: University Press, 1928), pp. 34-39. All citations are to 
this edition. Butler's Hudibras is discussed in chapter four of_ my 
study here. 
34 
of all times. Here he is addressing his contemporary audience, the men 
of his own times, though he does move on to attack the species in later 
passages. 
Man, Butler asserts, is himself responsible for his degenerate 
state. Man performs atrocities upon and infects his own kind: 
All this is nothing to the Evils, 
Which Men, and their confed'rate Devils 
Inflict, to aggravate the Curse 
On their own hated Kind, much worse; 
As if by Nature th' had been serv'd 
More gently, than their Fate deserv'd, 
Take pains (in Justice) to invent, 
And study their own Punishment; 
That, as their Crimes should greater grow, 
So might their own Inflictions too. 
Hence bloody Wars at first began, 
The artificial Plague of Man, 
That from his own Invention rise, 
To scourge his own Iniquities • 
• Man has only himself to blame for war; it was his own invention and not 
foisted on him from above. But man is obstinately perverse and destroys 
even those gifts that are given to him: 
• • • there is no good, 
Kind Nature ere on Man bestow' d,, 
But he can easily divert 
To his own Uisery and Hurt. 
Han converts law and equity and wealth, things which should be good in 
themselves, into plagues--and even misuses what should be his chief 
treasure, his mind: 
On hypothetic Dreams and Visions 
Grounds everlasting Disquisitions., 
And raises endless Controversies 
On vulgar Theorems and Hearsays. 
This misuse of his mind is also a charge that recurs continually in 
satires on mankind. 
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The verse satires surveyed here, even though some do not label 
themselves as such, are all examples of the satire on mankind. They 
form a basis or core of satires on mankind. This brief survey has shown 
some of the range of materials verse satires on mankind employ as well 
as some variety in tone and strategy. The reader should now have 
several examples of the genre firmly in mind. In chapter three when I 
elaborate on the strategies employed by such satires, I will naturally 
be providing additional examples, which will also give some indication 
of the chronological range of satires on mankind. 
What are some of the properties or ingredients which may be dis-
tilled from this abbreviated survey of satires on mankind? Not all of 
the following are essential characteristics, but all occur with some 
frequency in that particular kind of satire: 
1. first of all, a definite indicator of some sort that, in fact, 
all mankind is being referred to: such indicators may be the words 
"mankind" and "man" or, in French, "l'homme" used generically. The word 
"all" in front of such terms as "human beings" or "earthlings" is yet 
another indicator, as are the words "everyone" and "species." The 
object of attack is a trait or characteristic common to all men and 
therefore not a foible, abuse or corruption that might distinguish a 
good man from a bad one. The object is instead a defining characteris-
tic that distinguishes one species from another. The same expansive 
effect may be reinforced by a panoramic statement of a variety similar 
to Dr. Johnson's "Let observation with extensive view I Survey mankind 
from China to Peru" or Oldham's "Throughout the globe from London to 
Japan. II The use of characters representative of various ranks, 
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positions, races, and countries may contribute to the impression that 
all humans are being referred to. The teeming satiric scene, so well 
27 described by Kernan, may do the same. Finally, the use of the inclu-
sive pronouns listed below under 2 and 3 may be indications that the 
species, homo sapiens, is itself being attacked. 
2. an attack on the reader: in Boileau a particular reader is 
attacked first, but all readers are presumed human and duly designated 
by the term "mankind" and are consequently victims of the satire. 28 
This may be apparent immediately from the start (as in Boileau), it may 
be introduced later, or the satirist may leave it to dawn on the reader 
that he, too, is a part of the offending category. The satirist on 
mankind may occasionally resort to use of the pronoun "you" to implicate 
the reader, but "you" makes it appear as if he is dissociating himself 
from the human race, which seldom occurs in satires on mankind. 
3. the attacker himself incriminated: if he is attacking all man-
kind, the satirist must concede, whether overtly or not, that he too is 
27 
"The scene of satire is always disorderly and crowded, packed 
to the very point of bursting. The deformed faces of depravity, stu-
pidity, greed, venality, ignorance, and maliciousness group closely 
together for a moment ••.• " Alvin Kernan, The Cankered Muse: Satire 
of the English Renaissance (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959), 
p. 7. 
28 Ralph W. Rader makes this point in connection with Book Four of 
Gulliver's Travels: " ••. Swift seeks to vex and not at all to divert 
the reader by making him at once the witness and (through his participa-
tion in human nature) the object of attack •••• " "The Concept of 
Genre and Eighteenth-Century Studies," in New Approaches!£_ Eighteenth-
Century Literature, ed. Phillip Harth (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1974), p. 104. 
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guilty of whatever he charges men to be guilty of. The satirist on man 
often acknowledges this by use of the pronouns "we" and "us." That he 
often candidly admits his culpability places him on a level with the 
readers he has attacked and, hence, undercuts their natural response of 
"who in the hell does he think he is?" Occasionally, the satirist on 
mankind will assume a more Juvenalian pose and exult in the fact that he 
(and perhaps a few perspicacious friends) are aware of those unpleasant 
truths and are thus slightly superior to those who are not possessed of 
such knowledge. Nonetheless, these knowledgeable few are still incrimi-
nated if, in fact, the work is a satire on mankind. 
Numbers 1 through 3 here constitute a distinction between satire on 
mankind and other kinds of satire, and display a unique arrangement of 
a literary author-work-reader complex, ~ot just for satire but for any 
literary production. As I shall be arguing later, satirists on mankind 
are generally not reluctant to give clear indications that the focus 
of their attack is upon mankind itself. Swift and others were well 
aware that general satire is easy to deflect towards one's neighbors. 
The satirist on man with his blanket attack on the species does not 
29 
allow his uneasy readers so easy an escape. 
In addition, satires on mankind direct certain specific kinds of 
charges at mankind. Likewise, they refrain from making some charges. 
Satirists on mankind, for example, seldom if ever accuse mankind of 
29 Tuveson, however, writes that "readers of the 'satires on man' 
could accept the rhetorical strictures without feeling much personal 
uneasiness." (p. 78) I will be examining the place of the reader in 
more detail in chapter two. 
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being liars--that might be too easy for men to dismiss by merely saying 
that the poet himself is consequently a liar by his own admission. 
4. an attack on man's pride: his egocentrism or anthropocen-
trism, his feeling that the universe and all its resources and crea-
tures were created solely for him. Man is the king, the magistrate, of 
all nature, or so he thinks. That such a perception is being made by 
humans who are not disinterested judges in this case must not be for-
gotten. 
5. an attack of man's pride in Reason, that quality man had used 
to define himself, to set himself off from other creatures. When in 
satires on mankind reason is allowed man at all, it is generally "wrong" 
reason or used as a further indictment against him. Since he has reason 
to assist him; there is even less excuse for all his sins and follies. 
Furthermore, man's slight intellectual capacities make him presumptuous. 
With his inordinate pride and his puny intellect, man will presume to 
scan the skies and measure even the creator himself. 
6. a list of various and sundry accusations, perhaps a catalogue 
or, at the very least, a series of other charges: these will differ 
slightly from satirist to satirist. Boileau, for example, says that 
men do not possess true wisdom, that they vacillate and don't know what 
they do or do not want, and are subject to a host of passions they can 
not control, such as ambition, love, greed, and hate. These charges 
may or may not be revealed through animal comparisons. 
Just as satires on mankind launch certain charges, so do they employ 
certain specific kinds of strategies, ways of embodying these charges. 
7. an outside observer providing an "objective" perspective: at 
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the end of Boileau's Eighth satire, a reputedly stupid animal berates 
man. Since, to get an impartial observer, it is necessary to go beyond 
the immediate country (men and women of all countries being the victims) 
and kind, the impartial observer is often an animal or insect (the less 
valued by mankind the better to "get at" him) or a visitor from another 
planet. These strategies will be discussed in detail in chapter three. 
8. animal comparison: Boas's term, theriophily, may not.be an 
apt one considering the attitudes of the satirists. The satirist on 
mankind is often indifferent to animals, at least in his literary pro-
ductions. Animals are included only for the reflections they may be 
able to cast on the victims of the satire, that is, on humankind. In 
fact, sometimes the animals are denigrated first and then man is 
asserted to be the same as or appreciably worse than they. Therefore, 
the term animal comparison (comparison, of course, being understood to 
include contrast as well) might be more accurate. At any rate, the 
single most important assertion under this heading would be that man is 
the only animal that preys on his own kind. (This, by the way, is not 
zoologically true, but since, as I have claimed, satirists on mankind 
are not as much interested in animals as in hurting man, this assertion 
gets used repeatedly.) 
9. an equation that man=beast: this often includes ironies or 
paradoxes, such as "man is more brutal than the brutes" or "brutes are 
more humane than humans." This equation is, of course, related to 
number 8 in subject matter, but this play with language constitutes, I 
think, a separate but minor thread all its own. Wycherley and Mark 
Twain, among a host of others, make use of this. 
In addition, satires on mankind employ specific kinds of imagery. 
10. images of diminishment: satires on mankind naturally share 
with other kinds of satire the use of imagery to debase its objects. 
Man is thus often depicted as merely a bubble, a wisp of wind, a 
bladder, a little king, a mite, a reed, an ass, and so on. 
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Not all ten of these characteristics are to be found in every 
satire on mankind, but they all do appear regularly in that particular 
kind of satire. I will not be attempting to place the charges or ideas 
embodied in satires on mankind within a religious or philosophical 
context (the reader is referred to the excellent studies by A.O. Love-
joy, Griffin and others for that) but merely to demonstrate their use 
as materials in satires on mankind, that is, in their appearance and 
manipulation in a literary work. We need now to consider further the 
nature of these literary productions which embody the characteristics 
I have just elaborated. 
CHAPTER II 
THE NATURE OF THE BEAST 
We need to inquire further into the nature of the literary works 
embodying the characteristics enumerated in the last chapter. What 
exactly are they, and what do they seem to be doing? 
Satires on mankind are first of all, I am claiming, satire. As 
I noted in my preface, no attempt at defining satire has proven satis-
factory. When we use the word "satire," we are employing a word which 
has had numerous significations throughout its history. A survey of 
some of its definitions from its first appearance in English to the end 
of the eighteenth century will bear this out. Some of these definitions 
specify the verse form, while others designate the proper objects of 
the satire. Later definitions will point to the various components of 
satire. 
Alvin Kernan cites Barclay's statement in The Ship of Fools (1509) 
that 'This present Boke myght have been callyd nat inconvenyently the 
Satyr (that is to say) the reprehencion of foulysshnes,' and remarks, 
"Here, then, at the beginning of the century we have the relatively 
simple view which equates satire with any attack on foolishness."1 
Kernan adds that Thomas Langley's 1570 definition is typical for the 
times: 
1 The Cankered Muse: Satire of the English Renaissance (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1959), p. 54. 
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A satire is a Poesie~ rebuking vices sharpely, not regarding anye 
persones. LI~/ is very railing, onely ordained to rebuke 
vice. • • • The Satires had their name of uplandyshe Goddes, 
that were rude, lassivious and wanton of behavior.2 
Kernan summarizes the typical Elizabethan definition of satire: 
The Elizabethan definition of satire as it appears in formal 
pronouncements amounts to little more than, 'a poem in which the 
author playing the part of the satyr attacks vice in the crude, 
elliptic, harsh language which befits his assumed character and 
his low subject matter.' Decorum is the guiding principle, and 
the definition turns on the connection of satyr with satire.3 
Puttenham, in The Arte of English Poesie (1589), echoes the belief that 
the satirist is related to the mythical satyr and adds that vicious men 
as well as vice are the proper objects of satire: 
And the first and most bitter invective against vice and vicious 
men was the Satyre: which to th'intent their bitternesse should 
breede none ill will • • • they made wise as if the gods of the 
woods, whom they called Satyres or Silvanes, shou~d appeare and 
recite those verses of rebuke •••• 4 
A brief 1604 definition merely calls satire "a nipping and scoffing 
verse."
5 A year later, Casaubon, as Howard Weinbrot notes, was calling 
attention to two different types of satire: 
Isaac Casaubon's famous De Satyrica Graecorum poesi, ~ Romanorum 
satira (Paris, 1605), includes a long discussion of Horace's two 
different kinds of satire. Some satires, he says, are critical 
and written 'for marking, laughing at and sharply criticizing men 
filled with vice.'; others, however, are didactic and hope 
chiefly 'to teach virtue and to inspire love of it. '6 
2 Kernan, p. 55. 
3 Kernan, p. 62. 
4 Elizabethan Critical Essays, ed. G. Gregory Smith (Oxford: 
University Press, 1904), II, 32. 
5 Robert Cawdrey, A Table Alphabetical of Hard Usual English Words, 
ed. Robert A. Peters (1604; Gainesville, Florida: Scholars' Facsimiles 
& Reprints, 1966). 
6 The Formal Strain: Studies in Augustan Imitation and Satire 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), pp. 129-30. 
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Dryden, as we.will see, will call for "modern" satire to fulfill both of 
these functions in the same literary work. A 1670 dictionary of "hard 
words" also distinguishes two kinds of satire: 
Satyre (satyra) a kind of Poetry, whereof there seems to have 
been two kinds; the one more ancient, which consisted only in 
variety of Verses; the other more modern, containing an open 
reprehension of mens Vices, without respect of persons.? 
A distinction is made between satire and lampoon. This same dictionary 
calls the lampoon "a libel in verse." Eighty-five years later Dr. 
Johnson will still be making the same distinction. In 1676 Coles 
defines satire as simply "an invective poem," while "invective" is 
defined as "a railing, reproaching biting and bitter speech."8 
In A Discourse Concerning the Original and Progress of Satire 
(1693) Dryden, following Casaubon's lead, denounces the false etymologi-
9 
cal connection between satire and satyr. And he explains the correct 
derivation of the word: 
Satura ••• is an adjective, and relates to the word lanx, which 
is understood; and this lanx, in English a charger, or large 
platter, was yearly filled with all sorts of fruits, which were 
offered to the gods at their festivals.lO 
He conjectures that we call the works of Ennius, Lucilius, and Horace 
satires, "because they are full of various matters, and are also written 
7 Thomas Blount, Glossographia: ~ ~ Dictionary of Hard Words 
(London: 1670). 
8 Elisha Coles, An English Dictionary ••• (London: 1676). 
9 Essays of John Dryden, ed. W.P. Ker (New York: Russell & 
Russell, 1961), II, 45. 
10 Dryden, p. 54. 
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on various subjects." 
Dryden observes, then, that the general meaning of the word 
"satire" is broad: "If we take Satire in the general signification of 
the word, as it is used in all modern languages, for an invective, it 
is certain that it is almost as old as verse. .,12 He discusses 
this general meaning in greater detail later: 
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the word satire is of a more general signification in Latin than 
in French, or English. For amongst the Romans it >vas not only 
used for those discourses which decried vice, or exposed folly, 
but for others also, where virtue was recommended. But in our 
modern languages we apply it only to invective poems, where the 
very name of Satire is formidable to those persons who would 
appear to the world what they are not in themselves; for in 
English, to say satire, is to mean reflection, as we use that 
word in the worst sense; or as the French call it, more properly, 
medisance.l3 
Dryden alone gives us ample justification for allowing wide leeway in 
our usage of the word "satire," for avoiding too narrow a conception of 
it. He does have, however, his own prescription for modern satire. 
Dryden believes that satire is a natural product of all civiliza-
tions, so that we need not be overly concerned about its early history 
or >vhere it first emerged, for "scoffs and revilings are of the growth 
of all nations."14 Thus, in time, satire would spring up everywhere. 
As he says of Roman satire, "which sort of poem, though we had not 
11 Dryden, 55. p. 
12 Dryden, 44. p. 
13 Dryden, 67. p. 
14 Dryden, 45. p. 
derived from Rome, yet nature teaches it mankind in all ages, and in 
15 
every country." 
45 
Kernan sununarizes Dryden's position: "The historical movement of 
satire is, then, from crude scoffs and revilings to polished literary 
forms which have as their distinguishing marks the qualities of 'wit 
and morality.'"16 Casaubon had said that moral doctrine and urbanity 
or wit are the two things which make up Roman satire. Dryden comments, 
"but of the two, that which is most essential to this poem, and is, as 
it were, the very soul which animates it, is the scourging of vice, and 
exhortation to virtue."17 
For Dryden, satire ultimately has a high purpose, a high mission. 
"Satire is of the nature of moral philosophy, as being instructive ..... "18 
19 Horeover, "satire is undoubtedly a species of heroic poetry." A 
satire should be unified, and "The poet is bound, and that ~officio, 
to give his reader some one precept of moral virtue, and to caution him 
against some one particular vice or folly."20 Other virtues and vices 
may be mentioned, "But he is chiefly to inculcate one virtue, and insist 
21 
on that." This is Dryden's basic stipulation as to what modern satire 
15 Dryden, p. 100. 
16 Alvin B. Kernan, The Plot of Satire (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1965), p. 7. 
17 Dryden, p. 75. 
18 Dryden, p. 75. 
19 Dryden, 108. p. 
20 Dryden, 104. p. 
21 Dryden, 104. p. 
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should be doing. We need to remember that it is not a description of 
what satire has been doing consistently but Dryden's prescription. He 
adds later, "Of the best and finest manner of Satire ••• 'tis that 
22 
sharp, well-mannered way of laughing a folly out of countenance •••• " 
Jeremy Collier laments the way his contemporaries use the word: 
Satyr amongst the Latins, is, in a large sense, applicable to all 
Discourses that recommend Vertue, and explode Vice: But the Word, 
as it is now commonly used with us, only signifies a stinging 
piece of Poetry, to lash and expose the Vices of Men.23 
The verse satire, at least, was thus perceived for an extended period of 
time to be a poem which should both attack and praise. Howard Weinbrot 
says of this blame-praise pattern: 
We have seen, then, that the concept of. formal verse satire 
as incorporating attack upon a particular vice and praise of its 
opposite virtue was well-known at least from the publication of 
Dacier's essay on satire (1687) to the final volume of Warton's 
History of English Poetry (1781).24 
Shortly after 1700 Tom Brown reiterates the same belief, "Satyr is de-
signed to expose Vice and encourage Vertue. In actual prac-
tice, some verse satires adhere to this principle, and others do not. 
A 1702 dictionary maintains simply that satire is "a Kind of 
26 Poetry sharply inveighing against vice and vicious persons." 
22 Dryden, 105. p. 
23 Weinbrot, 61. p. 
24 Weinbrot, 74. p. 
25 Quoted in Paul J. Korshin, From Concord to Dissent (Menston, 
England: The Scolar Press, 1973), p. 146. 
26 J.K., A New English Dictionary; Or, a Compleat Collection of 
the Most Proper and Significant Words ••• (London: 1702). 
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The sixth edition of The New World of Words • • • (1706) defines it as 
"a Word that signifies all manner of Discourse, wherein any Person is 
reprov'd; but commonly taken for a Poem, that sharply and wittily re-
bukes Vice, and reflects upon the vicious; a Lampoon." 27 B.N. Defoe's 
1735 definition seems derived from these last two: "a kind of Poetry, 
sharply inveighing against Vice and vicious Persons, a Lampoon; also all 
28 
manner of Discourse wherein any Person is sharply reproved." The 
thirteenth edition of An Universal Etymological English Dictionary. 
(1749) furnishes exactly the same definition. 29 The lampoon had 
generally been distinguished from satire but here they are equated. 
In 1744 Corbyn Morris differentiated among raillery, satire, and 
ridicule: 
Hence the Aim of Raillery, is to please you, by some little 
Embarrassment of a Person; Of Satire, to scourge Vice, and to 
deliver it up to your just Detestation; And of Ridicule, to set 
an Object in a mean and ludicrous Light, so as to expose it to 
your Derision and Contempt.30 
Of the three, satire has the most serious mission, for "Raillery, is a 
genteel poignant Attack of slight Foibles and Oddities; Satire a witty 
27 Edward Phillips, The New 1-Jorld of Hords: Or Universal English 
Dictionary • • • 6th ed. (LondOU: 1706) . 
28 ~Compleat English Dictionary (Westminster: 1735). 
29 N. Bailey, An Universal Etymological English Dictionary 
13th ed. (London: 1749). 
30 Corbyn Morris, An Essav towards Fixing the True Standards of 
Wit, Humour, Raillery, s;tire, and Ridicule (1744), Series one, No.~ 
(The Augustan Reprint Society, 19471, p. 37. 
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and severe Attack of mischievous Habits and Vices.-"31 If raillery goes 
toe far, it will end up being malicious and rude, "But Satire, the more 
deep and severe the Sting of it is, will be the more excellent; Its 
intention being entirely to root out and destroy the Vice."32 Ridicule, 
on the other hand, 
is justly employ'd, not upon the Vices, but the Foibles or Mean-
nesses of Persons, And also upon the Improprieties of other Sub-
jects. • • • It being evident that Immoralities and Vice are too 
detestable for Ridicule, and are therefore properly the Subject 
of Satire; Whereas Foibles and Meannesses are too harmless for 
Satire, and deserve only to be treated with Ridicule.33 
In 1790 Thomas Sheridan still defines "satire" as "A poem in 
34 
which wickedness or folly are censured." In 1791 Walker provides the 
same exact definition, still insisting upon the verse form and the same 
b . 35 su Jects. 
These various definitions, spanning almost three hundred years, 
show considerable variety. Some allow for prose forms, while others 
would restrict the word to poetry. Some allow for personal satire; 
some do not. The first definition of the OED bears in on these issues: 
A poem, or in modern use sometimes a prose composition, in which 
prevailing vices or follies are held up to ridicule. Sometimes, 
less correctly, applied to a composition in verse or prose in-
tended to ridicule a particular person or class of persons, a 
lampoon. 
31 Morris, p. '50. 
32 Morris, p. 50. 
33 Morris, pp. 52-3. 
34 A Complete Dictionary of the English Language •.• 3rd ed. 
(London: 1790), II. 
35 John Walker, ~Critical Pronouncing Dictionary, ed. R.C. 
Alston (1791; Henston, England: The Scolar Press, 1968). 
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The NED notes that "satire" entered the English language in 1509, and 
that its meanings have steadily multiplied since then: "Not only have 
the ways in which we use it increased, but the kurion onoma or soul of 
the word has shown a progressive change from a specific, narrow meaning 
to an abstract, broad one." In the twentieth century the word signifies, 
according to the NED, formal verse satire, any verse with satiric in-
tent, a formal genre (either verse or prose) possessing uniform charac-
teristics, or not a formal genre but something "identifiable by its 
motive and spirit alone." 
The variety of all these definitions we have just surveyed, even 
without reference to the variegated mass of works which they purport to 
describe, suggests the complexity of the word. This variety may also 
illustrate the mixed platter, the jumble, or the richness of the prov-
ince which is satire. One may attempt to classify or define that medley 
known as satire from any of a number of angles, probably no one of 
which is quite sufficient alone. I will be discussing shortly, as my 
angle of approach, classification by the number of victims. Given 
satire's etymology, given the various forms it takes, its various 
victims and the multifarious methods of practicing satirists, "satire" 
is certainly a large and flexible enough entity to subsume or contain 
satires on mankind. I am claiming that the satire on mankind is 
legitimately one portion of this diffuse literary cluster. As a start-
ing point we need to search for any similarities among these various 
definitions or among the various kinds of satire. 
The common denominator of the various definitions of "satire" 
is, as has often been noted, attack. Alvin B. Kernan, for example, 
writes, 
Satire has been identified in many different ways, but it 
seems to me that literary tradition has selected and called 
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satire only those works which have as their primary and consistent 
motive an attack upon someone or something. In short, aggression 
lies at the heart of satire.36 
Satire is one kind of verbal aggression. It is a verbal mode of ex-
pressing disaffection with an idea, a person, a group, and pushed to 
its extreme, with everything. It differs from such nonverbal expres-
sions as the punch in the mouth, the burning of books, the bombing of 
nations or the destruction of the world via whatever technological 
means are available at a given time. Satire, at times, is the verbal 
equivalent of, or substitution for, a physical act which may range from 
a playful nudge to an all-out physical attack. We need to remember the 
physical bases in the etymologies of "insult," "sarcasm," and "excor-
iate." Lucilius defined his poems as facta saeva or "savage actions."37 
And Meredith called the laughter of satire "a blow in the back or the 
face."38 But, as I said, satire may be a substitution for physical 
' 
attack. In a most apposite and suggestive essay, Kernan writes, 
The art of satire, I would now like to suggest, might 
profitably, or at least interestingly, be approached as one in-
stance of the way in which man has learned to control aggression 
and manage it to useful ends. There are a number of points at 
which that art is remarkably similar to the aggression-inhibiting 
and -controlling devices of the animal world.39 
36 Alvin B. Kernan, "Aggression and Satire: Art Considered as a 
Form of Biological Adaptation" in Literary Theory and Structure, ed. 
Frank Brady~ al. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), p. 117. 
37 Ulrich Knoche, Roman Satire, trans., Edwin S. Ramage (Bloom-
ington: Indiana University Press, 1975), p. 42. 
38
ceorge Heredith, "An Essay on Comedy" in Comedy, ed. Hylie 
Sypher (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Anchor, 1956), p. 47. 
39 Kernan, "Aggression," p. 121. 
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Kernan cites a remark made by Anna Freud: "My father said that the first 
man to use abusive words instead of his fists was the founder of civili-
. ,.40 zat~on. Despite its sometimes unsavory associations and the negativ-
ity surrounding it, the attack of satire, then, may be a civilized 
response to the ways of the world. I would add that although it may 
sometimes lead to physical retaliation, it does not invite such as a 
response. In this way it differs from the direct curse or namecalling 
which is most often an invitation to escalate a confrontation from the 
verbal to the physical level. 
Nonetheless, satire is a weapon, its bullets words, which, de-
spite the childish "sticks and stones" incantation, can and do hurt. 
What has happened immediately prior to the iteration of "sticks and 
stones," of course, is that one has been injured with words. Like 
• 
handguns, satire is accessible to all and can be used for any purpose. 
It can be fired in any direction. It is so versatile a weapon that it 
can not only fire single shots and be put on autoroAtic for general 
massacre but it may attempt to blow up the entire world and even the 
heavens. 
The direction of satire is not determined for the satirist. It 
may serve any cause. It is not solely or even necessarily conservative, 
as some critics used to claim. To this extent satire is neutral; words 
as weapons may be employed by anyone for any purpose or cause. The 
satirist charges it, deploys it, As Kernan has written, "Theoretically, 
there is no reason why satirists cannot attack any person, attitude, or 
40 Kernan, "Aggression," p. 128. 
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way of life which happens. to amuse or displease them. The range of 
1 . h. l . 1141 actua sat~re supports t ~s cone us~on. 
As a verbal means of displaying aggression, then, satire's object 
is to injure, maim, destroy, or merely fire the warning shot (as a 
deterrent to the perpetrator or as an alarm to innocent citizenry, 
should there be any). The satirist's motives may or may not be honor-
able. Though satire shares the similarities noted above with the world 
of action, it is instead a literary activity. As such it may be in-
dulged in for any of a host of reasons. It may occasionally just be 
sour grapes. The satirist may merely be venting his mortido. He may be 
taking inordinate joy in distressing others. But, as with most other 
literary constructions, the author's motives may not be relevant at all 
to the reader. I have maintained that ·satire is purposive, but whether 
the motives that called it into being are discreditable or unsavory is, 
as far as I am concerned, beside the point. I am interested here in 
the literary product. 
Satire differs from other verbal disapprobation in that it is a 
literary construct rather than, for example, straight philosophical 
prose, although its concerns may be philosophical. As a literary con-
struct, it involves writer, narrator (or character propounding the 
satire), the satiric victim or victims, and reader or audience. In 
addition, various literary traditions and conventions come into play. 
The satirist may use, misuse, adapt, reject, or diverge from these as 
he pleases. Edward W. Rosenheim has refused to concede that satires on 
mankind belong under the generic heading of satire. He asserts that 
41 Kernan, Plot, p. 21. 
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"the essence of the satiric procedure is attack, and the attack launched 
impartially against everyone is no attack at all."42 In addition, these 
satires on mankind can be distinguished from satire by their ultimate 
effect, "which is basically didactic--and, in fact, philosophic. For 
they consider, albeit unfavorably, the timeless nature of man and his 
ld ,A3 wor • Finally, he adds, 
to consider universal propositions, in whatever light, is not 
mere 'attack,' but, if it is to be effective, philosophic inquiry. 
A true 'satire against mankind'--on the assumption that it tran-
scends particular men or groups of men yet strives to speak the 
truth--would lie beyond our definition of satire.44 
But as literary constructs and part of a literary tradition although a 
minor one, satires on mankind involve the audience in a way that is 
different from reading a philosophical tract. Moreover, satires on man 
are no more compelled "to speak the truth" than other types of satire 
or, for that matter, other types of literature. Distortion, exaggera-
tion, and slanting have long been employed by satirists of all kinds. 
Satirizing mankind is a distinct, purposive literary activity. 
The satire on mankind is a kind, or perhaps petit genre or subtype, of 
satire. In isolating satire on mankind for study, one arrives at what 
is basically a tri-partite classification of satire based on the number 
of victims. Thus, in using this angle of approach to the subject, one 
finds particular or personal satire, general satire, and satire on 
mankind. 
42 Edward w. Rosenheim, Jr., Swift and the Satirist's Art (Chi-
cago: University of Chicago Press, 1963),~ 29. 
43 Rosenheim, p. 30. 
44 Rosenheim, p. 30. 
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The word "satire" is and has been used to describe satire that is 
aimed at a particular person or idea or group of ideas, satire that is 
aimed at many people (all men, e.g., who wear maroon slacks, white 
belt, and white shoes--in the U.S. the figure could be hundreds or 
thousands, even hundreds of thousands, but certainly not all), and, 
finally, satire that satirizes all mankind. The first of these is 
personal or particular satire; the second, general satire; and the last, 
the type we are most concerned with here. 
Particular or personal satire is directed at specific identifiable 
objects, Richard M. Nixon or the John Birch Society, for example. Par-
ticular or personal satire names names. The most forceful elucidation 
of particular satire is that by Edward W. Rosenheim. His working defi-
nition of satire, wrought for an investigation of the works of Swift, 
is as follows: 
All satire is not only an attack; it is an attack upon discerni-
ble, historically authentic particulars. The 'dupes' or victims 
of punitive satire are not mere fictions. They, or the objects 
which they represent, must be, or have been plainly existent in 
the world of reality; they must, that is, possess genuine historic 
identity. The reader must be capable of pointing to the world of 
reality, past or present, and identifying the individual or 
group, institution, custom, belief, or idea which is under attack 
by the satirist.45 
Restated a few pages later, his definition looks like this: "satire 
consists of an attack EY means of ~ manifest fiction upon discernible 
historic particulars."46 Such a definition would seem to militate 
against or even preclude satires on mankind, and we have already noted 
45 Rosenheim, p. 25. 
46 Rosenheim, p. 31. 
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some of his remarks on that type. For now, Bertrand Goldgar's response 
to this will suffice: 
Without questioning his definition of satire, which is intended 
as a critical tool rather than as historical description, I think 
it worth recalling that attacks on human nature or the human 
species as such were thought in Swift's day to be well within the 
satiric genre.47 
In fairness to Rosenheim, we must remember that he is dealing with 
Swift and that Swift had spoken out against satire that indicts all, as 
a couple of well-known passages from A Tale of ~ Tub demonstrate: 
But Satyr being levelled at all, is never resented for an offence 
by any, since every individual Person makes bold to understand it 
of others, and very wisely removes his particular Part of the 
Burthen upon the shoulders of the tvorld, which are broad enough, 
and able to bear it.48 
And again referring to this kind of satire, Swift writes: "'Tis but a 
Ball bandied to and fro, and every Man carries a Racket about Him to 
49 
strike it from himself among the rest of the Company." Nonetheless, 
as we will see, this did not prevent Swift from writing satire on man-
kind occasionally. It also seems to me that these quotes from Swift 
are even more applicable to Addison's general satire than to the satire 
on mankind. For the victim, it is much easier to exclude oneself from 
a portion of "at least a Thousand," than it is to exclude oneself from 
mankind. 
47 
"Satires on J:.1an and 'The Dignity of Human Nature,'" P~1LA, 80 
(1965)' 535. 
48 Jonathan Swift: Selected Prose and Poetry, ed. Edward W. 
Rosenheim, Jr. (San Francisco: Rinehart Press, 1959), p. 41. 
49 s "f Wl. t, p. 42. 
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At any rate, a strong backlash developed against personal attacks 
upon individuals. Lashing the vice but sparing the name became the 
decent, humane thing to do. Strong sentiments supporting this approach 
were voiced in the Spectator. The Spectator, in essence, is advocating 
general satire: In #16, for example, Addison maintains that he is 
against attacks upon individual persons: 
If I attack the Vicious, I shall only set upon them in a Body; 
and will not be provoked by the worst Usage I can receive from 
others, to make an Example of any particular Criminal. In short, 
I have so much of a Drawcansir in me, that I shall pass over a 
single Foe to charge whole Armies. 
Again in Spectator 34 he promises "never to draw a faulty Character 
which does not fit at least a Thousand People." Later, in /1355, he 
pushes the idea of anti-personal satire to its limit. He makes the 
refusal to write it a virtue: 
If a Man has any Talent in Writing, it shews a good Mind to for-
bear answering Calumnies and Reproaches in the same Spirit of 
Bitterness with which they are offered: But when a Man has been 
at some Pains in making suitable Returns to an Enemy, and has the 
Instruments of Revenge in his Hands, to let drop his Wrath, and 
stifle his Resentements, seems to have something in it Great and 
Heroical. 
If one does write it, one shouldn't publish it. Furthermore, as we 
have already noted, throughout the eighteenth century satire was gen-
erally differentiated from the lampoon in much the way Dr. Johnson 
distinguished the two: "Proper satire is distinguished, by the general-
ity of the reflections, from a lampoon which is aimed against a par-
ticular person." 
On the other hand, there were those who expressed dissatisfaction 
with the amiable, toothless satire of the sort recommended by the 
Spectator: General satire was simply not effective. It was, as we've 
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just seen Swift noting, too easy to deflect general satire onto one's 
neighbors, or to see one's neighbor's face in the mirror rather than 
one's own. Pope observed that he would prefer writing less personal 
more general satire but that the latter sioply does not work: 
I would indeed do it with more restrictions, & less personally; 
it is more agreeable to my nature, which those who know it not 
are greatly mistaken in: But General Satire in Times of General 
Vice has no force, & is no Punishment: People have ceas'd to be 
ashamed of it when so many are joind with them; and tis only by 
hunting One or two from the Herd that any Examples can be made. 
If a man writ all his Life against the Collective Body of the 
Banditti, or against Lawyers, would it do the least Good, or 
lessen the Body? But if some are hung up, or pilloryed, it may 
prevent others. And in my low Station, with no other Power than 
this, I hope to deter, if not to reform.SO 
In preparing this letter for publication, as James Sutherland notes, 
Pope offers additional evidence for preferring, or needing, personal 
rather than general satire: 
To reform and not to chastise, I am afraid is impossible, 
and that the best Precepts, as well as the best Laws, would prove 
of small use, if there were no Examples to inforce them. To 
attack Vices in the abstract, without touching Persons, may be 
safe fighting indeed, but it is fighting with Shadows. General 
propositions are obscure, misty, and uncertain, compar'd with 
plain, full, and home examples. • • • The only sign by which I 
found my writings ever did any good, or had any weight, has been 
that they raised the anger of bad men. And my greatest comfort, 
and encouragement to proceed, has been to see that those who have 
no shame, and no fear, of any thing else, have appear'd touch'd 
by my Satires.Sl 
People are no longer ashamed when so many others join in the same faults 
as them, though I suspect one can be ashamed for one's whole kind. Yet, 
50 The Correspondence of Alexander ~. ed. George Sherburn, 
val. 3 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956), p. 423. 
51 English Satire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 
p. 158. 
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personal satire is not incompatible with satire on mankind, and the 
personal examples Pope wants pilloried might well be brought out for 
exposure in a satire on mankind, as specific instances going towards 
proving the satirist's argument. A few examples may not carry much 
weight argumentatively, but they do add concreteness to the generaliza-
tions being proferred. The satire on man differs from general satire 
not just in the broadness or extent of its generalizations and in the 
kind of satiric indictments it makes but also in the fact that it 
willingly resorts to the use of personal satire. Individuals will 
occasionally be named as egregious examples of the charges against man. 
Pope's remarks lamenting the ineffectiveness of satire that is not 
personal plus the similar observations of Swift might be placed along-
side the following more optimistic opinion about general satire reaching 
its victims: "For gen'ral Satire will all Vices fit, I And ev'ry Fool 
or Knave will think he's hit."52 But the first line here seems inaccu-
rate and the second naive and unduly optimistic. 
The spectrum of number of victims I have been offering would have 
at its narrowest end satire against a single victim and at its widest 
satire against all mankind, with general satire somewhere in between. 
One other type needs to be mentioned. The satire on the Times or the 
53 Age, sometimes referred to as the "now-a-days" topos, appears to be 
close to the satire on man, although there are some important differ-
52 The Satirist: In Imitation of the Fourth Satire of the First 
Book of Horace (London:l733). - -- -- --
--=== 
53 A.R. Heiserman, Skelton and Satire (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1961), p. 94. 
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ences. The complaint against the times may allow for more individual 
exceptions to its charges. It often harkens back to a Golden Age or at 
least the "good old days." It argues that things ought to be other 
than what they currently are. It may imply that the current deteriorated 
state of things is remediable. The same approach may emerge as an 
attack on all moderns, on the modern world. In eighteenth-century 
literature one encounters occasional attacks upon the "world," but 
judging from the contexts it seems to me that what is designated by the 
word "world" in such cases is generally something equivalent to what we 
mean by "high society" or the haut monde. 
The third basic kind of satire (elicited by the approach of using 
the number of victims), and our primary interest here, is the satire on 
mankind. The term itself has often been used indiscriminately or rather 
broadly, as Bertrand Goldgar has pointed out: 
It is important to note that in the early eighteenth century the 
distinction was often blurred; any work, whether philosophic, 
theological, or imaginative, which painted a dark picture of 
human nature might be called a 'satire on man. '54 
As we will see in chapter four, the term has been used likewise in the 
twentieth century. One of the purposes of the present study is to see 
if we can establish some criteria, based on the satires themselves, 
which will allow us to use the critical term "satire on mankind" with 
more precision. 
Satires on mankind also provoked numerous unfavorable responses 
in the eighteenth century: "While other forms of satire were still 
flourishing and meeting with critical approval, satiric indictments of 
54 Goldgar, p. 535. 
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mankind as a whole were censured as libels on the 'dignity of human 
11155 d l nature. Bertran Go dgar has ably surveyed these adverse reactions. 
He isolates three major charges which were typically made against the 
type: 
(1) satire on man debases the dignity of human nature; (2) it is 
inefficacious, and actually destroys incitements to virtue; and 
(3) it is the product of a malign and discontented mind.56 
We need to look at a couple of these. 
Addison, we will remember, promises "never to draw a faulty 
Character which does not fit at least a Thousand People" but continues 
"or to publish a single Paper, that is not written in the Spirit of 
Benevolence, and with a love to Mankind." Here we have two differences 
between satire on mankind and general satire: general satire is more 
selective in its victims and is, purportedly at least, written with a 
different spirit. Addison offers further evidence that the two must be 
differentiated. In Spectator 209 he reacts strongly against the satire 
on mankind. After finding fault with the anti-feminist satires of 
Juvenal and Boileau, he proceeds: 
Such levelling Satyrs are of no use to the World, and for this 
reason I have often wondered how the French Author above men-
tioned, who was a Man of exquisite Judgment, and a Lover of 
Virtue, could think Human Nature a proper Subject for Satyr in 
another of his celebrated Pieces, which is called The Satyr upon 
Man. ~Vhat vice or Frailty can a Discourse correct, which censures 
the whole Species alike, and endeavours to shew by some Super-
ficial Strokes of Wit, that Brutes are the aost excellent Crea-
tures of the two? A Satyr should expose nothing but what is 
corrigible, and make a due Discrimination between those who are, 
and those who are not the proper Objects of it. 
55 Goldgar, p. 535. 
56 Goldgar, p. 536. 
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Of course the vice or frailty that Boileau and other satirists on man 
expose is human pride. The satirist sets out deliberately to debunk 
exaggerated ideas of the "dignity of human nature." I will be respond-
ing shortly to Addison's claim that satire must attack only what is 
corrigible. 
One of the basic charges against satires on man, t~en, was that 
they debased human nature. The Tatler, for example, writes as follows 
of certain "modish French authors": 
Their business is to deprecate human nature and consider it under 
its worst appearances. They give mean interpretations and base 
motives to the worthiest actions; they resolve virtue and vice 
into constitution. In short, they endeavour to make no distinc-
tion between man and man, or between the species of men and that 
of brutes. (#108) 
Later these same authors are referred to as 
shallow and despicable pretenders to knowledge who endeavour to 
give man dark and uncomfortable prospects ·of his being, and 
destroy those principles which are the support, happiness, and 
glory of all public societies, as well as private persons. 
According to Hughes in Spectator 210, there are dangers in attempting 
to discomfit man in such a way: 
I am fully perswaded that one of the best Springs of generous and 
worthy Actions, is the having generous and worthy Thoughts of our 
selves. Whoever has a mean Opinion of the Dignity of his Nature, 
will act in no higher a Rank than he has allotted himself in his 
own Estimation. 
Hughes continues in this same vein in Spectator 537: 
It is very disingenuous to level the best of Mankind with the 
worse, and for the Faults of Particulars to degrade the whole 
Species. Such methods tend not only to remove a Man's good 
Opinion of others, but to destroy that Reverence for himself, 
which is a great Guard of Innocence, and a Spring of Virtue. 
But as an antidote to this pernicious way of looking at man, we have 
religion: "And whoever believes the Immortality of the Soul, will not 
need a better Argument for the Dignity of his Nature, nor a stronger 
Incitement to Actions suitable to it." 
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How do we respond to this charge? The satirist on mankind does 
make assertions which seem to degrade human nature. The satirist does 
seem to want to "give man dark and uncomfortable prospects of his 
being." I suppose we need to inquire for what purposes the satirist is 
bringing forth these charges. We should remember, however, that 
preachers as well as satirists have often differed about the best 
methods for effecting their purposes. Some prefer vinegar, and some 
sugar. Some prefer to shame their victims, to rub their noses into the 
dirt, to disgust them with themselves. Others favor flattery as the 
most efficient way to amend the audience or victims. Addison and 
Hughes here have been indicating that their particular temperaments 
lead them to prefer the more pleasant method. Satirists on mankind 
generally prefer the less palatable approach. 
A second prominent charge brought against satires on mankind is 
that they are simply not effective. We have already seen Pope, Swift, 
and Rosenheim claim that, in essence, an "attack launched impartially 
against everyone is no attack at all." We might ask what it means for 
satire to be effective. None of the major satirists had any illusions 
about their satire effecting major changes in their victims. In order 
even to try to assess their effectiveness we first have to decide 
exactly what it is that they are doing or trying to accomplish. We 
need, then, to examine these satires a little more closely. 
The satire on mankind is at the opposite end of the spectrum from 
individual satire. It attacks something about mankind, all men, the 
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human race, the species. As such it differs from personal satire, which 
is aimed at a specific individual or individuals, and from general 
satire, which may purport to attack dozens or thousands but never a 
single individual and never the entire human race. The satire on man 
casts aspersions of various sorts on all mankind. 
Satire on mankind shares the following with other satire--that is, 
with particular and general satire: 
the intent to attack via words 
the numerous conventional rhetorical devices satirists have 
employed against their victims 
the multiple forms and techniques available for the satirist's use 
a concern for using appropriate strategies to "get at," to 
penetrate to, to "nail" the victim 
an imagery of debasement 
a spectrum of tones varying from light to bleak, but still satiri-
cal 
the ability to appear incidentally in works not primarily satiric 
or to appear as discrete self-contained works. 
To me these similarities are crucial enough to qualify the satire on 
man as satire. But, on the other hand, satire on mankind appears 
different from what some consider satire for three primary reasons: 
it may appear unduly rhetorical rather than fictional; its bald, 
negative assertions may not appear, particularly in the 
verse satires, to be borne in upon, as Rosenheim says, a 
"manifest fiction" 
its direct or implied attack on the reader destroys the reader's 
expectation of enjoying the discomfiture of other victims 
what it is attacking may not be corrigible. The satirist on man 
does not offer positive alternatives. His offerings may be 
dismissed as misanthropic ravings. He is not the benevolent 
misanthrope type, whose wide currency Thomas R. Preston has 
revealed.57 His motives may not be honorable. 
57 Not in Timon's Manner: Feeling, Misanthropy, and Satire in 
Eighteenth-Century England (Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1975). 
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Some critics have felt uneasy about including direct invective within 
the realm of satire. Indirection is one of their criteria for satire. 
This causes them to look askance at many verse satires on man which 
forthrightly attack the species. David Worcester, for example, writes, 
"Satire is the engine of anger, rather than the direct expression of 
anger. Before our sympathy is won, we must be freed from the distress 
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of witnessing naked rage and bluster." Of course the satirist on man 
may not be particularly interested in winning our sympathy. Worcester 
distinguishes between gross invective or abuse and satiric invective: 
"This gross invective, or abuse, is distinguished from satiric invective 
by direct, intense sincerity of expression. Satiric invective shows 
detachment, indirection, and complexity in the author's attitude."59 
Worcester does concede that there are some exceptions to this. 60 
Feinberg finds the direct approach less satisfying than the indirect: 
Overdirect satire of hypocrisy, as in Moliere's ~isanthrope, is 
sometimes more irritating--and consequently less satisfying--
than a more subtle attack. The bitter pill needs sugarcoating, 
but no prescription exists for the precise amount.61 
Again, the satirist on man, or any satirist for that matter, may very 
well want to irritate rather than to satisfy. 
Kernan claims that "The satirist never seems to attack directly 
58 David Worcester, The Art of Satire (1940; New York: W.I.J. 
Norton, 1969), p. 18. 
59 Worcester, p. 19. 
60 Worcester, p. 20. 
61 Leonard Feinberg, Introduction to Satire (Ames: Iowa State 
University Press, 1967), p. 93. 
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but always pretends not to be doing what in fact he is doing."62 Kernan 
expands on this elsewhere: 
we do not ordinarily allow the term 'satire' to be used for such 
crude forms of verbal aggression as cursing, denunciation, dia-
tribe, invective, sarcasm, pasquinade. • To be true satire, 
verbal aggression must ••• be artfully managed, witty, in-
direct.63 
W.B. Carnochan maintains that "Irony is the indirection that converts 
. . . i 11 64 cr~t~c~sm to sat re. And Ellen Leyburn confidently asserts that 
indirection is a sine qua EP.!!. of satire: "Indirection as a basic 
necessity of good satire has been so ably set forth in recent criticism 
that there is no need to insist on it here except as it leads the 
satirist to choose allegory as a way of achieving fictionality." 65 
Frye writes that "Satire demands at least a token fantasy •• 
adds, "Two things, then, are essential to satire; one is wit or humor 
He 
founded on fantasy or a sense of the grotesque or absurd, the other is 
an object of attack. Attack without humor, or pure denunciation, forms 
one of the boundaries of satire."67 
Thus, there is considerable critical pressure to regard direct 
62 Kernan, Plot, p. 82. 
63 Kernan, "Aggression," p. 118. 
64 
"Swift's Tale: On Satire, Negation, and the Uses of Irony," 
ECS, 5, No. 1 (Fall, 1971), 124. 
65 Ellen Douglas Leyburn, Satiric Allegory: Mirror of Man (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1956), p. 7. 
66 Northrop Frye, Anatomy of Criticism (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1957), p. 224. 
67 Frye, p. 224. 
66 
denunciation, such as one often encounters in satires on mankind, as 
something beyond or outside the realm of satire. Not all satires on 
man are primarily direct; but oftentimes, even within a fictional 
setting, Houyhnhnms or extraterrestrials or a misanthrope will spew 
forth directly at mankind. It seems to me that such direct assertions 
are merely another part of the satirist's arsenal, another tactic the 
satirist may utilize to attack his victim or victims with some vigor. 
Another main reason that satire on mankind appears different from 
other satire is, as I have said, that it offers no positive alterna-
tives. As such it differs from what has been described as the formal 
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verse satire. Satires on man may be what Howard Weinbrot has 
characterized as revelatory satire, which "is primarily concerned with 
depicting a grim situation rather than both attacking vice and pre-
senting a clearly workable norm. Augustan formal verse satire, however, 
69 
adopts the latter method." Verse satires on mankind, however, appear 
to be, in fact, formal verse satires which do not conform to Dryden's 
or Mary Claire Randolph's strictures on the type. The satirist need 
not attack something which is corrigible, nor does he need to offer 
any positive alternatives. James Sutherland has made this point 
emphatically: 
68 Mary Claire Randolph, "The Structural Design of the Formal 
Verse Satire," PQ, 21 (1942), 368-84. 
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"On the Discrimination of Augustan Satires," in Proceedings 
££ the Modern Language Association Neoclassicism Conference, 1967-68, 
ed. Paul J. Korshin (New York: AMS Press, 1970), p. 6. 
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The satirist is destructive; he destroys what is already there 
(and what to many people appears to be functioning quite satis-
factorily), and he does not necessarily offer to fill the vacuum 
that he has created. He is, as Mr. Kenneth Tynan remarked re-
cently of Bernard Shaw, 'a demolition expert.' We are being 
grossly irrelevant, Mr. Tynan added, 'if we ask a demolition 
expert, when his work is done: But what have you created? ••• 
Shaw's genius was for intellectual slum-clearance, not for town-
planning.•70 
In attacking various aspects of humanity which are unchanging, or seem 
so, the satirist on mankind need not construct anything. Apparently, 
we need to enquire exactly what it is that satires on man are doing. 
What is it, then, that these literary productions, endowed with 
the characteristics we have enumerated, do? ~Vhat do they perform? 
This is not an easy question to answer, since satires on man vary. 
They differ in what they emphasize, in tone, and in numerous other ways 
as well. They do all employ, however, an identifiable, characteristic 
range of charges and strategies. 
Satires on mankind articulate a specific range of charges or in-
dictments. Men are frequently depicted as short-lived, puny, fearful 
creatures filled with various passions over which they can not or will 
not exercise control, such as envy, malice, and hatred. ~~n lives in 
endless mental turmoil; his emotions vacillate wildly. Certain of the 
abstractions he cherishes, such as love, honor, justice, nobility and 
so on, do not, in fact, exist. He is subject to a million ills, the 
least of which can render him into little more than food for the worms. 
In relation to other animals on this planet, man is both physi-
cally and psychologically inferior. Animals have the advantage over 
70 Sutherland, p. 1. 
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him in strength, speed, health, longevity and power of the senses. In 
addition, animals are exempt from the vices, fearful fantasies, super-
stitions, ambition, avarice, envy and so on of man. Man may, just may, 
have greater mental capacities than the animals, but these are no con-
solation to him and may be even further reason to indict him. What is 
worse, man is depicted as the only animal that preys on his own kind; 
this is the gravamen. Man is ultimately a beast and not nearly so high 
on the great chain of being as he would lika to think; he is closer to 
the other animals than he is willing to admit. 
The planet which man inhabits is infinitely small in relation to 
other planets and the universe as a whole. Man may be inferior to 
extraterrestrials in terms of life expectancy, size, intelligence, 
mental health, and technological advancement. Furthermore, man may not 
be the center of the creator's attention, and he is not capable of 
fathoming the creator's intentions. Man thus lives in uncertainty, 
though he does not recognize this. He is vulnerable, the victim of 
numerous dread "natural" disasters, plagues, earthquakes and the like. 
Though he likes to think of himself as a significant creature, he may 
not even be possessed of free will. 
In short, satires on mankind put forth an array of assertions 
which point inevitably to the conclusion that all men, their lives and 
their actions are of little consequence. 
Despite all this, the satirist on mankind adds, despite all his 
shortcomings and limitations, despite the overwhelming evidence leading 
ineluctably to the establishment of man's insignificance, he remains 
unaccountably proud. The satirist points out that there is obviously 
an enormous lack of self knowledge here, a lack of realistic self-
evaluation. 
This is the primary charge that satires on mankind make: man's 
enormous pride in the face of all this evidence to the contrary. Man 
is a self-inflated balloon. 
Satires on man differ in which of these charges they employ and 
in the number provided; but, in general, the charges I have just out-
lined are the standard ones which satires on mankind project. The 
question remains as to what, exactly: literary works employing these 
charges are in fact trying to accomplish. 
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Students of satire have long recognized the need to determine 
exactly who or what is being attacked. A major contribution of Edward 
w. Rosenheim's Swift and the Satirist's Art is the emp~asis he places 
upon locating the precise object of the satiric attack, that is, the 
satiric victim. At whom, then, is the attack (employing the charges I 
indicated) directed? Who or what is the satiric victim of satires on 
mankind? 
In one sense, as the term itself makes obvious, we all are. The 
assertions apply to every one who is a member of the species. ~ve are 
asked in satires on mankind to consider propositions inimical to our 
very beings. Human nature itself seems at times to be under attack. 
In so far as human nature is being attacked, the faults singled out for 
attack are, for the most part, not corrigible, not amendable; and the 
argument that satire attacks only those things which are corrigible has 
been made extensively not only in the eighteenth century but in our own 
as well. I have already objected to this attitude, but the point is 
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that as a result of this belief satires on mankind may not be classified 
as satire at all. 
As a result of the fact that all human beings are under attack 
here, a distinction arises between satires on mankind and other kinds of 
satire. Satires on mankind are unique in that, since all are being 
attacked, both satirist and reader are incriminated, are included among 
the victims of the attack. This has the effect of removing the satirist 
from his Juvenalian pedestal, where he was susceptible to the question, 
"who in the hell does he think he is?" The satirist, the speaker of 
the satire, is guilty of the charges he has brought forth against man-
k . d 71 ~n • The reader is also indicted in such a process. He is brought 
into the work in a way he is not accustomed to, more intimately than he 
perhaps desires, for the charges applying to the species inevitably 
apply to him or her as we11. 72 Thus, on one level, the human condition 
71 We need to distinguish this procedure from the satirist-
satirized which Robert C. Elliott and Kernan discuss. They refer to the 
method whereby an author undercuts the message or assertions of his 
satiric speaker by, in turn, satirizing that speaker. This allows the 
author to dissociate himself from unpopular assertions, although I would 
contend that the mere discharge or release of such material into a 
literary work (even though it may be undercut by being put into the 
mouth of a fool, gravedigger or madman) will certainly alter the texture 
of that work. I am not so sure that satirizing the satirist will truly 
"release" the reader from taking those unpopular assertions seriously. 
It is difficult to calculate the ultimate effect of this kind of under-
cutting. As James Sutherland notes, "Satire ••. is often active 
below the level of consciousness, and may therefore work by delayed 
action." (p. 156) 
72 k h d II • f Henry W. Sams calls such an attac on t e rea er sat~re o 
the second person" and speaks of the way Swift "circumvents the 
rhetorical alliance" ("Swift's Satire of the Second Person," ELH, 26, 
1959, p. 37). ~Vhat Sams calls satire of the second person and what I 
refer to merely as satire of the reader occurs naturally as part of the 
satire on man. Each reader, being human, is automatically a victim. 
He plays a special though uncomfortable role in satires on mankind; he 
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and all human beings, including writer and reader, are indicted in 
satires on mankind. 
But satires on mankind may operate on another level as well. 
Pride, as I said earlier, is crucial. All those negative assertions or 
charges directed towards mankind may be present as evidence in order to 
deflate, correct, balance or discredit overly optimistic evaluations of 
mankind. The satirist on mankind is trying to disenchant man with him-
self. The satire on mankind attacks man's pride, his anthropocentrism, 
his speciesism. Mankind's status is not so exalted as men like to 
think it is. The satirist, then, is involved in discrediting certain 
positive assertions about man. The substructure of the satirist's 
argument appears to be something like the following: 
Man thinks he is this (the central feature of the universe, the 
King of Nature-and the creation, inestimably above the animals, 
endowed with reason and an intellect which allows him to pierce 
the secrets not only of this planet but of the heavens and even 
the creator himself), 
't11hereas in fact he is this (a pride-filled, puffed-up, frail 
animal, an uncertain, blind, wrong-reasoned, errant, tormented 
creature upon whom the creator has not been overly bountiful in 
bestowing creature comforts and about whose well-being the creator 
is not overly solicitous). 
The satirist on man is therefore asking man to revaluate himself. More 
precisely, he is attacking what he believes to be misguided, unduly 
optimistic assertions about the human species. The satirist's rationale 
may simply be that it is better or safer for humankind to appraise 
itself accurately, no matter how unpleasant the truth may be. 
is not allowed the customary luxury satire offers of sitting back and 
watching some other poor Christian tossed into the ring. 
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What is interesting here is that, in contrast to that earlier set 
of charges I presented, not all humans are necessarily guilty of these 
overly pleasant assumptions about the species. Though all may, to some 
degree, be guilty of personal pride, not all are necessarily guilty of 
pride in humankind. On the one hand, since all are attacked, the reader, 
being a member of the species, can not feel superior in the manner Fein-
berg speaks of as being characteristic of satire: "Satire offers the 
reader the pleasures of superiority and safe release of aggressions."73 
On the other hand, the reader may not be guilty of pride in his species; 
and thus, even though the negative characteristics of the species are 
true for him or her as well, his lack of pride or his more accurate 
estimation of his kind may well place him slightly superior to others. 
Therefore, not all are necessarily culpable here. ~oreover, some of 
the guilty ones may amend their unrealistic attitudes towards the 
species, so that the satire on mankind is, at this level, attacking 
something which may be corrigible after all, since to be guilty and 
know one's guilt is different from being guilty and ignorant and self-
satisfied as well. 
As a result of these different levels, reading a satire on man-
kind may be a slightly more complicated process than a first glance 
indicates. With its two-pronged attack, the reader is irrevocably 
involved on the one hand, and may or may not be on the other. The 
writer, satirist, work, victim, reader configuration for the satire 
on mankind is, accordingly, unique. 
73 F . b 5 eJ.n erg, p. • 
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The focus of the satire on mankind, then, is ultimately on man's 
pride, his anthropocentrism, his assignment of himself to an exalted 
position in the grand scheme of things. A.O. Lovejoy distinguishes 
this kind of pride from an individual pride which causes specific men 
to elevate themselves over other men: 
But the pride to which such a typical writer as Pope, in 
the Essay ~ I1an, most frequently refers is not primarily the 
pride of the individual human creature comparing himself with 
others of his species, but the generic pride of man as such. The 
featherless biped, it was observed, has a strange tendency to put 
himself in the center of the creation, to suppose himself separa-
ted by a vast gap from all other and 'irrational' creatures, to 
credit himself with the possession of virtues of which he is 
inherently incapable, and to attempt tasks, especially intellec-
tual tasks, which he has in reality no power to accomplish.74 
Lovejoy goes on to discuss a number of considerations relevant to our 
topic here: 
Upon his own planet, at least, man reigned supreme over the brute 
creation, infinitely removed in dignity from even the highest 
animals by his sole participation in the intellectual light of 
the divine Reason; all other terrestrial creatures existed solely 
for his use and benefit; upon the acts of will of individual men 
inexpressibly momentous issues depended; and the good which man 
was capable of attaining immeasurably transcended all that could 
be experienced in this temporal world of matter and sense. But 
there were certain ideas especially current (though not original 
with) the eighteenth century which forbade mankind to hold any 
such flattering opinion of itself; and it was these ideas which 
underlay many of the recurrent invectives against 'pride.'75 
If the satirist on mankind is doing anything more than shedding his own 
sicknesses in his work, as D.H. Lawrence says, or enjoying the ironies 
74 
"'Pride' in Eighteenth-Century Thought," in The Augustan Age, 
ed. Ian Watt (Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett, 1968), p. 180. 
75 L . 180 OVeJOY, p. , 
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and paradoxes he presents, he is perhaps calling for an adjustment of 
man's perception of himself, a lessening of this blind complacency. 
The satirist on mankind is attempting to discredit the propositions 
that man is the base and support of Nature, the raison d'etre of the 
cosmos, the supreme creation whose perspicacity enables him to compre-
hend the nature of this universe and even to pierce the skies to fathom 
the creator and his intentions. 
In doing so, the satirist may be calling for a redefinition of 
man, asking man to consider carefully what he is and his tenuous 
position in the universe. 
Donald Greene has defined pride as "the condition of having a 
higher estimate of one's importance in the scheme of things than the 
76 facts warrant." What is the satirist's response to pride? The same 
as Pascal's, "S'il ~ vante, ~ l'abaisse." The satirist on mankind 
attempts to "put man in his place." This is part of defining and de-
limiting man. To decide exactly what man is, we do need to look at his 
negative traits. According to Charron, two prerequisites are necessary 
for achieving wisdom. One is to know oneself, and the other is to know 
the condition of man. The latter involves for Charron a careful look 
at man's limitations and defects, mental, physical, and emotional. 
This also means an examination of his place in the universe, which is 
not necessarily the one he customarily allots himself. 
Satires on mankind fulfill the negative part of this process. 
76 
"The Sin of Pride: A Sketch for a Literary Exploration," New 
Mexico Quarterly, 34 (1964), 9. 
75 
Some satires on man force a vision upon the reader of what, in essence, 
it means to be human. They force the reader to consider certain un-
savory characteristics which, they maintain, are essential, accurate, 
objective descriptions which must be incorporated into any definition of 
man. 
Satirists on mankind claim that man's flattering opinions of him-
self are inconsistent with observation. They claim, in a sense, to be 
"setting the record straight." Again, the satirist may exaggerate, and 
he may not consider the good things man is capable of. The satirist 
may assume that man is already too well acquainted with his better 
points and, therefore, is in need of considering the other side. The 
satirist may be performing what one of the characters in Cyrano de 
Bergerac's Voyage~ the~ says he has just done: 
But I desired to correct that insolent pride with which fathers 
insult over the weakness of their offspring, and therefore I was 
obliged to act like those who straighten a crooked tree; they 
pull it to the other side so that between the two twistings it 
grows straight again.77 
The satirist on man may be giving this kind of a wrenching to mankind, 
which is already bent and twisted in its pride. Ultimately, satires on 
mankind exhort man to tread with less certainty and more humility on 
this sometimes fair planet. The satirist on man assumes that there is 
value in knowing man's low place and his limitations, just as Addison 
assumes there is value in observing the dignity of man. Addison 
attempts to inspire, the satirist on man to shame. 
77 Voyages to the Moon and the Sun, trans. Richard Aldington 
(London: George Routledge & Sons, 1923), p. 123. 
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Such considerations of the constitution and nature of man and his 
place in the universe are, of course, philosophical concerns. One 
scholar, we will recall, has claimed that a true.satire on mankind be-
longs within the realm of philosophy rather than under the generic 
heading of satire. I would argue, instead, that satires on mankind 
while possibly embodying philosophical concerns, in common with much 
great literature, are, in fact, literary productions rather than 
serious philosophical inquiry. Satires on mankind, though they would 
sometimes like to appear as such, are not balanced inquiries searching 
for Truth. They do not, in general, weigh the pros and cons of the 
human condition and then attempt to determine exactly what the nature 
of man is and his place in the universe. Satires on mankind argue on 
the bias; they are slanted. When they do concede to mankind some 
positive quality, it is generally so that this can be taken away 
immediately or so that it can be overshadowed by something overwhelm-
ingly negative. 
Satires on mankind articulate a specific range of charges at man 
and do so via an identifiable, recognizable pattern of strategies. 
Part of the process of discovering exactly what man is, for example, is 
to place him accurately in relation to those "below" him and those 
above him on the great scale of being. Man presumes he is far superior 
to the animals, and his presumption extends towards the heavens and the 
creator whose intentions he thinks he can read. The relationship be-
tween man and god, from our vantage point, resists systematic classifi-
cation. Satirists on man posit several alternative possibilities, 
alternatives to the standard, "authorized" explanations or versions. 
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Since the relationship of man to the universe is probably unknowable, 
our position, it is asserted, should be merely to avoid presumption and 
limit our debates to the proper study of mankind, man. 
Thus, animal comparisons and animal perspectives along with 
extraterrestrial and cosmic perspectives become crucial elements of 
satires on mankind. These become essential strategies for "placing" 
man, for putting him in his place. Charges and strategies, with some 
interesting variations, represent a consistent strain right up to our 
own time. I hope to demonstrate this in chapter three. Since the 
topic which I have been asserting that satires on mankind address, the 
nature of man and his place in the universe, is a perennial one, 
satirizing mankind is as valid and necessary an activity today as it 
was three hundred or a thousand years ago. Though modernized and 
doctored for the times, the same essential charges and strategies are 
being employed today. 
CHAPTER III 
THE STRATEGIES 
Bertrand Goldgar has written that "the literary tradition of 
satires on man reached its height in the Restoration and had neared its 
end before it met much critical attack."1 Goldgar has isolated an era 
when the type was being written with some frequency, but the chronolog-
ical range of the following examples reveals that the tradition by no 
means reached its end in the eighteenth century. Whether satires on 
mankind attempt to record an accurate or exaggerated depiction of the 
human animal, or deep, dark feelings we may all experience at times, or 
whether they are the resul~ of the satirist searching for an even more 
outrageous windmill to assail, satires on mankind were written in 
ancient times and they are being written today. Moreover, their basic 
satiric charges and strategies have remained surprisingly consistent 
throughout the ages. 
Satires on mankind employ a recognizable variety of strategies 
in order to force home a characteristic set of satiric indictments. 
They employ, in general, one or a combination of the following: 
a. direct assertions 
b. an animal perspective 
c. an extraterrestrial perspective 
d. a cosmic perspective. 
1 
"Satires on Man and 'The Dignity of Human Nature,'" PMLA, 80 
(1965), 535. 
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a. Direct assertions 
The most basic approach is simply to make direct assertions. 
Even within this category there are sub-strategies which have proved 
particularly useful to satirists on man. In addition to direct state-
ments that the species possesses undesirable traits x, y, and z, such 
satirists charge that certain cherished traits which man imagines him-
self to have do not exist in the real world; they formulate definitions 
of the species which are sufficiently unflattering to constitute 
satire; and they humiliate the species by outlining the progress of 
human life. 
The direct statements employed by satirists on mankind assert 
that the human species has one or all of the undesirable traits I 
enumerated in the last chapter. The object of the attack is human 
nature, and it may be vulnerable through some facet of man's being 
which can be regarded as essential or definitive, such as his reason. 
Equally available to direct attack are man's physical limitations, 
especially his mortality. Authors following the direct line of attack 
find references to stink, vomit and excretory functions particularly 
useful in reminding man of his baser qualities. We have already seen 
an example of this in a sonnet by Des Barreaux (seep. 28). Alvin 
Kernan has described some of the raw physical properties of man which 
the satirist exposes. The satiric painter, he says, 
seems to be fascinated by the flesh, particularly fat and the 
sagging graying skin. His subjects if they are young and healthy 
are always gross and seem to reek of sweat, while if they are old 
they are either bursting the seams of their clothes or horribly 
cadaverous. If the satirist is more delicate than in the exam-
ples mentioned above, his characters still seem always indecently 
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carnal; man is caught in his animal functions of eating, drinking, 
lusting, displaying his body, copulating, evacuating, scratching. 
He is riddled with hideous and deforming diseases, most often 
venereal: the bone-ache, falling hair, a decayed nose, ulcerous 
teeth, boils, scurf. Gross, sodden, rotting matter is the sub-
stance of the satiric scene.2 
In an article entitled "The Augustan Nose," Philip Stevick focuses on 
one physical trait, man's smell, and makes a connection among man 
smelling, anti-rationalism, and the satire on mankind: 
For dozens of writers in the Restoration and the eighteenth 
century, the image of man smelling (in both the transitive and 
intransitive senses) is a polemical and satirical weapon, an 
image capable of carrying great descriptive intimacy, great in-
genuity of wit and comic virtuosity, and capable~ in others as in 
Shaftesbury, of suggesting man's very humanness. 
Stevick adds that "the literary preoccupation with smell in the eight-
eenth century is a concrete realization of a pervasive anti-rational-
ism."4 In attacking man's pride in reason, the satire on mankind is 
often associated with such anti-rationalistic positions. As we have 
seen, the satirist on mankind tries to get man to look at himself care-
fully, to see his unsavory side. Calling man's attention to the 
physical reality of human smell is one way to help him achieve this 
perspective: 
Thus, if bad smell is generally organic, if it serves to remind 
the person who experiences it of his essentially animal nature, 
then in those ages that are most aware of their own civilization, 
this reminder of man's animality is both potentially comic and 
philosophically useful, inducing, as it does, a proper perspec-
tive toward that contradictory humanness which is partly obscured 
by the forms and conventions of civilization.5 
2 The Cankered Muse (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959), 
p. 11. 
3 
"The Augustan Nose," UTQ, 34 (1965), 110. 
4 Stevick, p. 110. 
5 Stevick, p. 113. 
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or the satirist may depict man's physical frame as being merely ridicu-
lous: "The body is but a pair of pincers set over a bellows and a stew-
pan and the whole fixed upon stilts."6 
}fun's intellect is also attacked through direct assertions. 
Reason, if it is a characteristic of man at all, is of no assistance to 
him. It is weak or distorted, subject to more powerful impulses. 
A favorite way of satirizing mankind is denying that man possesses 
certain virtues, asserting that many of those supposed virtues on which 
men congratulate themselves are no part of man's nature. Thus, one 
finds satirists asserting that love, friendship, truth, honor, integ-
rity, honesty do not exist; true examples of them are not to be found, 
though people often try to make it appear as if they do possess one or 
more of these qualities. Occasionally the satirist will concede that a 
quality exists but will deflate it by showing that it is based on some 
vice. Mandeville does this, and we have already seen Rochester assert 
that man's motivation for some of his seemingly brave deeds is really 
fear. 
It is clear, however, that satirists are not attacking love, 
friendship, truth, honor, integrity, honesty. Abstract qualities do 
not make very manageable satiric victims. Instead, the satirist 
laments their absence from human life. The objects of attack in 
satires on mankind are men, the human race, and attacking man through 
his lack of virtues leads to a hostile assessment of the world man has 
6 Samuel Butler (the later), The Notebooks, ed. Henry Festing 
Jones and A.T. Bartholomew (London: Jonathan Cape, 1926), XX,lO. 
82 
made and inhabits. Attacking man through his lack of virtues leads to 
a second attack on man's pride embodied in the idea that the world is 
made for him. The lack of virtue eventuates in a world that is hostile 
to the individual, one in which he is always alone, always unsure of 
those about him, always ready to lash out, always suspicious that he is 
going to be had; it is a world in which he is always going to be afraid. 
Assertions that the world is in such a state reflect a diminished sense 
that man is a favored creature or even that his existence has much 
value. 
When a satirist on mankind uses types of evils or types of corrupt 
men in his work, the effect is not an attack on the type itself but a 
demonstration of the corruption of the whole species through the type. 
The Church, courts, the government, all may provide embodiments of 
• 
corruption; but their greater importance is found in the ramifications 
of their corruption into the society as a whole. The satirist is 
arguing that if courts, the church, and political leaders are all 
corrupt, then the corruption is one that infests the whole fabric of 
life. There is no escaping the influence of these elements; they affect 
the quality of life of the entire community. Life is therefore rendered 
less satisfactory, less just, less desirable; and the individual sees 
his pride in the accomplishments of his species (or what he has been 
seduced into understanding as the accomplishment of his species), 
rational government and rational society, their very humanity, turned 
to shame and disgust. 
A world thus emptied of virtue and decency becomes itself a 
reflection on mankind. Men are not good enough and, hence, these 
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qualities do not manifest themselves in the world where he is in charge. 
Or, as an alternative, the existence of a world lacking in such quali-
ties may be attributed to the creator or to Providence. If this latter 
approach is to be interpreted as satire on mankind, then the object of 
interest must emerge not as a theological examination of God's relation-
ship to the world but instead as a confrontation between man's anthro-
pocentrism and a stark reality which punctures human self-satisfaction 
with being the primary interest of divine providence. The satirist 
denies that the world can be accounted for by the benevolence which is 
assumed to be its motivation. Since one source for man's pride can be 
that he plays an exalted role in a grand and imposing world, he may be 
attacked on the ground that he plays no such role or on the ground that 
the world is neither grand nor imposing. 
Another kind of direct assertion which may be employed against 
mankind takes the form of a definition of both man and life which leads 
to the conclusion that a creature who can be thus defined is corrupt or 
inept. These satiric definitions are sometimes a microcosm of the 
entire genre. Animal comparisons, direct assertions, and slanting are 
often employed. We also find many of the customary attacks on man's 
mentality, his pride and presumption, his sense of security. Satiric 
definitions are designed to undercut unduly optimistic opinions about 
mankind by their implied contrast with the definitions that a reader 
would normally have or expect--all of which would be flattering to 
man's ego. The humor of the satiric definition resides partly in the 
contrast between the definition and what the reader understands about 
the thing defined. The reader may recognize that the definition is 
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insufficient, but he will also be struck by the fact that it is closer 
to reality than he would like to admit. The same essential effect is 
achieved whether the definiendum is "life" or "man." 
Satiric definitions of man go back at least as far as Plato, whose 
observation that man is a featherless biped diminishes man by what it 
obviously excludes. Definitions, sound definitions, include the 
essential and distinctive characteristics of the thing being defined. 
Plato's "definition" claims, then, that man is distinctive for being, 
in essence, a two-footed creature without having the luxury of feathers 
adorning his body. But the joke was carried further: 
Plato having defined man to be a two-legged animal without 
feathers, Diogenes plucked a cock and brought it into the Aca-
demy, and said, "This is Plato's man." On which account this 
addition was made to the definition, "With broad flat nails."7 
This is certainly a far cry from the grandiose terms in which man likes 
to think of himself. 
Man is often treated as a mere member of the animal kingdom in 
such definitions. Alexander Hamilton makes a distinction similar to 
the one Swift makes by calling man "a reasoning rather than a reasonable 
animal. "8 But this is a casual observation on Hamilton's part seemingly 
without any satiric purpose. It may be contrasted with the following 
purported definitions. In Pudd'nhead Wilson's New Calendar, Mark Twain 
7 Herschel Baker, The Dignity of Man: Studies in the Persistence 
of An Idea (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1947), title page. 
8 in Peter's Quotations: Ideas for~ Time, ed. Laurence J. 
Peter (New York: Bantam, 1979), p. 319. 
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remarks that "Man is the only animal that blushes. Or needs to." 
Donald A. Laird characterizes man through one of his less ennobling 
physical propensities. For Laird, man is the only animal which spits."9 
Man does not happen to be the only animal which spits, but Laird asserts 
that it is all that distinguishes man from the other animals. The 
point, I suppose, is that the only way man can be distinguished from the 
other species is by these irrelevant qualities, irrelevant because the 
classical definition of man is animal rationale. 
More serious contrasts with animals, within these assertions which 
take the form of definitions, are centered in man's aggression towards 
his own species, a concern we have noted in numerous satires on mankind. 
Ambrose Bierce's definition of man alludes, in the midst of some other 
charges, to his belligerence. Man is 
An animal so lost in rapturous contemplation of what he thinks he 
is as to overlook what he indubitably ought to be. His chief 
occupation is extermination of other animals and his own species, 
which, however, multiplies with such insistent rapidity as to 
infest the whole habitable earth and Canada.lO 
William James makes the traditional, though zoologically inaccurate, 
charge that man is the only animal to prey on his own species: 
Man, biologically considered, and whatever else he may be into 
the bargain, is the most formidable of all beasts of prey, and, 
indeedi the only one that preys systematically on his own spe-
cies.l 
9 
"There is a Lot to Just Sitting or Standing," Scientific 
American (Nov. 1928). 
10 The Collected Writings of Ambrose Bierce, ed. Clifton Fadiman 
(Secaucus, N.J.: The Citadel Press, 1946), p. 303. 
11 Memories and Studies (1941; Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 
1968), p. 301. 
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H.G. Wells concedes one advantage to man, that of mental capacity; but, 
as we have seen in numerous satires on man, this presumed advantage is 
in fact not one at all. Man, for Wells, 
is a brute, only more intelligent than the other brutes, a blind 
prey to impulses • • • victim to endless illusions, which make 
his mental existence a burden, and fills his life with barren 
toil and trouble.l2 
Superior intelligence does not necessarily mean superior use of it. 
Other satiric definitions stress man's imperfections, stress the 
fact that he is a flawed creature. Instead of reiterating man's usual 
anthropomorphic claim to having been created in the image and likeness 
of the creator, Mark Twain calls man "A creature made at the end of the 
week's work when God was tired."13 
Such satiric "definitions" exhibit a wide range in tone, just as 
do longer satires on mankind. Samuel Butler (1835-1902) remarks that 
"Han is but a perambulating tool-box and workshop, or office, fashioned 
for itself by a piece of very clever slime, as the result of long 
experience."14 Christopher Morley, in a light vein, defines "human 
being" as "An ingenious assembly of portable plumbing."15 Ian McHarg's 
definition, in contrast, is vitriolic: "Man is a blind, witless, low-
12 Peter, p. 319. 
13 in The Left Handed Dictionary, ed. Leonard Louis Levinson (New 
York: Collier:-1963), p. 136. 
14 Butler, p. 10. 
15 Human Being (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Doran & Co., 1934), 
pp. 76-77. 
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brow, anthropocentric clod who inflicts lesions upon the earth."16 And 
Philip Wylie's definition contains the forcefulness we have come to 
anticipate from him. Man is "the organ of the accumulated smut and 
sneakery of 10,000 generations of weaseling souls."17 
In Faulkner's .!h!_ Sound and the Fury, Jason III makes numerous 
comments which are satirical on mankind, a couple of which fit into the 
category of the purported definition: 
Father said a man is the sum of his misfortunes. One day you'd 
think misfortune would get tired, but then time is your misfor-
tune Father said. A gull on an invisible wire attached through 
space dragged. You carry the symbol of your frustration into 
eternity. Then the wings are bigger Father said only who can 
play a harp.l8 
Man is nothing, then, but the sum of his misfortunes. All-levelling 
Time is again brought to the fore. Man is nothing but a gull dragged 
through space by an invisible wire, which is time. Gull, of course, 
carries the additional meaning of dupe. Man is time's dupe as well. 
Finally, Jason III closes this passage with a cynical reference to the 
pedestrian visual representation of humans in heaven winged like angels 
and playing harps. Man, in Jason's estimation, is not meant for such a 
place--or, no such place would be congenial to man. 
Jason III's later definition of man is more obviously satiric; in 
diminishing man, it renders him more ridiculous. Here man is not the 
sum of his misfortunes, which might possibly cast a tragic or heroic 
16 Peter, p. 323. 
17 Levinson, p. 136. 
18 William Faulkner, The Sound and the Fury (New York: Modern 
Library, 1929), p. 129. 
88 
light upon him: 
Man the sum of his climatic experiences Father said. Man the sum 
of what have you. A problem in impure properties carried tedious-
ly to an unvarying nil: stalemate of dust and desire.l9 
In this case Jason defines man as nothing but what his particular 
climate dictates and as the glorious sum of "what have you," that is, of 
nothing in particular of any significance. Created of impure proper-
ties, "progressing" tediously towards "an unvarying nil," man is nothing 
but a "stalemate of dust and desire." The powerful image of this final 
phrase suggests that man is but desire placed in a state of suspended 
animation by the dust of which he is also composed. The state may more 
accurately be described as suspended unanimation. 
Satiric definitions of "life" may also be satires on mankind. 
Man is attacked indirectly by assertions that human life itself is 
distressful, of little value, or painful to the extent that it is not 
worth having. If life itself is not worth having, man has little to be 
proud of. The "gift" of life is not something that reveals a particular 
concern on the part of the creator for man. Man is not thereby rendered 
something special in the grand scheme of things. Calderon's definition 
of life as "A sentence that man has to serve for the crime of being 
born" illustrates this. One thinks immediately, I suppose, of Shake-
speare's ~Acbeth asserting the pomposity, the ridiculous vanity, and 
the utter meaninglessness of life: 
19 Faulkner, p. 153. 
Life's but a walking shadow, a poor player 
That struts and frets his hour upon the stage 
And then is heard no more: it is a tale 
Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, 
Signifying nothing. (Macbeth, V,v.) 
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But not all satirical definitions of life are this furious. The later 
Samuel Butler says merely that "Life is one long process of getting 
20 tired." Clifton Fadiman has described life as "A longish doze, 
interrupted by fits and starts of bewildered semialertness."21 And the 
poet Edna St. Vincent Millay argues that "It's not true that life is 
22 
one damn thing after another--it's one damn thing over & over." 
Others find life merely problematical or, as John Gay's epitaph reveals, 
a jest: "Life is a jest; and all things show it, I I thought so once; 
but now I know it."23 The equation of life and jest is heightened here 
by the claim of certainty or certification of the farcical nature of 
life from the other side of the pale, from beyond death. 
Finally, asserting that life is absurd may serve the same 
functions I have discussed above, and asserting that the universe is 
absurd places man in a precarious, uncomfortable position in relation 
to the absurd universe. The very absurdity precludes the possibility 
that man is a central part of the creation, that there is a master plan, 
ordained for the security of man and with benign intentions. Placed in 
20 Butler, p. 3. 
21 Levinson, p. 128. 
22 Letters of Edna St. Vincent Millay, ed. Allan Ross Macdougall 
(N.Y.: Harper and Brothers, 1952), p. 240. 
23 John Gay: Poetry and Prose, ed. Vinton A. Dearing (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1974), I, 253. 
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a precarious position in an absurd universe, man would be hard put to 
retain his facile optimism, his blind assumption that all was created 
with his benefit in mind. 
Such straightforward declamations against life and man are some-
times embellished with a particular kind of imagery which further 
diminishes the value of life and men. I refer to stage or theatrical 
imagery. We have already seen it in the passage from Shakespeare above. 
We find it in Rabelais as well, "The farce is finished. I go to seek a 
24 
vast perhaps." Life is farcical; it does not have the dignity of 
tragedy or the lightness of comedy. It is merely absurd. In a dis-
cussion of Fielding's satire, Ronald Paulson comments on the use of 
farce as a metaphor: 
Farce then is a general metaphor for contemporary life, and 
the analogy between living and acting is a natural one in which 
to express a concern with either fashion or hypocrisy, the 
attempt to mask as what one is not.25 
Sir Walter Raleigh used stage imagery to satirize man in a poem 
entitled "On the Life of Man." 
What is our life? a play of passion; 
Our mirth the music of division; 
Our mothers' wombs the tiring-houses be 
Where we are dressed for this short comedy. 
Heaven the judicious sharp spectator is, 
That sits and marks still who doth act amiss; 
Our graves that hide us from the searching sun 
24 
attributed to Rabelais by Motteux in his Life of Rabelais. 
25 Satire and the ~ovel in Eighteenth-Century England (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1967), pp. 85-6. 
Are like drawn curtains when the play is done. 
Thus march we, playing, to our latest rest, 
Only we die in earnest--that's no jest.26 
our mirth occurs only between the scenes or acts and is, therefore, 
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infrequent. Life is a short Comedy. God is a sharp critic, and death 
is the final curtain. Such stage imagery is used often in satires on 
mankind, for it allows the satirist to call men players, actors, 
puppets, to claim that men are always acting, playing a part--that is 
to say, that they are somehow not real or genuine. This is reinforced 
here by the final line, "Only we die in earnest •• II In addition, 
the stage imagery allows the satirist to call man's life a farce, a 
comedy, or a tragedy. Poe carries the stage imagery beyond satire to 
reveal the terror of life by asserting that the end of it all is, as 
his title proclaims, "The Conqueror Worm." 
Or, men may merely be puppets, with the insinuation that they are 
27 
manipulated by unseen strings. The cumulative effect of the stage or 
puppet imagery used to satirize the species seems to be that human 
beings are not alive and their concerns are not quite real, that at 
best they are shadows, reflections, players manipulated for reasons 
they do not understand. Their lives are "staged." Free will, in this 
context, is usually denied man, as, for example, it is in Twain's The 
26 
"On the Life of Man" in The Norton Anthology of English 
Literature, ed. Robert M. Adams (New York: W.W. Norton, 1968), I, 
828-29. 
27 F d. . or a 1SCUSS10n 
John M. Bullitt, Jonathan 
Harvard University Press, 
of Swift's use of the puppet symbol, see 
Swift and the .~atomy ~ Satire (Cambridge: 
1953), pp. 170-81. 
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Mysterious Stranger. Such imagery, we notice, is applied to all humans, 
to the species, and no exceptions are claimed or allowed. 
In yet another kind of imagery which works to diminish man's self-
esteem, man or his life is nothing but a bubble. This becomes a common 
image used to suggest the fragility of man, his unsubstantial and in-
consequential nature. For example, William Drummond (1585-1649) uses 
this image in "Madrigal I." 
This life which seems so ra~r 
Is like a bubble blown up in the air 
By sporting children's breath, 
Who chase it everywhere, 
And strive who can most motion it bequeath; 
And though it sometime seem of its own might 
(Like to an eye of gold) to be fixed there, 
And firm to hover in that empty height, 
That only is because it is ~ light; 
But in that pomp it doth not long appear; 
For even when most admired, it in a thought, 28 As swelled from nothing, doth dissolve in nought. 
In a poem entitled "Sic Vita" (1657) Henry King also called attention 
to the unstable and inconsequential nature of man's condition: 
Like to the falling of a star; 
Or as the flights of eagles are; 
Or like the fresh spring's gaudy hue; 
Or silver drops of morning dew; 
Or like a wind that chafes the flood; 
Or bubbles which on water stood; 
Even such is man, whose borrowed light 
Is straight called in, and paid to night. 
The wind blows out; the bubble dies; 
The spring entombed in autumn lies; 
The dew dries up; the star is shot; 
The flight is past; and man forgot.29 
28 
"Madrigal I" in Seventeenth-Century English Minor Poets, ed. 
Anne Ferry (New York: Dell Pub., 1964), p. 167. 
29 
"Sic Vita" in Seventeenth-Century English Minor Poets, ed. 
Anne Ferry (New York: Dell Pub., 1964), p. 31. 
Life, like these other natural phenomena, is transient; and, what 
perhaps hurts worst of all, man is soon forgotten. The bubble image 
appears again in Robert Dodsley's "Song" (1745): 
Man's a poor deluded bubble, 
Wand'ring in a mist of lies, 
Seeing false, or seeing double, 
Who wou'd trust to such weak eyes? 
Yet presuming on his senses, 
On he goes most wond'rous wise: 
Doubts of truth, believes pretences; 
Lost in error, lives and dies.30 
Man comes off here as essentially a fool, a poor, unseeing, deluded 
creature who does not know truth when he encounters it. His insuffi-
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cient senses are attacked (as they often are in satires on man) as well 
as his pride. 
A variation on the direct method of satirizing man through 
satiric definitions is the device of tracing the "progress" of man 
through life. This is essentially the "life is ••• " definition, but 
it specifies that life is a progress through a series of stages. This 
progress may be through a number of specified stages or may consist 
merely of the two mandatory stages of birth and death with little else 
intervening. One can be sure, however, that all stages will be equally 
distasteful or unacceptable. This is similar, then, to the satiric 
definition of life in that the implied construct is generally something 
like the following reductive statement: "the life of man is nothing but 
this, this, and this." 
30 
"Song" in A Collection of English Poems: 1660-1800, ed. R.S. 
Crane (New York: Harper & Row, 1932), p. 665. 
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Charron indulged in this particular strategy on a couple of 
occasions. The following is a fairly extended example: 
Our present life is but the entrance and end of a Tragedie, 
a perpetual! issue of errours, a web of unhappy adventures, a 
pursuit of divers miseries inchained together on all sides; there 
is nothing but evill that it distilleth, that it prepareth; one 
evill drives forward another evill, as one wave another; torment 
is ever present, and the shadow of what is good deceiveth us; 
blindnesse and want of sense possesseth the beginning of our life, 
the middle is ever in paine and travell, the end in sorrow; and 
beginning, middle, and end in errour.31 
All steps in the process are lamentable. In the midst of a long 
description of man and what he is, Charron again refers to this prog-
ress. Man is "uncleane seed in his beginning, a sponge of ordures, a 
sacke of miseries in his middle age, a stench and meat for wormes in 
his end."32 Man ends up smelling and as food for the "lower" animals. 
In a couplet he cails "Human Life" (1740), Matthew Prior offers his 
outline of human activity: 
What trifling coil do we poor mortals keep~ 
Wake, eat, and drink, evacuate, and sleep.~3 
Prior's is less intense than Charron's but does not reflect much more 
credit on mankind. 
This tactic often presents life as nothing much but an extended 
process of decay--or, it asserts that what occurs within those two 
poles of life and death is insignificant or troublesome at the very 
31 Peter Charron, Of Wisdome, trans. Samson Leonard c. 1606 
(Amsterdam: Da Capo PresS: 1971), p. 116. 
32 Charron, p. 118. 
33 The Literary Works of Hatthew Prior, ed. H. Bunker Wright and 
Monroe K. Spears (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959), I, 687. 
least. Issa's famous haiku on the subject portrays this: 
From washing bowl 
to washing bowl my journey--
and just rigmarole. 
A darker version of the process of life can be located in Jason's 
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association of life and disease in The Sound and the Fury: "Bad health 
is the primary reason of life. Created by disease, within putrefaction, 
into decay."34 This is the inexorable compass of life, though what is 
in between is far more ominous in Jason Compson's view than in Issa's. 
La Bruyere finds only three primary events in man's life: 
Il n'y a pour l'homme que trois evenements: 
naitre, vivre et mourir. Il ne se sent pas 
naitre, il souffre a mourir, et il oublie de vivre. 35 
In constructing satiric definitions and in utilizing this "progress" 
strategy, the satirist is guilty of slanting, of omitting relevant de-
tails. He leaves out any of the positive things which may occur in 
life, but the satirist is under no obligation to provide all the in-
formation on a given subject. 
Yet another strategy for satirizing mankind, which is similar to 
the satiric definition and to the depiction of the "progress" of man's 
life in that a great deal of slanting or simplifying is involved, is 
the division of all life into two or possibly three categories, each of 
which is unattractive, reprehensible, unacceptable or odious. Laurence 
34 Faulkner, p. 53. 
35 La Bruyere, Les Caracteres (Paris: Garnier-Flammarion, 1965), 
p. 273. 
96 
J. Peter, for example, attacks man's pride by claiming that "There are 
two kinds of egotists: Those who admit it, and the rest of us."36 Such 
an all-inclusive division allows for no exceptions. Woody Allen uses 
the same tactic in his movie Annie Hall. He divides all men into two 
kinds: the horrible and the miserable--the horrible are those with 
terminal diseases, cripples and so on, while the miserable are all the 
rest. Faulkner may be employing a variation on the same device when he 
has Jason (or perhaps Quentin, though the sentiments seem to be tapes 
from his father here) claim that there is not much difference between 
dead and live men: 
any live man is better than any dead man but no live or dead man 
is very much better than any other live or dead man. • 37 
Once again we see the reduction of differences. You are one or the 
• 
other, but there is not much difference. 
This division of life or men into two or more categories which 
admit of no exceptions (the only way out is to simply deny their 
accuracy) is, then, another device ready for use in the arsenal of the 
satirist on mankind. The satirist on man, however, has numerous other 
strategies or resources available to him for use in his remonstrations 
against mankind. Perhaps the one strategy satirists have most often 
employed is the comparison of man to animals. 
36 Peter, p. 166. 
37 Faulkner, p. 125. 
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b. The Animal Perspective 
The satirists on man have frequently made use of favorite preju-
dices and conclusions from non-satiric writers for a supply of material 
to refute or treat ironically; and with some frequency philosophical 
writers who attempted to delineate the nature of the human species and 
ascertain its place in the scale or chain of being have compared and 
contrasted man with the other creatures, often concluding that in the 
creation man was supreme. It was commonplace to position humanity 
below the angels and above the brute creation. Because it was common-
place, the grandiose assessment was readily available for attack. To 
the more disenchanted observer, man's traditional assumption of his 
supremacy is just another example of his overweening pride, his self-
satisfaction. His blind assigning of himself to so predominant a place 
in the grand scheme of things is basically unrealistic, an overly com-
placent attitude towards himself, and an inflated self concept. The 
last and most important part of Charron's portrait of mankind focuses 
on presumption and pride. Charron finds man presumptuous not only in 
relation to animals but to other men and even the gods (the latter will 
be covered in section d.): 
Beholde heere the last and leawdest line or liniament of 
this picture; it is the other part of that description given by 
Plinie; the plague of man, and the nurse of false and erroneous 
opinions, both publike and particular: and yet a vice both 
naturall and originall in man. Now this presumption must be con-
sidered diversly, and in all senses, high, low, collaterall, 
inward and outward, in respect of God, things high and celestiall; 
in regard of things base, as of beasts, man his companion, of 
himselfe, and all may be reduced to these two, To esteeme too 
much of himself, and not to esteeme sufficiently of another.38 
38 Charron, p. 152. 
98 
Man, it seems, does not have a proper perspective of himself. 
Man's supposed superiority over animals gives the satirist on 
mankind an object of attack which he can particularly relish, and 
several of them have employed the ironic observation that man's high 
assessment of his species can be explained by the fact that man himself 
has made it. If, however, man could be seen as others see him (animals 
for example) then the assessment might change. The new and more ob-
jective perspective may be accomplished by using animal characters to 
comment on the human scene directly, such as when Boileau has an ass 
observe that, "L'homme n'est qu'une bate." Or the commentator may com-
pare and contrast man with the animals with more objectivity and in-
sight than that which results in the usual panegyric on the species. 
Part of the delight satirists on mankind take in using· animals in 
this way stems from the fact that men have generally a low opinion of 
the "brutes." A readymade insult is therefore available when man is 
shown to be lower than what he considers the lowest. Man's low opinion 
of animals can be seen in speciesistic language, which operates like 
racist and sexist language. Presumption, which satirists on mankind 
aim directly at, is built into the language. Further, man is clearly 
touchy about his close relationship to animals. Note the embittered 
controversy still being waged over evolution or the fervor aroused by 
. 1 h 1 . 39 certa~n popu ar et o og~sts. 
39 The predominantly engineer-oriented Creationists are still in-
volved in skirmishes over textbooks teaching evolution. The works of 
Konrad Lorenz, Robert Ardrey, Desmond Morris and other ethologists have 
brought forth numerous vitriolic responses. 
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There has been a great traditional use of animal imagery for 
purposes of debasing individual men. Animal imagery has frequently 
been employed against characters by likening them to animals and thus, 
presumably, lowering them to the level of the animals. Such a tactic 
is so commonplace that it hardly requires documentation; one well-known 
example is Smollett's Roderick Random. In the vocabulary of these 
attacks, to be likened to an animal is to be rendered less than human. 
In the animal comparisons so popular with satirists on mankind, however, 
animals are treated generally as being superior to man so that to be 
human is to be rendered less than animal. A.O. Lovejoy and George Boas 
describe the typical use of such ideas by conventional moralists: 
The animals, or certain species of them, are first more or less 
idealized, and the virtues with which they are credited--temper-
ance, chastity, parental devotion, industry, gratitude, etc.--are 
then held up as reproachful examples to mankind. It is in these 
cases usually implied that men might be, and should be, superior 
to the beasts in these particulars, but for the most part are not; 
the more shame to them, the moralistintimates, that they should 
in fact sink lower than the theoretically lower orders of 
creation!40 
Animals' lives are often depicted as idyllic. They are often romanti-
cally idealized, but even when they are in fact denigrated in satires 
on mankind, they still usually come out ahead of man. 
In satires on mankind the assertions about animals are not inten-
ded to improve the readers' knowledge of animals. They are an implement 
for the purpose of attacking man. Since no serious remarks are intended 
about animals at all, to respond by saying, "Wait a minute; animals 
40 Primitivism & Related Ideas in Antiauity (1935; N.Y.: Octagon 
Books, 1980), p. 19. 
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aren't that way" is to quite miss the point. Thus, the term George 
Boas applies, theriophily, does not seem appropriate to satires on 
man, since what they are displaying is usually not a love of animals 
but a hatred of man or at least a solid disaffection with him. 41 In a 
later work, Boas and Lovejoy offer a different name for this: 
Such a recurrent phenomenon in the history of literature seems to 
need a name; we therefore, faute de mieux, propose to designate 
as 'animalitarianism' the tendency-to-represent the beasts--on 
one ground or another--as creatures on the whole more admirable, 
more normal, or more fortunate, than the human species.42 
I will simply be calling such material animal comparisons, or I will 
refer to the use of an animal perspective. 
As I have said, satires on mankind in the form of animal compari-
sons have been extant from earliest times. As the following brief 
survey will also show, they are still being written today~ Though some 
of these are miniature satires on man, they still possess the essential 
characteristics of the genre. 
The editor of a 1702 miscellany apparently thought the following 
passage from Menander worthy of his audience's consideration: 
All Animals are happy, and much wiser than Man. And first, look 
here on this Ass, 'tis true, his Fortune is very hard, yet he 
seeks out no ill Fortune for himself, but bears that with Patience 
that Nature has thrown him into; but we, not content with those 
Evils, that Necessity imposes on us, voluntarily seek out, and 
sollicit abundance of Misfortunes we might avoid. If any one 
41 George Boas, The Happy Beast in French Thought of the Seven-
teenth Century (1933; N.Y.: Octagon Books, 1966). This text is the 
classic treatment of the topic and contains one chapter specifically 
devoted to the satirists. 
42 L · d B 19 oveJOY an oas, p. • 
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happen to Sneeze, Superstion /sic/ gives us Pain: On a Word out 
of Joint, we are tortur'd with Anger. We are frighted at our very 
Dreams, and tremble at nocturnal Voices. Our Laws, Decrees, Con-
tentions, Suits, and all these things are Evils, that we have 
industriously added to those which come by Nature to us.43 
The ass, whose lot is not pastoral, is still superior to man in that 
man creates problems for himself in addition to those carefully pro-
vided for him by Nature. Thus animals are happier and wiser than man. 
These become standard assertions for satirists on mankind. 
The most important physical fact that satirists hurl at man is 
that of his mortality, his deterioration and death, and the slender 
thread which separates the living from the dead. Man is such a weak 
creature that an insignificant insect can destroy him. Men end up be-
coming food for the worms. Montaigne makes these points dramatically: 
Touching strength, there is no Creature in the world, open to so 
many wrongs and injuries as a man: He need not a Whale, an Ele-
phant, nor a Crocodile, nor any such other wilde beast, of which 
one alone is of power to defeat a great number of men: seely lice 
are able to make Silla give over his Dictatorship: The heart and 
life of a mighty and triumphant Emperor, is but the breakfast of 
a seely little Worme.44 · 
All men, even the very highest, are subject to this, as Hamlet empha-
sizes when telling where the dead Polonius is located. Polonius is at 
supper: 
Not where he eats, but where he is eaten. A certain convocation 
of politic worms are e'en at him. Your worm is your only emperor 
for diet. We fat all creatures else to fat us, and we fat 
43 Examen Miscellaneum. Consisting of Verse and Prose (London: B. 
L/intott/, 1702), pp. 186-87. 
44 Michel de Montaigne, Essays, trans. John Florio (London: J.M. 
Dent & Sons, 1910), II, 155. 
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ourselves for maggots. Your fat king and lean beggar is but 
variable service--two dishes, but to one table. That's the end. 
He elaborates, "A man may fish with the worm that hath eat of a king, 
and eat of the fish that hath fed of that worm" (IV,iii). Ambrose 
Bierce delights in presenting succinctly the same idea in his definition 
of "edible" in the Devil's Dictionary: "Good to eat, and wholesome to 
digest, as a worm to a toad, a toad to a snake, a snake to a pig, a 
pig to a man, and a man to a worm. ,AS Hamlet adds some later reflec-
tions on the fate of mortals, agains using examples of the highest-
ranking members of that species: "To what base uses we may return, 
Horatio! Why may not imagination trace the noble dust of Alexander 
till he find it stopping a bunghole?" In his next speech he adds, 
Imperious Caesar, dead and turned to clay, 
Might stop a hole to keep the wind away. 
0, that that earth which kept the world in awe 
Should patch a wall t'expel the winter's flaw: (V,i) 
Such examples of the very greatest of men are not supplied as warnings 
merely to the powerful but to remind all men of their mortality. 
Patrick Carey's "Nulla Fides" (c. 1650) contrasts man with two 
lowly members of the animal kingdom to demonstrate what a fragile, in-
significant creature man is. The first stanza asserts that even so 
tiny a creature as a fly has no difficulty in destroying a human being: 
For God's sake mark that fly: 
See what a poor, weak, little thing it is. 
When thou has marked, and scorned it, know that this, 
This little, poor, weak fly 
Has killed a pope; can make an emp'ror die. 46 
45 Bierce, p. 228. 
46 in Six Centuries of Great Poetrv, ed. Robert Penn '\-iarren and 
Albert Erskine (New York: Dell Pub., 1955), pp. 254-55. 
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The second stanza asserts that a tiny spark of fire, seemingly so small, 
"Hast burnt whole towns; can burn a world entire." That inevitable 
symbol of man's mortality, the worm, dominates the third stanza: 
That crawling worm there see: 
Ponder how ugly, filthy, vile it is. 
When thou has seen and loathed it, know that this, 
This base worm thou dost see, 
Has quite devoured thy parents; shall eat thee. 
The claim that man is nothing but food for the animals becomes a 
commonplace in satires on mankind. 
The final stanza is a summary which concludes that man and his 
world are nothing but trifling things: 
Honor, the world, and man, 
What trifles are they; since most true it is 
That this poor fly, this little spark, this 
So much abhorred worm, can 
Honor destroy; burn worlds; devour up man. 
Man and this world are so insignificant that seemingly insignificant 
things have the power to destroy them. Within his poem, Carey has 
moved in the demonstration of this from great people (pope and emperor), 
to the world, to "thee" specifically, that is, to the reader himself. 
The animal perspective is to be found in prose works as well. 
Richard Aldington accurately labels the satire he finds in Cyrano de 
Bergerac's "Story of the Birds" (c. 1648) as satire on mankind: "The 
satire on mankind in the story of the birds is very happy and furnished 
Tom d'Urfey with an opera."47 Satire on mankind can be located sporad-
ically throughout Cyrano's Voyage~ the Moon as well as the Voyage to 
47 Cyrano de Bergerac, Voyages ~ the Moon and the Sun, trans. 
Richard Aldington (London: George Routledge and Sons, 1923), p. 42. 
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the Sun, but the "Story of the Birds" is a discrete satire on man 
---
within the latter. 
The narrator is captured by the birds, who intend to eat him, but 
a friendly magpie intercedes by observing 
that it was a barbarous proceeding to put to death without trial 
an animal which to some extent approached their reasoning; they 
were ready to tear it to pieces, alleging that it would be very 
ridiculous to think that a completely naked animal, whom Nature 
herself had taken no care to furnish at its birth with the things 
necessary to preserve it, should be capable of reason like them-
selves. (241) 
In this brief section, we see several typical charges against man. He 
may serve as food for animals. He has only a smattering of reasoning 
prowess, and Nature has not been bountiful in providing for him. 
The birds who want to make an immediate repast of the man claim 
that man is nothing but a 
bald beast, a plucked bird, a chimera built up of all kinds of 
natures, terrifying to everyone: Man, I say, so foolish and so 
vain that he convinces himself we were created only for him; • 
Man who maintains that we only reason by means of the senses and 
who has the weakest, slowest and falsest senses of any creature; 
Man whom Nature made like a monster, in order to create all 
things, but in whom she inspired the ambition of commanding all 
animals and exterminating them. (241) 
Again, man's anthropocentrism, his sense of supremacy over other forms 
of creation is attacked, as well as his vanity and pride. His senses 
are depicted as the weakest of any creature. 
The feeling exhibited by the birds is so strong against man that 
the narrator is advised not to admit that he is a man; thus, he con-
cocts a story that he is in fact a monkey. A magpie, although he knows 
better, quite unreasonably favors keeping the man alive: 
105 
for although I am not ignorant that a man among living beings is 
a pest of which every civilized state ought to purge itself, yet 
when I remember I was brought up by them • • • I feel for you a 
tenderness which prevents me from inclining towards the juster 
party. (248) 
Civilized creatures, then, should rightfully eradicate mankind. An 
indictment is even drawn up against the man. 
Entitled "Pleading Made in the Parliament of Birds, the Chambers 
Assembled, Against An Animal Accused of Being a Man," the indictment 
makes it clear that the animals are, paradoxically, more human than the 
humans: 
It would not be difficult for us to prevent the violence he might 
do by killing him. However, since the safety or the loss of 
every living thing concerns the republic of the living, it seems 
to me we should deserve to be born men, that is to say degraded 
from the reason and immortality we possess above them, if we 
resembled them in any of their injustices. (252) 
Here animals make two traditional human claims: the possession of rea-
son plus the inheritance of immortality. The indictment goes on to 
claim that "all creatures were produced by our common Mother to live 
together sociably." (253) But man disturbs what Nature had intended: 
The first and fundamental law for the maintenance of a republic 
is equality; but man could not endure this eternally; he rushed 
upon us to devour us, he convinces himself that we were only made 
for his use. (253) 
Man's anthropocentrism, his speciesism, makes him assume he is superior 
to the animal part of creation: 
As an argument of his pretended superiority he cites the barbarity 
with which he massacres us and the little resistance he finds in 
overcoming our weakness, and yet he will not admit as his masters 
the eagles, condors, and griffins, by whom the strongest of them 
are overcome. (253) 
Hen are, in fact, cowards, "inclined to servitude," and they actually 
fear liberty (253). Nonetheless, "as a consequence of this ridiculous 
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chieftainship, he pleasantly arrogates to himself the right of life and 
death over us" (254). Furthermore, 
he thinks the Sun was lighted to enable him to make war on us; 
he thinks Nature allows us to make excursions through the sky 
simply for him to draw favourable or unfavourable auspices from 
our flight, and that when God put entrails into our bodies His 
only purpose was to make a book from which man might learn the 
science of future things. (254) 
Man's arrogance, his pride in this is "utterly insupportable." Still, 
that he holds such far-fetched opinions is no reason to condemn him to 
death: "since the poor beast has not the use of reason like ourselves, 
I excuse his errors in so far as they are produced by lack of under-
standing"(254). Errors of will, however, are unforgivable. Man, who 
kills his own kind, teaches animals to kill their own kind: "he de-
bauches the natural disposition of hawks, falcons and vultures, by 
teaching them to massacre their kind •. II (254) 
The case against man is so strong that even the defense counselor, 
normally a sympathetic bird, for the sake of his own soul's salvation 
refuses to speak in defense of "such a monster as man"(255). Naturally, 
with this kind of a defense, he is found guilty and given an appropriate 
sentence: 
To annihilate me by a punishment which would serve to undeceive 
me by challenging the pretended empire of men over birds, they 
ordered that I should be given up to the anger of the weakest 
among them; which meant that they condemned me to be eaten by 
flies. (256) 
Man's failure to know himself, to be aware of his limitations, his 
frail hold on life, and his failure to perceive his connection to the 
rest of creation are again highlighted here. 
In attempting to console him about his ensuing death, the birds 
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claim that man has no soul:."since your soul is not immortal like ours, 
you may well suppose when you die that everything dies with you"(257). 
This, of course, is an ironic reversal of man's customary position that 
animals do not possess souls. In addition, the man will have the honor 
of becoming sustenance for the animals, in essence, bird food: 
when you are eaten, as you will be, by our little birds, you will 
pass into their substance: yes, you will have the honour of 
contributing (even though blindly) to the intellectual operations 
of flies, and though you do not reason yourself, you will at 
least share in the glory of making them reason. (258) 
But he is saved at the last minute when his cousin's parrot rescues him 
out of gratitude. The man, it seems, had once maintained that birds do 
reason and had released the parrot from its cage. With birds, at least, 
"a good action is never lost" (261). 
A passage from the Voyage ~ the ~ is also relevant here. It 
attacks man's speciesism and anticipates some ideas that Mark Twain was 
to use later: 
you think your soul immortal to the exclusion of that of beasts? 
My dear friend, without exaggeration your pride is very insolent! 
And, I beseech you, whence do you deduce this immortality to the 
prejudice of the Beasts? Is it because we are gifted with reason 
and they not? To begin with, I deny that and whenever you please 
I will prove to you that they reason like ourselves. But even if 
it were true that reason has been granted us as a prerogative and 
that it was a privilege reserved to our species alone, does that 
mean that God must enrich man with immortality when He has 
already squandered reason upon him? I suppose I should give, in 
that case, a pistole to a beggar because I gave him a crown 
yesterday? You yourself see the falsity of the argument and 
that, on the contrary, if I am just, I ought to give a crown to 
another rather than a pistole to the first, since the other has 
had nothing from me. We must conclude from this, my dear friend, 
that God, who is a thousand times more just than we are, will not 
have given everything to some and nothing to others. (152-53) 
The attempt, again, is to render man less certain of his favored 
position in the universe, to make him less presumptuous. 
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In a lighter vein, Mme Deshoulieres makes use of animal compari-
sons in a couple of poems, and her depictions of animals are fairly 
unrealistic. As the first line of "Les Moutons" (1671) illustrates, 
she portrays their lives as idyllic: "H~las! petits Moutons, que vous 
48 ~tes heureux!" If Mme Deshouli~res were talking only of sheep in 
the first line, there would be no need for the word "alas." Again, it 
does not really matter what is said about animals here, because some-
thing is being asserted about man. 
Contrasts between the happy animal state and the less than desi-
rable human state are pointed out directly by Mme Deshoulieres: 
L'ambition, l'honneur, l'int~r~t, l'imposture, 
Qui font tant de maux parmi nous, 
Ne se rencontrent point chez vous. 
She concedes that man does of course have reason, but she is not going 
to maintain that it does him any particular good: "Ce n'est pas un 
grand avantage." In fact, as is by now customary, it turns out to be 
a hindrance. And the poem concludes that the sheep are "plus heureux & 
plus sages que nous." 
Many of the same attitudes turn up in another of l1me Deshoulieres' 
poems, "La Solitude," which deals with the pleasant state of things in 
nature, in those secluded places where man has not intruded. Instinct 
is again to be preferred to reason: 
152. 
En vain notre orgueil nous engage 
A ravaler l'instinct qui cans chaque saison, 
A la honte de la raison, 
Pour tous les animaux est un guide si sage. 
48 Both of Mme Deshoulieres' poems are printed in Boas, pp. 147-
Why even to think of comparing man to animals is brazen effrontery: 
De quel _droit, de quel front est-ce que l'on compare 
Ceux a qui la Nature a fait un coeur barbare, 
Aux Ours, aux Sangliers, aux Loups? 
Ils sont moins barbares que nous. 
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One recurring piece of evidence that satirists on mankind have cited is 
man's treatment of his own kind. Man will even turn against his own 
brother: 
Combien avez-vous vu de fois 
Le fr~re arme contre le frere 
Faire taire du sang la forte & tendre voix. 
Such is the simple, natural life of the animals according to Mme Des-
houli~res. We encounter a much more complex formulation of some of the 
same sentiments in my next example of a satire on mankind employing 
animal comparisons. 
William Wycherley's "Upon the Impertinence of Knowledge, the Un-
reasonableness of Reason, and the Brutality of Humanity; proving the 
Animal Life the ~ Reasonable ~' since the ~ Natural, and most 
Innocent" (1704), which fades in quality quickly after the title but 
goes on for six more pages in one interminable stanza, is an extended 
comparison of man to animals centering around the disadvantages man's 
b i h . 49 reason r ngs to ~m. 
Wycherley begins by asking why man should claim that his reason 
places him above the beasts, why he claims it as his distinguishing 
trait and takes so much pride in it: 
49 The Complete Works ££William Wycherley, ed. Montague Summers 
(Soho: The Nonesuch Press, 1924), III, 149-54. 
Why shou'd Man's vain Pretence to Reason be, 
From Beast, his just Distinction? whom still we, 
More Guilty, and less Human, for it see; 
Who, for his Knowledge, and Humanity, 
Lives, deals with his own Kind, more Brutally, 
As for his Reason, more Unreasonably; 
Who for it, o'er his Passions, has less Pow'r, 
Is more a Beast, as is his Reason more. 
Wycherley claims that men are more guilty and less human for having 
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reason. This is ironical and paradoxical since man had conventionally 
been defined as the animal with reason. The New World of Words: Or 
Universal English Dictionary (6th ed. 1706), for example, defines man 
as "a Creature endu'd with Reason, as oppos'd to brute Beasts •••• "50 
So, reason makes man treat his own kind more brutally, less reasonably, 
less humanely. The brutishness or brutality of humans (and occasionally 
the humanity of animals) is a play on words, an irony or paradox, that 
is seen again and again in satires on man. 
What, then, are the evils which attend man's reason? They are 
numerous, but most importantly reason interferes with three primary, 
crucial relationships man has: with his own kind, with animal kind, and 
even with God himself. 
Animals are predators but spare their own kind, whil·e man, thanks 
to reason, fears his fellow man: 
They, who on others prey, their Kind will spare; 
Whilst Man, does Man more for his Reason fear. 
As the Houyhnhnms were quick to realize, man has just enough reason to 
make him a frightening and destructive creature: 
50 Edward Phillips, The ·New \.J'orld of Words: Or Universal English 
Dictionary. 6th ed.-z1ondon: 1706~ 
Men, one another to each other find, 
More Brutal, for being of Human-kind; 
Beasts without Reason, may with Reason then, 
Be thought more just and sensible than Men, 
Who Foes to their own Kind have seldom been. 
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That men are brutal to their own kind is, as we have seen, a recurrent 
charge in satires on mankind. 
Man can not only not get along with his own kind, but he places 
himself in an unnaturally superior position in relationship to animal 
kind. The same point is made several times throughout the poem: 
By's Reason claims, o'er Brute Beasts, Pow'r, or Sway, 
By which, he yet is more a Beast than They. 
In another contrast Wycherley says, "For in Brute Beasts, whom we de-
spise, we see, I Their Will and Senses never disagree." The telling 
phrase is, of course, "whom we despise." We despise them because we 
think they are lower than we are; but, according to Wycherley, perhaps 
we shouldn't judge too hastily. We do not estimate ourselves properly 
in relation to animals; and, finally, we do the same in relationship to 
the Creator. 
Reason thus intervenes in religion as well, a point Wycherley 
also makes several times in the poem. For one thing, man's reason 
makes him presumptuous. As a result of reason man tries to "make 
Things above Reason, yield to Sense, I Will judge his I1aker, question 
Providence." As Pope noted, this is a singularly presumptuous thing 
for man to attempt. .Finally, towards the end of the poem, Wycherley 
claims that reason will lead man to doubt: 
Since he, but as he thinks, his Reason more, 
Doubts more his Maker's Being, and his Pow'r; 
Of Happiness here, and hereafter too, 
Deprives himself, by his vain Reason so. 
112 
In the end, then, reason may even damn him. 
Besides adversely affecting our attitudes towards other men, 
animalkind, and God, reason brings yet other bad effects. It overpowers 
the senses and asserts an unnatural control over them. Reason needs to 
be grounded in the senses, but too often "Man's Reason does his want of 
Sense betray." t1an finally opposes his senses, which had been overrun 
by Reason, to Nature, which is the "best Guide, that a Man of Sense can 
chuse, I For Reason's none, which against Nature goes." For men, then, 
reason gets in the way of nature. The same is not true, of course, for 
beasts: 
Whilst Beasts, acknowledging but Nature's Law, 
From their thick Sculls, no false Conclusions draw; 
For want of Sense, of nothing stand in aw; 
Themselves by Nature, more than Reason guide; 
So from Acts Natural less led aside. 
Furthermore, reason deters man from enjoying himself; it acts as a curb 
on his natural self. Reason increases man's doubts, cares, fears; the 
more reason he has, the less happiness. On the other hand, animals, 
not hindered by reason, are consequently happier than man: 
Then Beasts, as happier, the wiser are, 
In whom more strong all Appetites appear, 
For Want of Reason, have no Guilt, Shame, Fear; 
Whose want of Reason, Man must needs confess, 
Makes their Joys more, their Cares, Fears, Troubles less, 
So have, as less of Sense, more Happiness; 
More Peace of Mind, in Body, more Delight; 
In Sense, Love, Food, more Gust and Appetite. 
~mile Wycherley's comparisons favor animals throughout the poem, he does 
not seem particularly fond of animals here and does not overly idealize 
their lot. 
We come to an even wider departure from Mme Deshouli~res' ideal-
ized, pastoral animals when we reach John Gay's Fable XLIX, "The Man 
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and the Flea" (1727). 51 Here animals do not come off so well; they're 
not the orderly, natural creatures we find in so many poems of this 
type. Instead, they are bad, even to the point of possessing that most 
human of sins, pride: 
Whether on earth, in air, or main 
Sure ev'ry thing alive is vain! 
Does not the hawk all his fowls survey, 
As destin'd only for his prey? 
The crab and the snail are two others notable for their vanity. But, 
and here is the point, man just happens to be worse: 
What dignity's in human nature, 
Says Man, the most conceited creature. 
Man, too, examines the entire ~qorld and assumes that all was made 
solely for his purpose: 
• • • all these by heav'n designed 
As gifts to pleasure human kind, 
I cannot raise my worth too high; 
Of what vast consequence am I! 
But, as we have now come to expect, man will get his comeuppance and, 
in this case, by the lowly, insignificant flea: 
Not of th'importance you suppose, 
Replies a Flea upon his nose: 
Be humble, learn thyself to scan; 
Know, pride was never made for man. 
'Tis vanity that swells thy mind. 
What, heav'n and earth for thee design'd! 
For thee! made only for our need; 
That more important Fleas might feed. 
Again man is asked to reassess his inflated appraisal of himself: 
"learn thyself to scan." Again we see the attempt to destroy pride and 
anthropocentrism; and man is reduced to mere flea fodder. Once again, 
51 Fables (Los Angeles: Augustan Reprint Society, 1967), pp. 167-
169. 
114 
what is said about animals is unimportant here, because the message is 
stating something about man. Gay has merely changed the formula a bit. 
Man is not the opposite to animals here, just worse in degree. 
As we noticed earlier, Jonathan Swift was well aware of the 
marvelous evasive powers which enable most readers of satire to dodge 
the satirist's charges. They bounce the ball back or see their neigh-
bar's face in the mirror. It is less easy to remove oneself from the 
species, and Swift attacks the species through animal comparisons in 
"The Beasts Confession to the Priest ." (1732). In the preface to 
the poem Swift says he is chastizing man for not looking at himself 
objectively: 
I have been long of Opinion, that there is not a more general and 
greater Mistake, or of worse Consequence through the Commerce of 
Mankind, than the wrong Judgments they are apt to entertain of 
their own talents.52 
Man is thus guilty of affectation; he claims or attributes to himself 
what he notoriously lacks. Swift, then, is calling for man to formu-
late a more accurate self-appraisal. 
In the advertisement to the poem, Swift claims he is doing man an 
honor by comparing him to animals: 
The following Poem is grounded upon the universal Folly in Man-
kind of mistaking their Talents; by which the Author doth a great 
Honour to his own Species, almost equalling them with certain 
Brutes; wherein, indeed, he is too partial, as he freely con-
fesseth: And yet he hath gone as low as he well could, by speci-
fying four Animals; the Wolf, the Ass, the Swine and the Ape; all 
equally mischievous, except the last, who outdoes them in the 
Article of Cunning: So great is the Pride of Man. 
52 Swift: Poetical Works, ed. Herbert Davis (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1967), pp. 536-44. 
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Swift confesses that he can't really be logical about this, because he 
is prejudiced on the side of man. This is a delightful way of saying 
that man is in reality much lower than the animals. In addition, Swift 
adds that he has chosen four of the lowest animals so that man will 
have a better chance of measuring up to them. Unfortunately, man turns 
out to be lower than the low. 
Swift's animals are not the simple, pastoral animals of Mme Des-
houlieres; they are closer to those of Gay. During a plague, the king 
of the brutes proclaims that all animals must confess their sins to a 
priest. Their confessions, too, reveal affectation in that each prides 
himself on qualities he notoriously lacks. We can see this in the 
Swine: 
The Swine with contrite Heart allow'd, 
His Shape and Beauty made him proud: 
In Dyet was perhaps too nice, 
But Gluttony was ne'er his Vice •••• 
His Vigilance might some displease; 
'Tis true, he hated Sloth like Pease. 
The Goat, traditionally associated with lechery, first denies that he 
has a beard: 
The Goat advanc'd with decent Pace; 
And, first excus'd his youthful Face; 
Forgiveness begg'd, that he appear'd 
('Twas Nature's Fault) without a Beard. 
'Tis true, he was not much inclin'd 
To fondness for the Female Kind. 
These animals, then, are not particularly acute at looking at them-
selves. Now we get some instructions from Swift: 
Apply the Tale, and you shall find 
How just it suits with human Kind. 
Some Faults we own: But, can you guess? 
Why?--Virtues carry'd to Excess; 
Wherewith our Vanity endows us, 
Though neither Foe nor Friend allows us. 
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swift next supplies us with appropriate examples of classes of men who 
are adept at mistaking their talents, who are, that is, exemplars of 
affectation: 
The cringing Knave who seeks a Place 
Without Success; thus tells his Case: 
Why should he longer mince the Matter? 
He fail'd, because he could not flatter. 
The Statesman tells you with a Sneer, 
His Fault is to be too Sincere. 
The Sharper swore he hated Play, 
Except to pass an Hour away: 
And, well he might; for to his Cost, 
By want of Skill, he always lost. 
In the final stanza, Swift reverses his tactics: 
I own, the Moral not exact; 
Besides, the Tale is false in Fact. 
The reason the story is false, however, is not that what has been said 
about man is not true. Swift has given us a bit of false hope before 
finishing man off. Rather, what has been said about animals is untrue: 
Creatures of ev'ry Kind but ours 
Well comprehend their nat'ral Powers; 
While We, whom Reason ought to sway, 
Mistake our Talents ev'ry Day. 
Swift closes by saying that Aesop probably intended to compliment man-
kind by claiming that "Beasts may degen'rate into Men."53 
53 Swift has directed an even more devastating attack upon the 
species in Gulliver's Travels. This is not the place, however, for a 
consideration of that work as a satire on mankind. That particular 
topic invites extensive study, and it has already been covered to some 
extent by various scholars. Phillip Harth has called Gulliver's Travels 
"a satire on mankind in which each book contributes a separate item to 
a bill of particulars against humanity's racial pride," in "The Problem 
of Political Allegory in Gulliver's Travels," HP: A Supplement to Honor 
Arthur Friedman, 73 (May 1976), p. S47. The fullest examination has 
been by ~~.B. Carnochan, who concludes, "~Then we need a description of 
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Dr. Johnson's original Idler 22, which he later suppressed, is 
another example of a satire on mankind viewed through the animal per-
54 
spective. The modern editors suggest that its misanthropic tone is 
probably the reason he did not include it in the collected edition: 
The parallels with the Fourth Voyage of Gulliver's Travels are 
obvious. Johnson's close affinities with Swift and his attempt 
to resist them (e.g. his strong aversion to "general satire," of 
which Mrs. Thrale speaks; his strange antipathy to Swift; his 
conscious attempts to cultivate "good-nature") help to explain 
both the writing of this essay and his suppression of it in the 
collected edition. (317) 
In Idler 45 he reacts against those who would attack the species: 
There is in many minds a kind of vanity exerted to the disadvan-
tage of themselves; a desire to be praised for superior acuteness, 
discovered only in the degradation of their species, or censure 
of their country. (139) 
Nonetheless, Johnson had done just that in Number 22. 
This time the form is that of the prose essay rather than verse. 
Dr. Johnson tells the story of a shepherd who through his long residence 
in the forest has learned to understand the speech of birds. The 
shepherd has overheard an old vulture instructing her young. In doing 
the class in which Gulliver falls, we do well enough with the label, a 
'satire on man."' This is from Lemuel Gulliver's Mirror for Man 
(Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1968), p. 165. James E:-Gill has 
discussed in detail the animal comparisons of Book Four in "Beast Over 
Man: Theriophilic Paradox in Gulliver's 'Voyage to the Country of the 
Houyhnhnms, "' SP, 67 (1970), 532-49. And Ernest Tuveson has examined 
Swift's ability-to entrap his reader within the satire and found Swift 
superior to other satirists on man, in "Swift: The View from within the 
Satire" in The Satirist's Art, ed. H. James Jensen and Malvin R. 
Zirker, Jr.-cBloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1972), pp. 55-85. 
54 The Idler and the Adventurer, ed. W.J. Bate, John M. Bullitt, 
and L.F. Powell (New Ha~: Yale University Press, 1963), pp. 317-20. 
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so, she provides an animal perspective on the human scene. We see the 
human race and its activities through her eyes. The charges brought 
forth are ones we have heard before and which by no means will end with 
Dr. Johnson. 
In teaching her young about food, the old vulture mentions man. 
The young are anxious to know his whereabouts for "his flesh is surely 
the natural food of a vulture" (318). How, the young wonder, can one 
kill such a large creature. The mother vulture's response touches on 
a number of the issues we have encountered before in satires on man: 
"We have not the strength of man," returned the mother, "and I am 
sometimes in doubt whether we have the subtility; and the vul-
tures would seldom feast upon his flesh, had not nature, that 
devoted him to our uses, infused into him a strange ferocity, 
which I have never observed in any other being that feeds upon 
the earth." (318-19) 
• 
Man, it is asserted, is made by Nature to serve as vulture food. Simi-
lar claims have been made by fleas, worms and other animals in satires 
on man. The creator has no elevated purpose in mind for man if he is 
nothing but food for the consumption of animals. Man even has a pro-
pensity for serving his own kind up for the vultures. He does this 
through war: "Two herds of men will often meet and shake the earth with 
noise, and fill the air with fire" (319). Many will be dismembered and 
mangled, all "for the convenience of the vulture" (319). 
The pupils ask why men do not eat their prey. The wolf won't let 
a vulture touch what he has killed until he himself is finished with it, 
and "Is not man another kind of wolf?" (319) The mother replies that 
man "is the only beast who kills that which he does not devour, and 
this quality makes him so much a benefactor to our species" (319). The 
question arises as to why man indulges in all this manslaughter. The 
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mother says she can't answer that though she is "reckoned the most 
subtile bird of the mountain" (319). She tells them of a wise old 
vulture she used to visit when she was young. He "had fed year after 
year on the entrails of men," and, therefore, is presumably an expert 
on the subject of man (319). She tells her pupils what her old mentor 
had concluded about mankind: 
His opinion was, that men had only the appearance of animal life, 
being really vegetables with a power of motion; and that as the 
boughs of an oak are dashed together by the storm, that swine may 
fatten upon the falling acorns, so men are by some unaccountable 
power driven one against another, till they lose their motion, 
that vultures may be fed. (319-20) 
Some observers of the human scene, the wise one goes on, see an inkling 
of political activity among humans. Such observers believe that in 
every herd there is "on~ that gives directions to the rest, and seems 
to be more eminently delighted with a wide carnage" (320). This leader 
is seldom either the biggest or the swiftest, "but he shews by his 
eagerness and diligence that he is, more than any of the others, a 
friend to vultures" (320). The leaders among men, then, are obviously 
not to be trusted. The point of the whole, I suppose, is that the 
birds of prey, the vultures, find man a more insidious predator than 
they themselves are. Though man's viciousness is unaccountable from 
their point of view, they are content in that, since he does not con-
sume his prey, dead men end up as nourishment for the vultures. 
In a poem somewhat doubtfully attributed to Goldsmith, "The 
Logician Refuted" (1759), we find several hallmarks of a satire on man-
kind from the animal perspective: the "definition" of man, man's pre-
tensions to reason, and the advocacy of instinct. First, Goldsmith 
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or, at least, the narrator of the poem attacks the classical definition 
of man: 
Logicians have but ill defined 
As Rational, the human kind.55 
Man is once more charged with pride and speciesism. In addition, he 
may not be the "apple" of the Creator's eye. The narrator maintains 
That man and all his ways are vain; 
And that this boasted lord of nature, 
Is both a weak and erring creature. 
That instinct is a surer guide, 
Than reason-boasting mortals pride; 
And that brute beasts are far before 'em, 
Deus est anima brutorum. 
---
Animals, of course, are the precise opposite of man: 
No judges, fidlers, dancing-masters, 
No pick-pockets, or poetasters, 
Are known to honest quadrupeeds, 
No single brute his fellows leads. 
Brutes never meet in bloody fray, 
Nor cut each others throats for pay. 
Now we may want to question a couple of the poet's zoological asser-
tions here; but, as I have maintained, the poet is saying something not 
about animals but about man. 
The use of animal comparisons and contrasts has continued into 
the twentieth century. A couple of examples will, I hope, suffice. 
Edgar Lee Hasters in "Schroeder the Fisherman" from the Spoon River 
Anthology does not idealize animals but says merely that they are 
rapacious in their own ways: 
55 Collected Works of Oliver Goldsmith, ed. Arthur Friedman 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press,:f966), IV, 411-13. 
I sat on the bank above Bernadette 
And dropped crumbs in the water, 
Just to see the minnows bump each other, 
Until the strongest got the prize. 
Or I went to my little pasture, 
Where the peaceful swine were asleep in the wallow, 
Or nosing each other lovingly, 
And emptied a basket of yellow corn, 
And watched them push and squeal and bite, 
And trample each other to get the corn. 
And I saw how Christian Dallman's farm, 
Of more than three thousand acres, 
Swallowed the patch of Felix Schmidt, 
As a bass will swallow a minnow. 
And I say if there's anything in man--
Spirit, or conscience, or breath of God 
That makes him different from fishes or hogs, 
I'd like to see it work!56 
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In this poem it is the comparison which holds sway. There is a direct 
assertion that no difference exists between man and animals. Schroeder 
can see no differences among man and fishes and hogs. Man seemingly 
has no spirit, no conscience, no breath of God to distinguish him from 
the other representatives of the animal kingdom. 
Mme de Stael (1766-1817) is reputed to have said, "The more I see 
of man, the more I like dogs."57 Ezra Pound, using the same two objects, 
arrives at a more tentative but ultimately, I think, similar conclusion. 
Pound's five-line "Meditatio" harbors no romantic attitude towards 
animals. Examining dogs, Pound finds them inferior to man: 
When I carefully consider the curious habits of dogs 
I am compelled to conclude 58 That man is the superior animal. 
56 Edgar Lee Master, Spoon River Anthology (New York: Collier 
Books, 1962), p. 188. 
57 Peter, p. 323. 
58 Selected Poems of Ezra Pound (New York: New Directions, 1957), 
p. 34. 
But before we get a chance to congratulate ourselves he adds, 
When I consider the curious habits of man 
I confess, my friend, I am puzzled. 
Pound's position is obviously not far from that of Mme de Stael. 
"When serpents bargain for the right to squirm" (1950) by e.e. 
cummings is a sonnet the first three quatrains of which are numerous 
dependent clauses beginning with the word "when." The general tenor 
of all these dependent clauses might be paraphrased as "when natural 
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creatures and natural phenomena perform unnatural human acts." We can 
see this in the second quatrain: 
when every thrush may sing no new moon in 
if all screech-owls have not okayed his voice 
--and any wave sings on the dotted line 
or else an ocean is compelled to close.59 
The concluding couplet provides the grammatical completion of the 
sentence: 
then we'll believe in that incredible 
unanimal mankind(and not until). 
Man is separated from the natural part of creation by the word "unani-
mal." Since it is highly unlikely or impossible for any of the depen-
dent clauses will come true, the poet is saying that he can not believe 
in the species of which he is a member. 
James Thurber has summed up a number of considerations that have 
been discussed in this section: 
Man is born to the belief that he is superior to the lower ani-
mals, and • • • critical intelligence comes when he realizes that 
he is more similar than dissimilar. • • • He will not get 
59 Complete Poems: 1913-1962 (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovano-
vich, 1972), p. 620. 
ahywhere until he realizes • • • that he is • • • less kindly 
than the dog, possessed of less dignity than the swan, and in-
capable of being as magnificent an angel as the black panther. 
I have become a little tired of the capitalization of man, his 
easy assumption of a dignity more apparent than real, and his 
faith in a high destiny for which he is not fitted by his long 
and bloody history.60 
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We see Thurber in the twentieth century echo the observations we have 
been hearing all along in this section: man's unrealistic placement of 
himself as superior to the animals when in fact he is much closer to 
them than he would care to admit; his incapacity to realize that he is 
actually inferior to them in some ways; his pride in self; and his 
assumption of a high place in the grand scheme of things. As Ellen 
Douglas Leyburn has written, "Brute creation seems sometimes to exist 
as a satire on man~ind."61 
Before concluding this section, I want to call attention to one 
additional strategy. George Boas has pointed out a strategy which goes 
one step further than comparing man to animals, even the lowest form of 
animals: "We might mention here a type of literature which, not content 
with ranking beasts higher than men, ranks plants higher."62 He cites 
Innocent III's De Contemptu Mundi, Book I, chapter nine as an example. 
In his Voyage ~ the Moon, Cyrano de Bergerac uses the same device. He 
asserts that man's position in the universe, in God's eye, is of no 
6° Cited in Leonard Feinberg, The Satirist (New York: The Citadel 
Press, 1965), p. 275. 
61 Satiric Allegory: Mirror of Man (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1956), p. 57. 
62 Boas, p. 19. 
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more importance than the life of a plant, a lowly cabbage even: 
And to say that God loves man more than a cabbage is to tickle 
ourselves to make ourselves laugh; He is incapable of passion and 
therefore cannot love or hate anybody; and if He were capable of 
love He would rather feel tenderness for the cabbage you are 
holding (which cannot offend Him) than for a man when He already 
has before His eyes the wrongs the man is fated to commit.63 
He carries the argument further: 
Since God, the common Father of all things, cherishes equally all 
His works, is it not reasonable that He should have shared His 
benefits equally between us and plants? True, we were born 
first, but in God's family there is no right of primogeniture. 
If then cabbages did not share with us the fief of immortality, 
doubtless they received some other advantage, the briefness of 
whose existence is compensated for by its grandeur.64 
Finally, man is told, "Remember then, 0 proudest of all animals, that 
alt~ough the cabbage you cut says not a word, it thinks none the 
less."65 I suppose the same point I have been making about animals 
applies to cabbages as well: nothing is really being asserted about 
cabbages. They are present only for their use as an outrageous way of 
making man less sure of himself, less proud of himself. 
The charges we have seen exhibited through use of the animal per-
spective are as follows: 
f. man is the only animal to kill or prey on his own kind 
2. man is anthropocentric and speciesistic; he foolishly thinks 
all was created solely for him, whereas animals may say the 
same since 
3. man ends up as food for many animals 
63 Cyrano de Bergerac, p. 128. 
64 Cyrano de Bergerac, p. 129. 
65 Cyrano de Bergerac, 130. p. 
4. man is physically inferior to many animals 
5. man is temperamentally or psychologically inferior to many 
animals 
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6. man may have greater mental capacities, such as reason, but 
these are no consolation and may be even further reason to 
indict him 
7. man is a beast (though it may not be fair to the beasts to 
label him one) 
8. man is not as high on the grand scale of being as he would 
like to think; he is closer to the animals than he would like 
to admit 
9. man may not be the focus of the Creator's undivided atten-
tion.66 
Most of these charges can be located in Montaigne and Charron and 
earlier classical sources, and we find many of them being reiterated 
today. The emphasis, as with other strategies for satirizing mankind, 
is on belittling man and by rendering him less sure of himself, asking 
him to undertake a reappraisal of himself and his place in the uni-
verse. 
66 In her irreverent twentieth-century version of an eighteenth-
century novel, Fanny: Being the True History of the Adventures of 
Fanny Hackabout-Jones (New York: New American Library, 1980), Erica 
Jong reveals a familiarity with Swift and the satire on man. The 
narrator says that humans are "sub-equine and sub-canine" (p. 60). She 
has her fictional Swift make a claim of superiority for horses over 
humans which I have not seen elsewhere: "E'en the Droppings of a Horse 
are Golden Stones compar'd to a ~an's brown and putrid Excrement! ••• 
And is this not because the Horse eats nought but the purest Grass and 
Hay, whilst we, who claim to be the Rational Race, eat largely dead and 
decaying Flesh? By a Creature's very Droppings shall ye know him!" 
(218) But these assertions seem purely comic rather than satiric. 
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c. The Extraterrestrial Perspective 
If the satirist decides to attack man as a species, it may readily 
occur to him to compare and contrast man with representatives from the 
animal kingdom, as we have just seen. Man has probably always done 
this--noted wherein he is inferior to certain animals and where su-
perior. But how else might the satirist go about making man feel his 
insignificance, his feebleness of body and intellect? The usefulness 
of an outside perspective commenting on the contemporary scene has long 
been known to the satirist. Montesquieu's Lettres Persanes is one 
well-known example. But the problem remains of how to get outside the 
human realm, since, on one level, all humans are .being attacked. One 
solution, in addition to that of employing animals, is simply for the 
satirist to fabricate extraterrestrials to comment on the human scene 
or for use in comparisons and contrasts with earthlings. 
To get this outside perspective, then, the satirist may decide to 
create one. Oliver Herford, in a poem entitled "Earth" (1898), does 
just this. He suggests what an outside observer might see were the 
planet to suffer destruction: 
If this little world tonight 
Suddenly should fall through space 
In a hissing, headlong flight, 
Shriveling from off its face, 
As it falls into the sun, 
In an instant every trace 
Of the little crawling things--
Ants, philosophers, and lice, 
Cattle, cockroaches, and kings, 
Beggars, millionaires, and mice, 
Men and maggots all as one 
As it falls into the sun. • • • 
Who can say but at the same 
Instant from some planet far 
A child may watch us and exclaim: 67 
"See the pretty shooting star:" 
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In this brief poem we find a surprising number of the concerns we have 
been discussing in relation to the satire on mankind. The earth, 
relatively speaking, is a "little world." The possibility of its de-
struction is brought out. The possibility of other life out in space 
is posited. Such life may outlive or survive us; and, in fact, the 
destruction of the earth may appear merely diverting from that perspec-
tive. Thus, man's pride is again attacked, his pride of place in the 
universe and his pride in his petty accomplishments. The earth may not 
be the center of the cosmos; man may not be the sole, special creation 
of the Maker; and, finally, man is linked with, in fact, levelled with, 
other "little crawling things." 
In another poem entitled "Earth," John Hall Wheelock makes use of 
a Martian observer of our planet: 
"A planet doesn't explode of itself," said drily 
The Martian astronomer, gazing off into the air--
"That they were able to do it is proof that highly 
Intelligent beings must have been living there."68 
The irony, of course, turns on the word "intelligent," and the whole 
point is to make one doubt the intelligence of human beings or to 
suggest that destruction is all man's intelligence is good for. The 
Houyhnhnms were apparently right to fear the modicum of human intellect 
which Gulliver possesses. 
67 in Mindscapes: Poems for the Real World (New York: Dell Pub., 
1971)' p. 84. 
68 in Sound and Sense: An Introduction to Poetry, Laurence 
Perrine, 4th ed. (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1973), p. 124. 
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Marjorie Hope Nicolson finds an early example of this theme in 
Cicero's Somnium Scipionis: 
In his dream Scipio beheld a vision which, beginning with Car-
thage, ended with a conception of the whole universe and realiza-
tion of the comparative insignificance of this earth, a vast 
panorama of the 'Milky Circle' in which appear 'stars which we 
never see from the earth • • • all larger than we have ever 
imagined ••• indeed, the earth itself seemed to me so small 
that I was scornful of our empire, which covers only a single 
point, as it were, upon its surface.r69 
A slightly different device is to project earthlings out into space to 
one of the other planets. In some of the cosmic voyages Nicolson 
describes, the earthlings may not be worthy of this new location and be 
exiled from.it "and sent back to earth until such time as they become 
worthy of return--a form of punishment that frequently recurs in modern 
voyages."70 
In numerous science-fiction movies of the 1950s which involved 
extraterrestrials coming to earth, the theme was often that though they 
appeared alien to us, they were a more advanced civilization and that 
because we had not even been able to handle the problem of making this 
earth a peaceful place, we were not yet worthy of making their 
acquaintance. They were beyond us technologically and emotionally, and 
we were not yet ready for what they could do for us. 
If you are an earthling, there is no way out for you, at least in 
terms of the imaginative construct and its assertions. You can not 
69 Voyages to the Moon (New York: Macmillan, 1948), pp. 16-17. 
70 Nicolson, p. 17. 
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prove that such planets with sentient, intelligent life do not exist, 
though of course you can deny it--and, as Swift and psychologists 
remind us, the human capacity for denial is extraordinary. 
The next two satires on man utilizing the extraterrestrial per-
spective which I will discuss are more extensive treatments of the 
topic. In both William Walsh's "Aesculapius ••• " and Voltaire's 
"Micromegas" extraterrestrials are brought down to earth. 
William Walsh's "Aesculapius: Or, The Hospital of Fools. An 
Imitation of Lucian" is a humorous satire on mankind, close to what we 
71 
would consider comedy. It contains none of the malice, misanthropy, 
or Juvenalian rage one has come to associate, however mistakenly, with 
the most prominent examples of satires on mankind. 
This time the extraterrestrials are in fact two of the gods, 
Mercury and Aesculapius, who have just arrived on the scene, charged by 
Jupiter to assist mankind. The choice of Aesculapius, the god of 
medicine, may be a light allusion to what was seriously considered 
during the Renaissance as the medical purpose of satire. Mary Claire 
Randolph aptly sums up the earlier attitude: 
To the Renaissance critic and satirist, satire is a scourge, a 
whip, a surgeon's scalpel, a cauterizing iron, a strong cathar-
tic--all in one; its mission is to flay, to cut, to burn, to 
blister, and to purge; its object is now a culprit, a victim, a 
criminal, and now an ailing, submissive patient, a sick person 
71 in The Works of Celebrated Authors, of Whose Writings there 
are but Small Remains (London: J. & R. Tonson-and S. Draper, 1750), 
II, 210-25. All citations are to this edition. The work had also been 
included in a 1714 miscellany. 
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bursting with contagion; and the satirist himself is a whipper, 
a scourger, a barber-surgeon, an executioner, a 'doctour of 
physik. •72 
Mercury sums up their mission in his first proclamation: 
Whereas daily Complaints are made by all the World, of the In-
numerable Follies of Mankind, by reason of which they are neither 
happy themselves, nor will suffer others to be so: The great 
Jupiter, out of his fatherly Compassion to Mankind, has sent 
Aesculapius to apply Medicines to them. Whoever therefore there 
is, that is troubled with Folly of what kind soever, let him 
repair hither, and he shall be cured without any Fee. (210) 
The disease they are to cure is Folly, a widespread if hardly terminal 
one. Even so, that Mercury, Aesculapius, and perhaps Jupiter himself 
are naive enough to think people will rush forward claiming to have the 
disease reveals that even the gods themselves may not be immune to 
folly. The response to the proclamation was, of course, predictable, 
·though apparently not for Aesculapius: 
What shou'd be the Meaning of this? Every particular Man 
complains of the Follies that are in the World; and when we come 
hither to apply Medicines to them, there is not one ~~n that 
offers himself to be cured. (210) 
One of man's follies, then, is his inability to admit to having any 
follies. Mercury, seeing the lack of response to his proclamation, is 
now quick to advise Aesculapius that Folly is different from most other 
diseases. The difference is that men "can easily find the least 
Symptom of it in other People, yet there is no Man that perceives the 
greatest in himself" (211) His own suggestion is certainly no improve-
72 Mary Claire Randolph, "The Medical Concept in English Ren-
aissance Satiric Theory," SP, 38 (1941), 125-57; rpt in Satire: }fodern 
Essays in Criticism, ed. Ronald Paulson (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 
Prentice-Hall, 1971), p. 135. 
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ment: if you have a friend or acquaintance who suffers from Folly, 
bring him to be cured. So, every man brings his neighbour but sees 
nothing wrong with himself: 
See! see! What Crouds are getting together! Every Man seizes 
his next Neighbour, without any Deliberation at all; and they 
come willingly too, because every Man seems ready to accuse the 
other. (211) 
One group of accusers all have something to do with marriage. Large 
numbers of those assembled are present on account of their marriages. 
When Aesculapius sees this, he decides that in marriage, one is auto-
matically guilty of folly until proven innocent: 
It were an endless Work to hear of every one who play'd the 
Fool in Marriage. To save Time, therefore, we will put up all 
the married People at a Venture; and if there be any one who can 
give us satisfactory Reasons, to prove that he did not play the 
Fool in it, we will let him out again. (216) 
Of course, no one is able to do that. 
Aesculapius observes that an even larger crowd has gathered to 
turn in their fellows. We will remember that Alvin Kernan has de-
scribed the characteristic scene of satire as "always disorderly and 
crowded, packed to the very point of bursting. The deformed faces of 
depravity, stupidity, greed, venality, ignorance, and maliciousness 
group closely together for a moment •• 11 73 mlile the vices he lists 
here are a trifle severe to apply to Walsh's work, the scene is 
certainly filled with fools. 
Aesculapius realizes that it is impossible for him to treat the 
members of such a mob individually, so he decides to reverse his 
73 Kernan, p. 7. 
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tactics and remove all the "healthy" specimens to cut down the size of 
the crowd. Therefore the crowd is asked to bring forth not fools but 
wise men. Mercury is quick to see the folly of this plan: "Art thou no 
better acquainted with the Nature of Mankind than this? Believe me, if 
we stay here till one Man accuses another of being wise, we may stay 
till the End of the World" (218). Once again, however, Mercury's own 
suggestion is equally foolish, "But if you would search for Wise Men, 
you must not ask Mens Opinion of one another, but take what every Man 
thinks of himself" (218). He accordingly asks those that are wise to 
"range themselves upon the Right Hand, and distinguish themselves from 
the rest" (218). There is, naturally, one massive movement toward the 
right. Every man but one moves to the "wise" side. This group of 
• characters, all thinking themselves preeminently wise, is represented 
by three types: the poet, the statesman, and the Stoic philosopher. 
They are all quickly dispatched. It is the poet, though, who has 
leaped to the fore. When asked why he has so confidently placed himself 
first, he answers that "As much as a Man is above a Beast, so much is a 
Poet above another Man. It is we who converse with the Gods, and 
despise the rest of Mankind" (218). This is an interesting equation 
the poet has unwittingly set up. The reader may be expected, by a sort 
of reverse theriophily, to solve the equation like this: since, it 
turns out, poets are not above other men, men are not above beasts. 
And this is exactly the position which many satirists on mankind have 
taken. 
The sole man who had not moved to the "wise" side stands laughing 
at the Stoic for trying to divorce himself from mankind: 
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Alas: Sir, who can forbear laughing, to see Men hope by 
their Pride and Vanity, to exempt themselves from those Infirmi-
ties, to which all Mankind are naturally subject. (222-23) 
His attack on the Stoic and his presumption continues thus: 
This contemplative Person, who has found out the Follies of all 
Mankind, has one of his own that he does not see, ten times more 
extravagant than any of theirs; Since there is no Folly, sure, so 
extravagant, as for one who labours under all the Frailties, and 
Weaknesses, and Infirmities of Mankind, to think himself in any-
wise comparable to the Perfection of a God. (223) 
Aesculapius, for once, has the perspicuity to see that the man attacks 
more than just the Stoic. What are you, then, he asks, "who dare 
accuse the Stoics of Folly, who accuse all the World beside?" (223) 
The man's answer shows how he differs from all the others assembled 
there, from the rest of the crowd: 
Alas? Sir, I am a Fool too, and am so well convinced of it, 
that you see I keep by myself on the left Side, when all the rest 
go to the Right; and were I not convinced myself, I have given 
sufficient Reason to convince any one else, by troubling myself 
with correcting the Follies of others, while I have so many 
Follies of my own that are un-corrected still. (223) 
But if only the perfect were allowed to try to correct the flaws of 
others, no preacher would preach, no teacher teach, nor any writer 
write (including William \olalsh). 
Aesculapius asks the man if all men are alike. His response, 
while noting that the composition of all human beings contains an ample 
supply of folly, does not reveal the man to be a true misanthrope, a 
hater of mankind: 
No, there are some who are called Wise and some who are called 
Fools, not but that the wisest ~an has a sufficient Stock of 
Folly too. But the best Method I can propose to distinguish 
Mankind, is by calling those Men Wise, who know themselves to be 
Fools; and those Men Fools, who think themselves to be Wise. 
(223-24) 
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This is the Socratic position: in order to be wise, you have to know 
you are a fool. And that is the case of the one man represented as 
being wise here--he is admittedly a fool. This is a paradoxical situa-
tion; but the content of, or the assertion being made within the para-
dox, is satirical of mankind. 
Aesculapius tells Mercury to report back to Jupiter: 
You may tell him, that upon a full Survey of ~~nkind it appears, 
that every one has such a sufficient Share of Folly, that he has 
no Reason at all to complain of his Neighbours having more. That 
in Answer to those who think their Folly obstructs their Happi-
ness, it is very plain, that the Happiness of Mankind is so com-
plicated with this Folly, that it is impossible to cure them of 
the one, without endangering the other too. (224) 
If the end of this passage sounds a bit like ~~ndeville, the following 
sounds even more so: 
On the other Side, by taking away their Folly, we shou'd take 
away one of the most useful Qualities in the World, since it is 
very evident, that Mankind live upon the Follies of one an-
other. (224) 
Fools of various sorts and various professions make the world go round. 
Mandeville certainly would have agreed that Folly is good for the 
economy and, in fact, probably necessary. 
One of the specific examples Aesculapius mentions in praise of 
folly brings us consciously back to the writer-reader relationship: 
"And were there not writing Fools, what would the reading Fools do for 
a Diversion?" (224-25) This may serve to remind the reader that he is 
one of those being assailed here and to announce to the reader that the 
satirist knows full well he is guilty himself, that he does not possess 
a "better-than-thou" attitude. 
Aesculapius concludes that he and Mercury might just as well 
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leave things as they are: 
So that upon the whole Matter, I think we had even as good leave 
the World as we find it. However, if he thinks there ought to be 
somewhat done in this Matter, after having made so much Noise 
about it; the most general Folly in Men being that of shewing 
Severity to other Peoples Faults, while they neglect those they 
commit themselves; He may order a solemn Proclamation to be made, 
That ~ Man shall have the Privilege of censuring the Follies of 
other People, till he ~ bring ~ Certificate, under the Hands 
of three judicious Neighbours, ~he has~~ all of his 
~· (225) 
Jupiter's plan for medical assistance has failed; he has sent the god 
of medicine to cleanse mankind of Folly, but the strain has proved 
resistant to any treatment. All Aesculapius can do is make the rather 
lame concluding suggestion that Jupiter issue another edict, revealing 
once again Aesculapius's own ineptitude--or the hopelessness of attempt-
ing anything whatsoever to assist a resolutely folly-ridden mankind. 
The medical purpose of satire itself may be lightly satirized here. 
The god of medicine, sent to cleanse folly from mankind, has not sur-
gically removed Vice (indeed was not even given that honorific if 
equally hopeless mission) but has been unable to treat even that per-
sistent but less serious disease of folly. 
The hospital, or place of confinement, for fools may be the world 
itself; or, looked at another way, we may all be outpatients. At any 
rate, there seems little doubt that "Aesculapius: Or, the Hospital of 
Fools" is in fact a satire on mankind. The generalizing words are 
here, "mankind," "men" used generically, "all," "no one," and so on. 
To flesh this out a bit, Walsh provides some stock types: old age-youth, 
profligate-miser, cuckold-cuckolder, old wife-young husband, and, 
finally, poet, statesman, and Stoic. All these are guilty of possess-
ing Folly. The only exception, or seeming exception, is the man who is 
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admittedly a fool, which makes him a little wiser than his peers, but 
nonetheless a fool. All, then, are guilty, no one exempt; and yet the 
charges are not viewed seriously. The attack is not vicious, and we 
are allowed some laughter at all this, the bumbling gods included. 
The second extended work I mentioned which makes use of extra-
terrestrials to satirize mankind is Voltaire's Micromegas. Marjorie 
Hope Nicolson calls it Voltaire's "immortal satire on cosmic voy-
ages."74 She claims that "There are few earlier themes that he did not 
weave into this greatest of satires on the cosmic voyage and that he 
did not reduce to nonsense by devastating exaggeration."75 I will con-
tend that the thrust of the satire is not at the devices of the cosmic 
voyage but rather at man himself. In Micromegas we encounter many of 
the devices and charges previously enumerated; all seem to be firing 
directly towards mankind itself. 
David L. Gobert sees the work not as satiric but as essentially 
comic. He claims that "Critics have traditionally believed that 
Voltaire stresses the smallness of man in Micromegas, and they have 
almost completely ignored what is implied in the other half of the 
work's title."76 He cites Dorothy McGhee as "one of the most recent 
critics to reduce Micromegas to a condemnation of man." 77 I am 
74 Nicolson, p. 57. 
75 Nicolson, p. 214. 
76 
"Comic in Micromegas as expressive of theme," Studies on 
Voltaire and the Eighteenth Centurv, 37 (1965), 53. 
77 Gobert, p. 53. 
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interested in his word "reduce" here, as it seems to me symptomatic of 
numerous responses to literary works which are sharply critical of man 
or human nature. It is as if a work which contains adverse criticism 
of man is automatically less than a work which does not. At any rate, 
Gobert says he will focus on the comic resolution or neutering which 
results from the large-small duality: "This study is a demonstration of 
how 'large equals small' constitutes the comic theme on the levels of 
action and language."78 Gobert's essay is ingenious and in places 
helpful, but he has to strain at times to make the events fit into his 
thesis. 
The subtitle of Micromegas is Philosophic Story. The conte 
philosophique and the philosophical journey may contain or reflect any 
of a number of philosophical beliefs or support any of a number of 
diverse philosophical systems. And, the fictional portrayal of life on 
other planets can be used for numerous purposes--just one of which is 
satirizing man. As I have said, the genre of the conte philosophique 
is an established one, but we need to be more specific and say that 
this particular conte philosophique or cosmic voyage is indeed a satire 
on mankind. It employs the conventional charges we have been discussing 
and its aim seems to be to discomfit the reader and his species by dis-
crediting some of their cherished assumptions. 
As might be expected from the title, size is going to play an 
important part in Voltaire's attempt at diminishing man's pride in 
himself and his species. The images will be those which suggest the 
diminution of mankind. These will be applied directly to man through 
78 Gobert, p. 53. 
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attacks on his stature and indirectly through an attack on his habitat. 
We are told, for example, at the very start of the story that the 
main character, Micromegas, "measures from head to foot twenty-four 
thousand paces (which make one-hundred-and-twenty thousand royal 
feet)."79 Using the size of men as five feet and the earth nine thou-
sand leagues in circumference, Voltaire concludes that "the globe which 
produced Mr. Micromegas must have exactly twenty-one million six hun-
dred thousand times more circumference than our little earth" (413). 
Voltaire is not going to stop here, however, for he employs the 
device of an intermediate planet and being between the superior Sirius 
and Micromegas and the inferior earth and earthlings. Micromegas sets 
out on a tour of the universe and arrives in Saturn. Saturnians are 
dwarfed by Micromegas but are still incomparably larger than men. 
Micromegas is provoked to smile when he sees the size of Saturn and its 
inhabitants, but the satire here is not directed at these extraterres-
trials which Voltaire has created; instead, he has created these 
intermediary extraterrestrials and their planet to make the satire on 
man even more telling: 
Although he was accustomed to see new things, he could not, on 
beholding the littleness of the globe and its inhabitants, re-
frain from that superior smile to which even the wisest men are 
sometimes subject. For Saturn, after all, is hardly more than 
nine hundred times bigger than the earth, and its citizens are 
dwarfs only about a thousand fathoms tall. (415) 
Voltaire employs direct denigration upon earth and earthlings through-
79 The Portable Voltaire, ed. Ben Ray Redman (New York: The 
Viking Pr~, 1968), p. 413. All citations are to this edition. 
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out the story. Thus, the earth is referred to as "our little ant-
hill" (413), "our little mud-heap" (415), and the "molehill" (422). 
Mankind is referred to throughout by such terms as "maggots" and 
"invisible insects" (428). With Saturn and the Saturnian, however, 
Voltaire attacks something which, while far beneath his Sirian, is 
still superior to man. This has the effect of further diminishing man, 
making him appear even more insignificant. 
The denigration of the planet earth is an indirect way of defla-
ting man and his pride. That the earth is small and has no global im-
portance in the universe is a reflection on man. This earth, far from 
being the center of the universe (as man had enjoyed believing for 
centuries), is, in Voltaire's fictional construct at least, merely one 
of the lesser, inhabited planets·. Man and his planet have no special 
place in the creation; they occupy no central position. 
Micromegas becomes friends with one of these Saturnians. He dis-
covers that the Saturnians have "only" 72 senses but that they still 
find themselves "too limited" (417). And, despite the large number of 
emotions arising from 72 senses, they still find themselves often 
bored. Micromegas understands this because, though the Sirians have 
more senses than the Saturnians, they often find themselves in the same 
state: 
"That I can quite understand," said Micromegas, "for although in 
our world we have nearly a thousand senses, we still have an 
indescribable vague yearning, an inexpressible restlessness, 
which warns us incessantly that we are of small account, and that 
there exist beings far more perfect. I have traveled a little, 
and I have seen mortals much below our level; I have also seen 
others far superior: but I have not seen any who have not more 
appetites than real needs, and more needs than contentment. One 
day, maybe, I shall reach the country where nobody lacks any-
thing, but up to now no one has given me definite news of that 
country." (417) 
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Saturnians, then, are far superior to humans, and Sirians are superior 
to Saturnians; but, as Micromegas has said, there are races who are 
even superior to the Sirians. The human race is considerably dimin-
ished under such a superterrestrial chain of beings; and, even were the 
human race able to improve itself to a level with these superior beings, 
there would still be no possibility of true happiness. 
Voltaire has satirized man by denigrating his habitat, his 
physical stature and, next, his brief stint here on earth. The Sa-
turnian laments the brevity of his life span, and Micromegas commiser-
ates with him. The reader knows that whatever figures are used, they 
will undoubtedly not make the human race feel as if it is much subject 
to longevity. Such, of course, is the case, as the Saturnian makes 
clear: 
We live for only five hundred complete revolutions of the sun. 
(That makes fifteen thousand years, or thereabouts, according to 
our reckoning.) As you can see, that means dying almost as soon 
as one is born. Our existence is a point, our duration a flash, 
our globe an atom. Hardly has one started to improve one's self 
a little than death arrives before one has any experience. For 
my part, I dare make no plans; I am like a drop of water in an 
immense ocean. I am ashamed, particularly before you, of the 
ridiculous figure I cut in this world. (417-18) 
Voltaire, lest his reader should fail to make the connection, is quick 
to point out the figures in human terms. Here, again, a being in-
estimably grander than man has humbled himself before an even greater 
being (who, we recall, has already conceded that there are beings 
greater than himself). Micromegas immediately makes it clear that such 
humility is appropriate: 
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"If you were not a philosopher," returned Micromegas, "I should 
fear to distress you by telling you that our life is seven hun-
dred times as long as yours, but you know too well that when a 
man has to return his body to the earth whence it sprang, to 
bring life again to nature in another form--which is called 
dying--it is precisely the same thing, when the time for this 
metamorphosis arrives, whether he has lived a day or an eternity. 
I have been in countries where the people lived a thousand times 
longer than my people, and they still grumbled. (418) 
Man would be unhappy even if he did survive for thousands of years. 
That advantage in age does, however, allow for greater mental 
development in the extraterrestrials. Micromegas, for example, when he 
was but a child, around 250 years old, solved fifty of Euclid's prob-
lems, that is, eighteen more than Pascal. Gobert interprets this to 
indicate that the intellectual accomplishments of Micromegas are not 
all that impressive: "Voltaire points out Micromegas's superiority over 
Pascal only to imply that, after all, this is not in reality unqualified 
praise of his hero."80 Micromegas is imperfect; he does have faults. 
Such criticism, however, is not really aimed at Micromegas. His 
limitations reveal that even beings far superior to man are not perfect; 
therefore, man is even farther away from being a species which has 
anything to be vain about. 
Voltaire pauses in his satire on man to acknowledge that there 
are some who are better able to comprehend the nature of things, who 
see things from a better perspective: 
But everywhere there are persons who know how to accept their fate 
and thank the author of nature. He has spread over this universe 
variety in profusion, coupled with a kind of wonderful uniformity. 
For instance, all thinking beings are different, and yet at bottom 
80 Gobert, p. 55. 
all resemble each other in their possession of the gifts of 
thought and aspiration. (418) 
142 
This will not be the bleakest sort of satire on mankind, which leaves 
man alone in an overwhelmingly hostile environment or makes him the 
hapless product of a demented or hostile creator. Voltaire asserts 
here that there is an overall plan to the universe. Things are in just 
proportion and in due degree, as Pope said--it is just that man has 
misplaced himself within this grand scheme. He has esteemed himself 
too highly. Micromegas addresses the Saturnian further on the subject: 
I admire His wisdom in everything. I see differences everywhere, 
but everywhere also I see proportion. Your world is small, and 
so are its occupants; you have few sensations; your matter has 
few properties: all that is the work of Providence. (419) 
The creator has chosen that some species be smaller and have fewer 
sensations than others. 
Up until now, comparisons with the earth and earthlings have been 
implied (with the exception of those conversions from extraterrestrial 
to earthly measurements). The two superior beings decide to go on a 
philosophical journey, during the course of which, the reader is sure, 
the planet earth will be encountered and direct comparisons and con-
trasts will be presented. 
As expected, our two space travelers soon see "a small glimmer: 
it was the earth, and it stirred the pity of the people coming from 
Jupiter" (421). The ocean seems merely a pond to them. They try to 
discover whether earth is inhabited, "but as their eyes and their hands 
were in nowise adapted to the diminutive beings which crawl here, they 
perceived nothing which might make them suspect that we and our col-
leagues, the other dwellers on this earth, have the honor to exist." 
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The planet itself receives some direct criticism. The earth 
is so badly constructed and so irregular; it is of a form which 
to me seems ridiculous! • • • Do you not observe the shape of 
the globe, how flat it is at the poles, and how clumsily it turns 
round the sun, with result that the polar regions are waste 
places? What really makes me think there is no one on the earth 
is that I cannot imagine any sensible people wanting to live 
here. (423) 
Through the use of a diamond as a magnifying glass, the Saturnian 
makes out something in the sea and places it on his thumbnail. It is 
a whale, and Micromegas begins laughing "at the extreme smallness of 
the inhabitants of our globe" (424). Next, they discover a ship loaded 
with a cargo of philosophers, though they are not able to perceive 
something as small as men at first. Here Voltaire interrupts his 
narrative and inserts a disclaimer: 
I do not wish to offend here anyone's vanity, but I feel obliged 
to ask self-important persons to note with me that, if the 
average height of a man be taken as five feet, we do not cut a 
better figure on this earth than would an animal about one six-
hundred-thousandth of an inch high on a ball ten feet in circum-
ference. Imagine a being which could hold the earth in its hand 
and which had organs in proportion to ours--and it is very likely 
there would be a great number of these beings: then conceive, I 
ask you, what they would think of those battles which let a 
conqueror win a village only to lose it in the sequel. I do not 
doubt that if some captain of giant grenadiers ever reads this 
work, he will increase by at least two feet the height of his 
soldiers' forage-caps, but it will be in vain, I warn him: he and 
his will never be anything but infinitely little. (425-26) 
This passage bears some examination. Is Voltaire singling out only 
self-important persons for attack, as he seems to be doing? Or those 
who find war heroic and glorious? I think he may be doing both of 
these as well as satirizing mankind here. What he says will perhaps 
offend self-important people more than humble people, but what he says 
is nonetheless true of all men, given the imaginative construct he 
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posits here. The latter part of the quotation may be viewed as a 
specific example of a kind of human activity that such larger supra-
human creatures would look down on and view in its proper absurd per-
spective. 
The two space travelers are finally able to see the human beings. 
They decide to examine "these insects" (427). With an ear trumpet made 
from a paring of one of Micromegas' fingernails, they are also able to 
hear the humans. With astonishment "They heard maggots talking toler-
ably good sense. " (428) Micromegas addresses them: 
Invisible insects who the Creator has pleased should be born in 
this abyss of the infinitely little, I thank Him for having 
deigned to let me discover secrets which seemed unfathomable. At 
my court, maybe, they would not condescend to look at you, but I 
despise no one, and I offer you my protection. (428) 
It is only because Micromegas is tolerant that he would bother with men. 
The humans do possess, to the amazement of the space travelers, 
some mental capacities, as is evidenced in their ability to calculate 
the size of the extraterrestrials. The correct calculation of his 
height brings forth a paean of praise from Micromegas: 
"I see more than ever," he said, "that nothing must be judged by 
its apparent size. 0 God, who has given intelligence to beings 
which appear so contemptible, the infinitely small costs Thee as 
little effort as the infinitely great, and if there can possibly 
be creatures smaller than these, they may still have souls 
superior to those of the splendid animals I have seen in the 
sky, whose foot alone would cover the world to which I have 
come. (430) 
There are animals, then, as large as our entire world. But Micromegas 
has moved from being a reasonably perspicacious creature to one 
suspiciously naive concerning human life. He avers that humans have 
found true happiness: 
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0 intelligent atoms in whom the Eternal Being has been pleased to 
manifest His dexterity and His might, the joys you taste on your 
globe are doubtless very pure, for as you are so immaterial, and 
seem to be all spirit, your lives must be passed in Love and in 
Thought: that, indeed, is the true life of spirits. Nowhere yet 
have I found real happiness, but that you have found it here I 
cannot doubt. (430-31) 
The reader, of course, is quite sure that Micromegas will shortly be 
disillusioned. Sure enough, one of the philosophers, "more frank than 
the rest," reveals to him that "apart from a small number of people who 
were little esteemed, the rest of the inhabitants of the world were a 
crowd of madmen, miscreants, and unfortunates" (431). This candid 
philosopher continues with some reflections on the makeup or constitu-
tion of man along with some observations on history: 
If evil be a property of matter, ••• we have more matter than 
is necessary for the doing of much evil, and too much spirit if 
evil be a property of the spirit. Do you realize, for instance, 
that at this moment there are a hundred thousand madmen of our 
species wearing hats killing, or being killed by, a hundred 
thousand other animals wearing turbans, and that over almost all 
the face of the earth this has been the custom from time immemo-
rial? (431) 
In satires on mankind, war, massive aggression against one's own kind, 
is often treated as one of man's distinct characteristics. 
The Sirian inquires about the cause of this slaughter "between 
such puny beasts" (431). The philosopher's answer, similar to the one 
given by Hamlet on a similar occasion, is that "The matter at issue 
is some mud-heap as large as your heel" (431). At this the Sirian 
becomes incensed and wants to destroy all human life: "Such a riot of 
mad fury is inconceivable! I am tempted to take three steps and with 
three blows of my foot to crush out of existence this anthill of absurd 
cut-throats" (431). He is told not to bother, that they destroy them-
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selves. "Know that, even when they have not drawn the sword, hunger, 
exhaustion, or debauchery carries them nearly a~l off" (432). 
Not all humans are this low, though; presumably some are better 
occupied. The philosophers do not seem to kill people for money, so 
one is asked how they do occupy themselves: 
"We dissect flies," answered the philosopher, "we measure 
lines, we gather mathematical data. We agree on the two or 
three points we understand, and we argue about the two or three 
thousand we do not." (432) 
Man's slight mental prowess, then, is but ill employed. 
In fact, all man's accomplishments are finite and limited, as is 
b~ought out pointedly in the last couple pages of the story after 
Micromegas asks about man's soul and how he forms his ideas. We are 
then provided with a brief catalogue of the responses of various philo-
sophical systems to these questions. Of these responses, only one is 
given tentative approval by Micromegas. The follower of Locke does not 
place man at the center of the universe (as did the Leibnizian who 
preceded him). He is humble, not presumptuous, and aware of numerous 
possibilities which his mind is not able to fathom. But our satire 
against man, his activities, his pretensions, his ignorance of how 
ignorant he really is, is brought to a close by a Thomist, 
a minute animalcule in a clerical hat who interrupted the other 
animalcule philosophers. He said he understood the whole mys-
tery; that the explanation was to be found in the Summa of St. 
Thomas. He looked the two celestial inhabitants up and down, and 
asserted that their persons, worlds, suns, and stars were created 
solely for man. (435) 
While there is direct satire against the Thomists, Voltaire is reacting 
against an anthropocentric position which man still endorses, for 
example, in his attitudes towards members of the animal kingdom. 
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The response of the space travelers to the Thomist's assertion is 
predictable: "At this speech the two travelers fell on top of each 
other, suffocating with that inextinguishable laughter which, accor-
ding to Homer, is the lot of the gods" (435). They laugh so hard the 
Sirian drops the ship. It falls into one of his pockets but is easily 
recovered: 
The Sirian picked the maggots up again and spoke to them once 
more with much kindness, although at the bottom of his heart he 
was rather angry that such infinitely small creatures should be 
possessed of an arrogance almost infinitely great. He promised 
to prepare for them a fine volume of philosophy, written very 
small so that they might be able to read it, and that in the 
volume they would fin an explanation for everything. And to be 
sure, he did give them this book before he left them. They took 
it to Paris to the Academy of Science: but when the aged sec-
retary opened it he found nothing but blank pages. "Ah!" said he. 
"I thought as much." (435) 
Man's presumption is laid bare here; the limits of man's knowledge are 
brought forcefully to his attention. 
The satire in Micromegas, then, does not seem addressed towards 
the conventions of the cosmic voyage; instead, it is directed squarely 
at man as a species. His habitat is depicted as unsatisfactory and 
diminutive in relation to other globes in the universe, his physical 
stature is revealed to be puny, his life span but a point, and his 
character as aggressive and stupifyingly proud and presumptuous. 
Voltaire concedes man some plusses. He possesses a smattering of 
intellect which, when used with humility and with some idea of its 
limitations, can be of some assistance to him. Furthermore, Voltaire 
implies a grand scheme or plan which, while perhaps not actually 
beneficent towards man, is at least not inimical. Voltaire's satire 
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here is not designed to maim man, merely to humble him. The extra-
terrestrial dimension and Voltaire's ingenious uses of it have offered 
him a perspective from which to direct his shafts at the whole world 
of men. 
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d. The Cosmic Perspective 
A fourth strategy for satirizing mankind is to examine man not 
from an extraterrestrial perspective, but from a cosmic one. Here man 
is made to seem insignificant in the universe, in the grand scheme of 
things. (We have already seen an example of this in Micromegas.) 
Again the attack is generally aimed at his pride, his self-assurance, 
his feelings of overwhelming importance. This time, however, the focus 
is on the woes that beset man rather than those he creates or is 
directly responsible for. Charron attacks man's presumption in be-
lieving that nature takes much interest in him and that the cosmos or 
universe is concerned about him: 
Besides all this, man beleeveth that the heaven, the 
starres, all this great celestiall motion of the world, is only 
made for him. • • • And the poore miserable wretch is in the 
meane time ridiculous: he is heere beneath lodged in the last and 
worst stage of the world, most distant from the celestiall vaut, 
in the sincke of the world, amongst the filth and lees thereof, 
with creatures of baser condition, made to receive all those 
excrements and ordures, which raine downe and fall from above 
upon his head; nay he lives not but by them, and to endure all 
those accidents that on all sides happen unto him; and yet he 
makes himselfe beleeve that he is the master and commander of 
all, that all creatures, yea those great luminous, incorruptible 
bodies, whereof he knowes not the least vertue, and which he is 
constrained with astonishment to admire, move not but for him, 
and to do him service. And because he beggeth (wretch that he 
is) his living, his maintenance, his commodities, from the beames, 
light and heate of the Sunne, from the raine and other distilla-
tions of heaven, and the aire, he sticks not to say, that he 
enjoyeth the heavens and the elements, as if all had been made, 
and still moove only for him. In this sense a gosling may say as 
much, and perhaps more justly and peremptorily.81 
There are several ways for the satirist to deflate such presumption. 
81 Charron, pp. 154-55. 
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The kinds of assertions I will be mentioning here may exist in-
dependently of satire. They may be used in other contexts and for 
other purposes. What I am presenting is material which a satirist on 
man may utilize to effect his attack on the species, to puncture man's 
presumption in believing that the cosmos has been created solely for 
him. 
One way the satirist on mankind may accomplish this is simply to 
portray the universe as indifferent to man and his petty concerns. 
God, in such a case, would remain "eternally unaffected by the powers 
of the human species."82 Another way is to expose man as being totally 
alone in the universe, to assert that there is no Providence governing 
him, no benevolent deity looking on, no cosmic babysitter whose special 
charge is the care of man. Or, one might argue, look at the evidence, 
look at the state of this world, the seemingly gratuitous suffering 
millions must undergo, the plagues, the so-called "natural" disasters 
or "acts of God," the earthquakes (such as the one at Lisbon), the 
tornadoes and so on--now, if there is a Being looking down on the 
human scene, he, she, or it must of necessity be a malevolent one, a 
sadistic one or a crazy one. At the very least, the deity is imperfect 
in one way or another. 
In satires on man, and perhaps only in satires on man, such 
attacks on God or the Creator are not directed at God. The satirist on 
man is writing to men, not presuming that God is his audience. God is 
not being addressed; men are. The satirist is using those assertions 
82 Barry Schwartz, The New Humanism: Art in ~ Time of Change (New 
York: Praeger, 1974), p. 11. 
151 
about the creator to attack man's anthropocentrism and his bloated ego. 
This will become clear shortly, I hope, in my discussion of Venus on 
The Half-Shell. 
Attacks on human nature, which had regularly been used to stress 
the enormous gulf between men and God, also lead naturally to attacks 
on the creator of human nature for the miserable job he had done. But 
satirists on mankind make use of such assertions only to call attention 
to the faulty product of the creation. Thus, when Woody Allen in Love 
and Death calls God "an underachiever," he is not attacking God but 
man, for mankind is the specimen Allen has examined and used as the 
basis for his judgment about God. As Hume pointed out in his Dialogues 
Concerning Natural Religion, man and this world may be the production 
of a God worse than an underachiever: 
This world, for aught he knows • • • was only the first rude 
essay of some infant Deity, who afterwards abandoned it, ashamed 
of his lame performance; it is the work only of some dependent, 
inferior Deity; and is the object of derision to his superiors: 
it is the production of old age and dotage in some superannuated 
Deity, and ever since his death, has run on at adventures •••• 
And the gods may be treated as being even worse than somewhat decrepit 
and incompetent. As Gloucester says, "As flies to wanton boys, are we 
to th'gods; I They kill us for their sport" (Lear, IV, i). Those 
plagues and natural disasters I mentioned earlier and even the physical 
fact of death are often used to document this charge. What I am re-
ferring to here, again, is a different activity from attacking certain 
human conceptions of the deity to point out the inadequacy of that 
particular human construct. The purpose of the satirist on man is not 
to find fault with the conceptions of God as perpetuated by specific 
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religions; he is attacking, as I have said repeatedly, man's over-
estimation of himself and his place in the cosmos. In doing so, 
granted, he is utilizing material in his satires on mankind which might 
be put to different uses elsewhere. 
To return to the ways the satirist might accomplish this task of 
"putting man in his place," we need to consider Mark Twain's tactic in 
~Mysterious Stranger. He uses the argument that God may be malevo-
lent, but his argument takes another turn. His argument, baldly para-
phrased, runs something like this: could there be such a nasty god who 
would perform or allow such horrible things to occur? Of course not; 
hence, there is no god and you are here alone. The effect here, of 
course, is ultimately similar to that of the second way I outlined 
above. 
Yet another way for the satirist to attack mankind is to assert 
that man is a slave to outside influences or internal compulsions which 
are beyond his control. He has no free will. He is programmed from 
outside and, hence, at best a puppet or robot. This material, too, can 
be used in a satire on mankind for it reduces man to the status of a 
creature who is not in control of himself, who does not even determine 
what he likes, dislikes, does, believes and so on. Such assertions may 
be classified under this cosmic perspective because of the fact that 
man is programmed to be such, and presumably programmed by the creator. 
If such is the case, man has certainly no reason to be overly enamored 
of himself. The same strategy may be employed from the extraterres-
trial perspective should superior beings from other planets somehow 
manipulate man in a similar way. Vonnegut's The Sirens of Titan may 
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offer an example of this. In that novel, the course of human events is 
manipulated so that humans will fabricate a spare part for the rocket 
ship of some superior extraterrestrials. 
Some brief examples of this cosmic perspective aimed at diminish-
ing man will, I hope, prove illustrative. Stephen Crane's "A Man Said 
to the Universe" portrays the that-out-there as merely indifferent to 
man and his petty concerns: 
A man said to the universe: 
"Sir, I exist!" 
"However," replied the universe, 
"The fact has not created in me 
A sense of obligation."83 
In "The End of the World," Archibald MacLeish is a bit more severe: 
Quite unexpectedly as Vasserot 
The armless ambidextrian was lighting 
A match between his great and second toe 
And Ralph the lion was engaged in biting 
The neck of Hadame Sossman while the drum 
Pointed, and Teeny was about to cough 
In waltz-time swinging Jocko by the thumb--
Quite unexpectedly the top blew off: 
And there, there overhead, there, there, hung over 
Those thousands of white faces, those dazed eyes, 
There in the starless dark the poise, the hover, 
There with vast wings across the canceled skies, 
There in the sudden blackness the black pall 84 Of nothing, nothing, nothing--nothing at all. 
MacLeish's poem achieves several things. The top does blow off. Man's 
activities are laughed at (note what important things are happening 
83 in The Scope of Satire, ed. Charles Sanders (Glenview, Il.: 
Scott, Foresman, 1971), p. 60. 
84 Sanders, p. 63. 
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when the top goes off), as are perhaps implicitly all those hopes of 
man that there is something governing him out there, some providence 
or design, and perhaps a life after death. \Yhat a grand irony, sug-
gests MacLeish, if there is not. The poem's purpose? Perhaps merely to 
rattle us, to unsettle us, to force us to ask the question, "what if?" 
We will see something similar to the conclusion of MacLeish's poem, 
although reached by more intricate steps, when we examine Twain's The 
Mysterious Stranger. 
I believe we can also read Swift's "Day of Judgment," at least in 
the version usually reprinted today, as a satire on mankind employing 
this cosmic perspective. Jove actually seems malicious towards mankind: 
"Offending Race of Human Kind, 
By Nature, Reason, Learning, blind; 
You who thro' Frailty step'd aside, 
And you who never fell--thro' Pride; 
You who in different Sects have shamm'd, 
And come to see each other damn'd; 
(So some Folks told you, but they knew 
No more of Jove's Designs than you) 
The World's mad Business now is o'er, 
And I resent these Pranks no more. 
I to such Blockheads set my Wit! 85 I damn such Fools!--Go, go, you're bit." 
85 Maurice Johnson, in "Test and Possible Occasion for Swift's 
'Day of Judgment,'" PMLA, 86 (1971), 210-17, presents evidence that, 
judging from the variants, "there was a definite tendency to make the 
poem tell in a certain way--against dissenters. And as eighteenth-
century commentary makes plain, this reflects the light in which the 
work was viewed" (213). I would only contend that whoever is responsi-
ble for the version we now generally see has incorporated elements 
which allow us to interpret it as a satire on mankind. As has been 
suggested earlier, particular and general satire are not necessarily 
incompatible. A satire on mankind may very well spring from (and con-
tain references to) particular events and persons. 
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The first two lines of the quotation, which, incidentally, are missing 
from one other version of the poem that Johnson prints, seem all-
encompassing enough. The "Race of Human Kind" is being attacked. Man 
is mentally and perhaps physically blind. Three different examples of 
human frailty follow immediately. The word "World" again supports a 
generalized interpretation. "Pranks" seems to refer to all three 
examples, not merely to members of sects. In my reading, then, the 
final couplet refers to the entire offending race. W.B. Carnochan 
likens this poem to Gulliver's Travels: 
The brilliant 'Day of Judgement' is the nearest analogue in 
Swift's satire to the Travels. It is also, _like them, a study in 
tactics: God takes the part of laughing satirist, frustrating the 
expectation of divine anger with colloquial derision; the satirist 
himself is implicated, as he is (I argue) in Gulliver.86 
As I have been contending, in satires on mankind the satirist is, on 
one level, inescapably implicated. 
In Swift's poem we found the dispenser of "just desserts" down-
right rude to man. He can not even be bothered to damn them. Robert 
Frost takes a more serious approach in "Design." Examining evidence 
from the natural world, he decides that if there is a providence, some 
design, it must perforce be a malevolent one: 
w~at but design of darkness to appall?--
If design govern in a thing so small. 
Either there is no providence ordaining things, or if there is, it is 
an evil one. Once more, this is not an observation which will move man 
to dwell on his own magnificence. 
86 Lemuel Gulliver's Mirror for Man (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1968), p. 200. 
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A more lengthy example, Mark Twain's The Mysterious Stranger, is 
a full-blown satire on mankind. In it we find a number of the devices 
and ploys by now familiar to us. Twain employs the animal comparisons 
and insists, for example, that the word "brutal" should never be 
applied to any human act. In the following he also attacks man's 
pride, his pretensions to reason, and his treatment of his fellow kind--
all staple items of the satire on mankind: 
"No, it was a human thing. You should not insult the brutes by 
such a misuse of that word; they have not deserved it," and he 
went on talking like that. "It is like your paltry race--always 
lying, always claiming virtues which it hasn't got, always deny-
ing them to the higher animals, which alone possess them. No 
brute ever does a cruel thing--that is the monopoly of those with 
the Moral Sense. When a brute inflicts pain he does it inno-
cently; it is not wrong; for him there is no such thing as wrong. 
And he does not inflict pain for the pleasure of inflicting it--
only man does that. Inspired by that mongrel Moral Sense of his! 
~ sense whose function is to distinguish between right and wrong, 
with liberty to choose which of them he will do. Now what advan-
tage can he get out of that? He is always choosing, and in nine 
cases out of ten he prefers the wrong. There shouldn't be any 
wrong; and without the Moral Sense there couldn't be any. And 
yet he is such an unreasoning creature that he is not able to 
perceive that the Moral Sense degrades him to the bottom layer of 
animated beings and is a shameful possession.87 
What are the individual's prospects in this vicious world? Well, "Only 
the mad can be happy, and not many of those. The few that imagine 
themselves kings or gods are happy, the rest are no happier than the 
sane" (p. 68). This is not too different from Swift's "perpetual 
Possession of being well Deceived." 
Finally, Twain evokes man's insignificance in the universe. The 
87 Mark Twain's 'The Hystericus Stranger' and the Critics, ed. 
JohnS. Tuckey (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Pub. Co.,-r968), p. 26. All 
citations are to this edition. 
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angel named Satan creates some finger-sized people to divert the boys 
he is talking to. But, annoyed by the noise of weeping and praying of 
this miniature society, he 
reached out and took the heavy board seat of our swing and 
brought it down and mashed all those people into the earth just as 
if they had been flies, and went on talking just the same. (p. 9) 
The creator obviously feels no compunction about summarily executing 
his creation. 
At the end, ~Mysterious Stranger seems to be an anti-theodicy. 
Frost had said if there is anything, it must be malevolent. Twain seems 
to be saying, if there is anything, it must be malevolent; hence, there 
is nothing. Examine the evidence. They ways of god to man can't be 
justified; hence there is no god: 
A God who could make good children as easily as bad, yet preferred 
to make bad ones; who could have made every one of them happy, yet 
never made a single happy one; who made them prize their bitter 
life, yet stingily cut it short; who gave his angels eternal 
happiness unearned, yet required his other children to earn it; 
who gave his angels painless lives, yet cursed his other children 
with biting miseries and maladies of mind and body; who mouths 
justice and invented hell--mouths mercy and invented hell--mouths 
Golden Rules, and forgiveness multiplied by seventy times seven, 
and invented hell; who mouths morals to other people and has none 
himself; who frowns upon crimes, yet commits them all; who 
created man without invitation, then tries to shuffle the respon-
sibility for man's acts upon man, instead of honorably placing it 
where it belongs, upon himself; and, finally, with altogether 
divine obtuseness, invites this poor, abused slave to worship 
him! (pp. 73-74) 
How can you even imagine a god like this, he asks. And in the very 
end, Twain even takes man's life away from him: 
There is no God, no universe, no human race, no earthly life, no 
heaven, no hell. It is all a dream--a grotesque and foolish 
dream. Nothing exists but you. And you are but a thought--a 
vagrant thought, a useless thought, a homeless thought, wandering 
forlorn among the empty eternities. (p. 74) 
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Twain here has perhaps pushed the satire on mankind as far as it can 
go. There is not much more to take away from man. The tone and the 
charged language do not allow man any dignity whatsoever, do not accord 
him any tragic heroism in his isolation. 
Kilgore Trout's Venus~ the Half-Shell (1975) is an example of a 
modern satire on mankind which employs the extraterrestrial and cosmic 
strategies while making many of the charges we have shown to be typical 
of satires on mankind. Venus ~ the Half-Shell achieved some popularity 
several years ago, especially among the young. Most of its readers 
probably did not realize that Trout, or whoever wrote the novel (Kilgore 
Trout is a character in Vonnegut's Breakfast of Champions), was making 
use of conventions which are, at the very least, several hundred years 
old. 88 The novel is decidedly a satire against mankind. 
Trout makes use of the basic strategies we have discussed. This 
is evident even beginning with the epigraph: "Dedicated to the beasts 
and the stars. They don't worry about free will and immortality." The 
editor, himself an example of the fake editor as in Gulliver's Travels, 
informs us that Trout's work "has been praised for its high imagination 
and Swiftean satire" (6). 
Trout begins by asserting, as Voltaire did in Micromegas, that 
inhabited space is much grander than man has imagined. The Space 
Wanderer, we are told, is a popular figure "throughout the ten billion 
inhabitable planets, and he is the hero of TV series on at least a 
88 Kilgore Trout, Venus~ the Half-Shell (New York: Dell, 1975). 
All citations are to this source. 
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million, according to the latest count" (7). The existence of extra-
terrestrial life would take from man his presumed special place in 
creation. He would no longer be the sole progeny of the creator; and 
if that other life is more intelligent than man, so much the worse. 
Throughout the novel, human beings will be attacked in a number 
of ways. Trout writes, "Humans were badly flawed, flawed physically 
because of genetic mutations, flawed mentally and emotionally because 
of a flawed and mutating society" (114). One of the less serious 
physical charges against humans is that they are smelly. But Trout is 
not about to stop here; he also tells us why earthlings smell so bad: 
But the octopoids of Algol, perhaps the most philosophical of all 
races, contended that it wasn't the food that caused the bad 
smell. Psychology affected physiology. Earthmen stank because 
their ethics stank. (24). 
In this short passage man is attacked three ways: physically, ethically, 
and intellectually. He smells, his ethics stink, he is one of the 
lesser species of sentient life in the universe and certainly no the 
most capable of cerebration. Additional physical charges stress man's 
inferiority to other species, the insufficiency of his senses, and his 
mortality. Trout adds that man is sexually inferior to other species 
as well: "relatively speaking, Terrestrials were geldings" (189). 
Earthlings are referred to as "an endangered species," (30) be-
cause they have practically destroyed their own planet. The planet is 
scheduled to be sanitized by a group who have been cleaning up the 
universe (32). Later Simon hears a long speech maintaining that life 
itself is an accidental disease: 
"Our religion maintains that the stars, planets, and moons are 
living beings," she .:;aid. "These are the only forms of life big 
160 
enough and complex enough to interest the Creatrix. Biological 
life is an accidental by-product. You might say that it's a 
disease infecting the planets. Vegetable and animal life are 
bearable forms of the disease, like acne or athlete's foot. 
"But when sentient life, beings with self-consciousness, 
evolve, they become a sort of deadly microbe." (67) 
Thus, man is so small as to be beneath the concern of the Creatrix. Man 
is a deadly microbe, a parasite, stupid enough to destroy his own planet 
and eminently worthy of being "cleaned" off the earth. 
The impetus for our interplanetary Gulliver, Simon Wagstaff, 
setting out in the first place is his quest to find the answer to the 
really overwhelming question that is so ingenuously phrased in Heming-
way's Torrents of Spring, "What does it all mean?" Simon stands up, 
shakes his fist at the sky and asks the primal question: "Why ~ ~ 
created onl~ ~ suffer and die?" (34) Simon asks his space ship to 
take him to heaven: "To his surprise, the computer screen flashed the 
Chinese equivalent of 'O.K."' (37) Heaven is not quite what it is 
reputed to be, merely another planet (uninhabited until 2879 A.D.), nor, 
as we might by this time suspect, will be Creator be. Simon learns the 
Creator's motivations for creating the world: 
It's this. The Creator has created this world solely to provide 
Himself with a show, to entertain Himself. Otherwise, He'd find 
eternity boring. 
And He gets as much enjoyment from watching pain, suffering, 
and murder as He does from love. Perhaps more, since there is so 
much more hate and greed and murder than there is of love. Just 
as I enjoy watching through my telescope the struggles of those 
who are fighting to get to me, a sadistic pleasure, I admit, so 
He enjoys watching the comedies and tragedies of the beings He 
created. (149) 
The assertion of a sadistic or merely an indifferent God serves to 
reduce man's importance in the cosmic scene: 
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Once you've admitted the premise that there is a Creator, no 
intelligent person can come to any other conclusion. Now, tell 
me, can you state honestly, from all you've observed, that the 
Creator regards his creatures, human or otherwise, as anything 
but actors in a drama? (149-50) 
Here, again, we see the use of stage imagery to denigrate humans. 
Simon the questor wants to know "the identity of the universe" 
(164). On the planet of the Clerun-Gowph, Simon will receive some 
answers to his primal questions. Naturally, these will not reflect 
much credit on mankind and the planet earth. Here Simon encounters 
Bingo, "the only survivor of the first creature created by It. II 
(199) The sexless creator is called It. Simon discovers that "It went 
out to lunch one day and never came back. ." (200) Bingo explains 
the origins of life on the planets, including earth: 
"Well, many billions of years ago we started to make a 
scientific survey of every planet in the world. We sent out 
scouting expeditions first. These didn't find any sign of life 
anywhere. But we were interested in geochemistry and all that 
kind of stuff, you know. So we sent out scientific expeditions. 
These built bases, the towers that you no doubt have run into. 
The teams stayed on these planets a long time--from your ephemeral 
viewpoint, anyway. They dumped their garbage and their excrement 
in the soupy primeval seas near the towers. These contained 
microbes and viruses which flourished in the seas. They started 
to evolve into higher creatures, and so the scientists hung 
around to observe their development." 
He paused to drink another beer. 
"Life on these planets was an accident." 
Simon was shaken. He was the end of a process that started 
with a cockroach crap. 
"That's as good a way to originate as any," Bingo said, as 
if he had read Simon's thoughts. 
After a long silence, Simon said, "Why aren't there any 
towers on the planets in my galaxy?" 
"The life there didn't look very promising," Bingo said. 
(201) 
The origins of man posited here are hardly honorific, are exactly the 
opposite of the special creation which man has imagined himself to be 
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the result of. 
But Bingo had been joking with his last remark above. A giant 
computer had been built so the tower was not needed: "All we had to do 
was to ask the computer and it would tell us what we'd find before we 
studied a place" (202). How is this possible? The answer is that the 
world or universe is constructed on mechanistic principles similar to 
those Twain posits in The Mysterious Stranger. That all things are 
predetermined takes away from man even that bit of self-esteem he gets 
from thinking he makes up his own mind. It also represents a denial of 
man's free will. Bingo elaborates on this: "Once the universe is set 
up in a particular structure, everything from then on proceeds pre-
dictably. It's like rolling a bowling ball down the return trough" 
(202). This denial of human freedom means that life is programmed, but 
unfortunately man is not privy to the nature of the program. Simon 
asks him about the part chance plays, but Bingo claims that there is no 
such thing: "What seems Chance is merely ignorance of the part of the 
beholder" (202). Man simply does not know. Not only does he have 
nothing to be proud of, this lack of knowledge actually puts him into a 
precarious position, for he does not, as a result, know how to conduct 
himself properly in the world. 
Simon asks the final question, the one that has puzzled man from 
the very start, "But why, then, did It create us!" (203) Bingo's 
answer, again, is designed to denigrate mankind, to make man feel 
worthless and unimportant in the cosmos: 
"Look at the universe. Obviously, it ~vas made by a 
scientist, otherwise it wouldn't be subject to scientific 
analysis. Our universe, and all the others It has created, are 
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scientific experiments. It is omniscient. But just to make 
things interesting, It being omnipotent, blanked out parts of Its 
mind. Thus, It won't know what's going to happen. 
"That's why, I think, It did not come back after lunch. It 
erased even the memory of Its creation, and so It didn't even 
know It was due back for an important meeting with me. I heard 
reports that It was seen rolling around town acting somewhat con-
fused. It alone knows where It is now, and perhaps not even It 
knows. Maybe. Anyway, in whatever universe It is, when this 
universe collapses into a big ball of fiery energy, It'll 
probably drop around and see how things worked out." 
Simon rose from the chair and cried, "But why? Why? Why? 
Didn't It know what agony and sorrow It would cause sextillions 
upon sextillions of living beings to suffer? All for nothing?" 
"Yes," Bingo said. 
"But why?" Simon Wagstaff shouted. "Why? Why? Why?" 
"Why not?" (203-04) 
So ends the novel, on one of the more anti-climactic notes in litera-
ture. Again, the concern is a perennial one, the same question that 
theodicies address themselves to: how does one explain the evil and 
suffering in the world? The answer here is not the agnostic one of "we 
just don't know why." Instead the Creator is represented as one who 
indeed was well aware that he would be creating agony and suffering for 
all people and was doing it not to test them or for any high purpose 
whatsoever. He was proceeding not from infinite wisdom but merely from 
the whimsical "why not?" 
The satire here is not aimed at just the Christian religion and 
its followers. Mankind as a whole is the true target. In particular, 
Trout attacks man's overestimation of his own importance and place in 
the universe by offering a cosmic perspective. In doing so Trout pro-
vides an indifferent creator of man, who is not particularly stable or 
reliable in the first place, a beginning for man which is accidental 
and partially a result of the offal of extraterrestrials, and a dis-
position of things on earth which is prearranged but of which humans 
• 
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have no inkling. Physically, humans are short-lived and have a noisome 
odor. Their senses are less refined than those of dogs. Technologi-
cally, intellectually, and ethically, they are inferior to numerous 
extraterrestrial species. Religion is not the target here; the satiric 
victim is, as Trout writes, "Homo sap" and all his pretensions to 
grandeur. Kilgore Trout, then, has written an entertaining satire on 
mankind employing many of the staple devices, charges, and strategies 
we have observed in earlier satires on mankind. 
Again, the kinds of assertions I have mentioned for possible use 
in attacks on mankind from this cosmic perspective may, of course, 
exist independently of satires on mankind and may be brought forth for 
purposes other than such satire. I offer them here as materials which 
satirists on man have utilized to achieve their particular purposes. 
Such kinds of assertions within a satire on mankind serve to 
diminish man by allowing him a less desirable place in the grand scheme 
of things than he has previously thought, than he has claimed for him-
self. He has overestimated himself and his position, and the satirist 
on mankind refuses to allow him to get away with this. His pride, his 
sense of certainty and security, are stripped ruthlessly from him by 
the satirist's onslaught. Alvin Kernan has written, "The satirist's 
despair of man and society extends to the very operation of the 
cosmos itself."89 
89 Kernan, p. 20. 
CHAPTER IV 
SOME CONCLUSIONS 
In the first three chapters I have attempted to delineate and 
delimit a subtype of satire, the satire on mankind. By analyzing 
several undisputed examples of the type, I have isolated certain dis-
tinguishing characteristics of the satire on mankind: 
1. a twofold victim which on one level is the species and, on 
another, inflated definitions of mankind and those who hold such 
self-flattering misconceptions of the true nature of the species; 
2. a satirist who, on one level, is as culpable as his victims 
since he is a member of the species being attacked; 
3. a reader who is also inescapably involved for the same reason. 
The reader is thus placed in a significantly different position 
from his customary one in reading satire. He is, at one level, a 
victim of the satire rather than an observer who may enjoy the 
discomfiture of others; 
4. a characteristic set of strategies which serve to propel a 
characteristic set of satiric charges or indictments. 
We may define the satire on mankind, then, as a literary work which 
embodies a twofold attack upon the species and upon those who entertain 
inflated opinions of that species (or who endorse flattering definitions 
of homo sapiens) and which most often proceeds in its attack along the 
lines I have suggested in the first three chapters here. 
If I have described accurately what satires on mankind are and 
what they do, then two things become clear: 
1. some works which have been labeled satires on mankind are, in 
fact, not; 
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2. some definitions of "satire" need to be expanded in order to 
include or reflect this particular satiric activity. 
Before discussing several works which have been mislabeled, I 
want to consider one poem which has not been called a satire on mankind 
but which contains many of the ingredients I have identified as charac-
teristic of that type. In the first stanza of "Man" (1650), Henry 
Vaughan reveals the orderliness he has discovered in the natural world: 
Weighing the stedfastness and state 
Of some mean things which here below reside, 
Where birds like watchful Clocks the noiseless date 
And Intercourse of times divide, 
Where Bees at night get home and hive, and flowrs 
Early, aswel as late, 1 Rise with the Sun, and set in the same bowrs. 
The second stanza makes it apparent that Vaughan is contrasting such 
stability with the lives of men: 
I would (said I) my God would give 
The staidness of these things to man! for these 
To his divine appointments ever cleave, 
And no new business breaks their peace; 
The birds nor sow, nor reap, yet sup and dine, 
The flowres without clothes live, 
Yet Solomon was never drest so fine. 
Vaughan has been paraphrasing Matthew, 6: 26-29 here, which may give us 
a clue that his purpose is homiletic rather than satiric. In the next 
stanza he contrasts man to "The staidness of these things." Man is 
depicted as a vagrant, lost and wandering: 
Man hath stil either toyes, or Care, 
He hath no root, nor to one place is ty'd, 
But ever restless and Irregular 
About this Earth doth run and ride, 
1 The Complete Poetry of Henry Vaughan, ed. French Fogle (New 
York: W.W. Norton, 1969), pp. 245-46. 
He knows he hath a home, but scarce knows where, 
He sayes it is so far 
That he hath quite forgot how to go there. 
In the final stanza man is even compared unfavorably to stones: 
He knocks at all doors, strays and roams, 
Nay hath not so much wit as some stones have 
Which in the darkest nights point to their homes, 
By some hid sense their Maker gave; 
Man is the shuttle, to whose winding quest 
And passage through these looms 
God order'd motion, but ordain'd no rest. 
The generalizing indicator is here, the animal comparisons, and even 
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unfavorable comparisons to plants and stones. The assertions of aimless 
wandering and fruitless activity, the charge that God has provided 
benefits to other parts of the creation which he has not accorded to 
man, the claim that man's intellect is insufficient to enlighten him 
and, finally, the assertion that man is propelled through life without 
rest by the Creator--all these are materials which satirists on man 
have often employed. 
Still, the poem is not a satire on mankind. The materials are 
not marshalled here for satiric purposes, to humiliate, to discredit, 
to rub salt in the wound. Satires on man, I have been maintaining, 
puncture our overly-pleasant assumptions about the species. Vaughan 
does not refer to such misconceptions, nor to man's anthropocentrism 
and speciesism. Vaughan does have some negative things to say about 
man, but such negative propositions alone do not constitute satire on 
mankind. While Vaughan's observations might undermine pride, pride is 
not being attacked here. The assertions are not present to humiliate 
man, to cause him to lower his estimation of himself. They do not 
threaten his self-image. In fact, he is given the consolation that, 
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even if his life or lot is not quite as satisfactory as he would like 
it, still there is ultimately a providence; and this offers him some 
security. Though man doesn't know where, he "knows he hath a home." 
God is not necessarily taking it easy on man: he "ordered motion. but 
ordained no rest." But He is there and, ultimately, in charge of 
men's lives and their welfare. Vaughan's poem is a homiletic lament. 
It is a meditation of the ways of God to man, but there is no real 
criticism involved. Satires on man which bring in the creator at all 
generally present the deity as disdainful of man, malevolent, or at 
best indifferent to him. But Vaughan is asserting merely that we are 
not privy to God's grand designs. The tone is resigned, without out-
rage; there is no hostility seething under witty images here. Thus, 
despite its use of some of the common materials employed in satires on 
mankind, the poem is not an example of the type. 
As I have said before, materials which satirists on man use may 
appear in sermons and other kinds of literary activity which are them-
selves not satiric. This seems to have been the case with Vaughan's 
poem. We need to use some care, then, before assigning a work the 
classification of "satire on mankind." Failure to consider carefully 
the exact nature of satires on mankind has led to the mislabeling of 
several works. The mislabeling itself may not be occasion for much 
concern, but when it is to any degree part of a thoughtful process it 
can indicate a misunderstanding or misinterpretation of the functioning 
or the direction of the genre, the individual piece being labeled or 
both. The following works or parts of works have all been termed 
satires on mankind. They do not appear to be so to me. 
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According to D.H. Griffin, Mathurin Regnier's "Satire 14" (1613) 
is a "full-scale satire on man." 2 "Satire 14" does contain satire on 
mankind; but it is decidedly not, as a whole, a satire on man. Admit-
tedly, it does start out as if it is going to be just that: 
J'ay pris cent et cent fois la lanterne en la main, 
Cherchant en plain midy, parmy le genre humain, 
Un homme qui fust homme et de faict et de mine, 
Et qui peust des vertus passer par l'estamine. 
Il n'est coing et recoing que je n'aye tant~ 
Depuis que la nature icy bas m'a plant~: 
Mais tant plus je me lime et plus je me rabote, 
Je croy qu'a mon advis tout le monde radote, 
Qu'il a la teste vuide et sans dessus dessous, 3 Ou qu'il faut qu'au rebours je sois l'un des plus fous. 
The narrator claims that, like Diogenes, he has been searching hither 
and thither for one single honest man but to no avail. Either, says 
the narrator, everybody talks drivel and has an empty, topsy-turvy head 
or I myself am one of the most crazy of all. This last statement pre-
pares us for a more tentative, less absolutely-certain narrator than 
was customary in English Elizabethan satire. Here are no wild-eyed, 
raging satyrs who flail their victims, of the sort Alvin Kernan de-
scribes in The Cankered Muse. 
Regnier's narrator is vulnerable from the very start. "I may be 
mistaken," he seems to be saying, "My perceptions may be wrong." This 
is made clear at the start of the second stanza: 
2 Satires Against Man: The Poems ~ Rochester (Berkeley: Univer-
sity of California Press, 1973), p. 175. 
3 Oeuvres completes, ed. Jean Plattard (Paris: Societe D'Edition 
"Les Belles Lettres," 1965), pp. 127-33. 
C'est de notre folie un plaisant strategesme, 
Se flattant, de juger les autres par soy-mesme. 
Ceux qui pour voyager s'embarquent dessus l'eau 
Voyent aller la terre, et non pas leur vaisseau: 
Peut-estre ainsi tromp~ que faucement je juge. 
The fourth stanza introduces even more of a surprise than this self-
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effacement on the part of the narrator. The surprise comes in the form 
of encomium. yfuy, one might well ask, is praise being introduced into 
what has started out as a satire on mankind? After all this searching, 
the narrator says, 
Pour retrouver un homme envers qui la Satyre 
Sans flater ne trouvast que mordre et que redire, 
Qui sceust d'un chois prudent toute chose eplucher, 
Ma foy, si ce n'est vous, je n'en veux plus chercher. 
It is not certain who Regnier is eulogizing here, other than that it is 
a statesman with fifty years of service to his country. It is not 
really important in terms of my argument who is being praised. What is 
important is that the location or discovery of this one paragon reduces 
the impact of the earlier satire on mankind, and the focus is reduced 
from "all" men as a species to "most." This alone suggests that Regnier 
is not writing a satire on mankind. Even if the statesman is not 
exactly the man the narrator has been looking for, he is still close 
enough so that the narrator feels no need to search further. 
In the middle of the poem Regnier pauses to reflect upon his art: 
Or c'est un grand chemin jadis assez fraye, 
Qui des rimeurs francais ne fut oncq' essaye: 
Suivant les pas d'Horace, entrant en la carriere, 
Je trouve des humeurs de diverse maniere, 
Qui me pourroient donner subject de me mocquer. 
He places himself in a well-charted tradition. Following in the foot-
steps of Horace, he traces out various humours as subjects for his 
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satire. This is what Regnier apparently perceives himself to be doing, 
but it is not a description of what a satirist on mankind does. 
Next Regnier launches into a diatribe against, among other 
faults, gambling and its consequences, employing particular examples. 
In doing so, he incorporates an attack on the misuse of reason, although 
he does not go so far as to deny its existence or usefulness. He con-
eludes that reason is a strange beast: 
Ainsi ceste raison est une estrange beste; 
On l'a bonne selon qu'on a bonne la teste, 
Ou'on imagine bien, du sens comme de l'oeil, 
Pour grain ne prenant paille, ou Paris pour Corbeil. 
Men, in Regnier's opinion, are apparently capable of reason and good 
sense, though the number who employ the capacity may be small. 
Regnier closes his "satire" with a brief fable designed again to 
apply to the statesman. Jupiter received Minos and Tantalus into 
heaven and treated them with great favor. The one who knew how to act 
remained in this favored state, but the other who did not know how to 
conduct himself was cast out. The import here is obvious. The narrator 
is saying, you have been in favor for some time--and deservedly so. 
You have merited the trust that has been bestowed upon you. 
It becomes apparent that the thrust of "Satire 14" is not satire 
on man; in fact, the whole work does not seem to be a satire at all, 
though it does contain satire. The incidents and assertions all seem 
planned, though sometimes rather casually connected, to further the 
author's design of complimenting one particular individual. The satire 
that is present is there seemingly as counterpoint to the encomium. 
Since the poem is praiseful of the statesman, the species is not under 
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attack as a species. Mankind is not a satiric victim here. If 
Regnier's "Satire 14" was· designed to satirize mankind, it was faultily 
executed and the eulogistic elements intervened. 
George Wasserman has argued that Hudibras Part I should be 
categorized as a satire on mankind. 4 Wasserman's argument that Part I 
"is a satire on mankind, a redefinition of the ~ qua ~ of man as 
folly and viciousness," is based primarily on quotations from Butler's 
5 
notebooks. Wasserman locates assertions of the sort we are familiar 
with. Butler attacks man's pretence to reason and by use of copious 
animal imagery subtracts from man some of the dignity with w·hich he 
ordinarily endows himself. 
To be sure, the objects of Butler's satire are numerous. The 
religious satire is there. As Wilder and others have pointed out, the 
literary conventions of the epic and the heroic ideals associated with 
it are obviously taken to task in Hudibras, just as they are in Don 
Quixote. John Dennis had seen the poem as an attack on hypocrisy; and, 
more recently, Ian Jack has followed suit. 6 In addition, there are 
numerous other professions, sciences, specialities, and people who are 
ridiculed. Politicians, scientists, members of the Royal Society, 
philosophy, alchemy, medicine, the classics, history, foreign travel, 
lawyers, women, and pedantry have all been identified by critics as 
4 
"'A Strange Chimaera of Beasts and Men': The Argument and 
Imagery of Hudibras, Part I," SEL, 13 (1973), 405-21. 
5 Wasserman, p. 406. 
6 Ian Jack, Augustan Satire: Intention ~ Idiom in English Poetry 
1660-1750 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952), p. 17. 
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victims of the satiric attack. Does the number of victims add up to 
an attack on mankind? Do these various categories or echelons of 
corruption constitute an attack on the whole taken segment by segment? 
I see no such plan here, nor do I find Butler suggesting anywhere in 
the text that he is attempting to do this. At best we can say that if 
Butler intended the various attacks on specific corruptions to be added 
up into a general attack on the species, he does not himself do the 
adding. As a consequence he has allowed his major point to go by 
default. If he intended the work to be a satire on mankind, he did 
not succeed in producing one. 
A somewhat better case can be made for the argument that Butler 
is satirizing the times or his age. The times are bad, what a horrible 
age we live in, things are in desperate straits--such complaints have 
probably been extant for as long as man has been a social animal; and 
they continue down to our own day. Juvenal took on his own society 
(although for his own safety he purported to attack an earlier era); 
and there is some evidence that Butler is doing the same here, attacking 
his times. 
Butler wrote in his notebooks that "This age will serve to make a 
very pretty farce for the next, if it have any wit at all to make use 
f 't ,7 0 ~ • He certainly indulges in particular satire against the his-
torical incidents of his own times. Party and government are attacked, 
but Butler is talking about a specific time in England, when "Both 
7 Hudibras Parts I & II & Selected Other Writings, ed. John 
Wilders and Hugh de Quehen (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), p. 288. 
• 
8 Parties joyn'd to do their best, I To Damn the Publick Interest." 
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Though announced intentions by satirists are sometimes suspect, we do 
have primary evidence that Butler is attacking the current state of 
things in England. Such evidence is available in his letter to Sir 
George Oxenden, dated March 19, 1662/3, which Wilders reprints: 
• • • Butt I assure you my chiefe designe was onely to give the 
world a Just Account of the Ridiculous Folly & Knavery of the 
Presbiterian & Independent Factions then in power •••• 9 
This statement, while it cannot be taken as conclusive, certainly lends 
some credence to a narrower interpretation of the text than Wasserman 
suggests. 
In his satire on the times, Butler attacks man's excessive con-
cerns about money and gain, man's inability to speak the truth or keep 
his word. However, is it asserted that all are culpable? Possibly all 
are greedy, all susceptible to man-made fears, and all averse to truth; 
in these Butler does not seem to be limiting the time period. But for 
the most part, the answer is no: A few apparently do hold out against 
hypocrisy, though perhaps not for the best of reasons. Does Butler 
claim that all factions and all parties and all governments are despic-
able? Even if we could say that all are being attacked within Butler's 
time, we should still have to limit the extent of our generalization to 
England itself, since Butler nowhere gives us authorization to apply it 
elsewhere, to export it beyond Great Britain. 
8 John Wilders, ed., Hudibras (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), 
III, ii, 147-48. 
9 Wilders, p. 451. 
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Butler was familiar with the theriophilist tradition. 10 He wrote 
a verse satire on mankind, "Satire upon the Weakness and Misery of 
Man," which I have already discussed. And while there is plenty of 
evidence to show that his sentiments are in accordance with many of 
those of other satirists on mankind, Butler does not take the final 
step in Hudibras. He simply does not make it clear that all mankind is 
culpable. Wasserman claims that Part I is a satire on mankind read in 
the light of certain notebook passages; and the notebooks do indeed 
give evidence that Butler entertained certain attitudes that recur as 
basic material in satires on mankind, but we must ask if this material 
is transferred in quantities sufficient to justify calling the work, or 
even Part I, a satire on man. There are relatively few lines within 
the text to justify such a claim. 
Butler roots Hudibras in England and at a particular time, and 
nowhere does he imply that he is surveying mankind from China to Peru. 
The particular satire is not used to provide instances or examples to 
support generalizations about the species. Types or classes of people 
are indicted but not for the purpose of attacking the species. \ole are 
shown, for example, a pedantic, Presbyterian knight, a bumpkin who has 
the "light," some tradesmen, an astrologer, a politician, a lawyer and 
some few others; but these certainly do not represent all segments of 
society. Nor do the main characters represent mankind. The reader does 
not look at Hudibras (or Hudibras and Ralpho together) and unmistakably 
see himself. Moreover, if Butler had wanted to make Hudibras represen-
10 Wasserman, p. 407. 
176 
tative of all men, he would not have misguided his readers by suggesting 
that he had an individual in mind as prototype for Hudibras: 
'Tis sung, There is a valiant Mamaluke 
In forrain Land, yclep'd 
---To whom we have been oft compar'd, 
For Person, Parts, Address, and Beard. (I,i, 895-98) 
As a result, it seems apparent that Hudibras as a whole more legiti-
mately falls into the category of a satire on the times than that of 
the satire on mankind. I have argued earlier (pp. 58-9) that the 
satire on the times is most often substantively different from the 
satire on mankind. The complaint against the times more often allows 
for exceptions to its charges, often reflects upon the "good old days," 
and may imply that the current unsatisfactory state of things is 
reversible. To satirize one's age means to satirize one's own time and 
milieu, one's own society. The generalizations are narrower than those 
of the satire on man. In satirizing one's own times, one is not attack-
ing the entire species; Butler seems clearly to be doing the former 
rather than the latter. 
Robert Gould's "A Satyr Against Man" appears in a couple of dif-
ferent forms. An earlier version of one part can be found in "Love 
given over: or a Satyr against the Pride, Lust, and Inconstance, etc of 
Woman. With Sylvia's Revenge, or a Satyr Against Man, In Answer to the 
Satyr against Woman."11 The satire against man, as the full title in-
dicates, is simply that: a response or balance to his satire against 
women. When Gould uses the words "mankind" and "man" here, he means 
11 London: H. Hills, 1709, pp. 1-24. 
men, as in, for example, 
Man, by some angry God in passion hurl'd 
Down, as a Plague to vex the Female World. 
Furthermore, there are none of the typical animal-man comparisons in 
the poem. When animals do get mentioned, they are not treated as 
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physically or morally superior to men, as is customary in most satires 
on man: 
Lyons and Tygers Men have learnt to tame, 
Retaining nothing frightful but their Name: 
With low submission have their Keepers own'd, 
And trembled when their Masters have but frown'd, 
But Man, unruly Man, that Beast of Reason, 
'Gainst Woman still continues in his Treason. 
One might argue, I suppose, that I am quibbling about the number of 
intended victims here, that taken jointly satires on men and women 
constitute satire against mankind. I do not, however, find any such 
amalgamation here. The two parts seem to defuse each other rather than 
to build up to one explosive, potent case against humankind. The two 
satires touching here seem to discharge energy or lose voltage. There 
is no frame made explicit which would say, in effect, since all men and 
women are bad (which is by no means resolved here), that, therefore, 
all mankind is bad, inconstant, odious, or whatever. Had he wished, 
Gould could have easily provided such a frame. Thus, in the single-
part version, the "Satyr Against Man" is not, in my estimation, a 
satire on mankind. 
In Gould's collected Works (1709), the poem is considerably 
l .f. d d . f. 12 amp 1 1e an appears 1n 1ve parts. It is this version which Lovejoy 
12 The Works of Mr. Robert Gould: Consisting of those Satyrs Which 
~formerly Printed, and Corrected since £z the Author, vol. 2 (London: 
1709). All citations are to this edition. 
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13 is thinking of when he identifies it as a satire on man, this version 
which Eugene Sloane discusses in his section entitled "Satires on 
Han."14 Again, the title Gould chose is "A Satyr Against Man." The 
question remains, does this extended poem qualify as an example of the 
type? 
The opening lines in this extended version again suggest that he 
is writing this satire to balance his satire against women: 
I who against the Women dre'tv my Pen, 
With equal Fury now attack the Hen. (148) 
As in the earlier single-part version, when Gould uses "man," he 
generally means "men." And, thus, he is not re~erring to the species. 
Gould attacks his age and issues a warning about the current state of 
things, but he does leave room in his discussion for good men and good 
women, the encomium, for example, on Anne and Marlborough. Gould does 
qualify his generalizations. By attacking most but not all men, Gould 
is writing general satire not satire on mankind. 
Hore importantly, Gould's satire has a homiletic purpose. In 
those satires on mankind which mention the deity at all, as I observed 
earlier, God is often portrayed as indifferent or even inimical to man. 
But for Gould the world is ultimately constructed upon equitable prin-
ciples by a just God for the purpose of testing man. The satire, thus, 
is designed to shake certain men out of their moral stupor, that is, 
13 A.O. Lovejoy, Reflections on Human Nature (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins Press, 1961), p. 16. 
14 Robert Gould: 17th-Century Satirist (Philadelphia: University 
of Pennsylvania, 1940), p. 57. 
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those who are capable of being saved--and apparently some of these do 
exist. The attack, then, is subsidiary to the homily. 
Gould attacks those man-animal comparisons which end up derogating 
mankind and which are staple items for satirists on mankind. He places 
man higher on the great scale of being; he pictures God favoring man 
over all the other animals. He roots his poem in England, as did 
Butler, and does not try to extend those boundaries much, though he is 
quite willing to make a thrust or two at France and Louis XIV. Gould 
could easily have announced to the reader that his generalizations 
extend from China to Peru had he desired to, but he does not take this 
step. 
There is even some direct evidence that Gould is not satirizing 
man~ind. He goes so far as to criticize the very idea of writing a 
satire on mankind. Society, he says within the poem itself, sometimes 
influences one to perform certain kinds of unsavory mental activities: 
Better if yet we wild in Woods did roam. 
Made some cool Shades, or silent Cave our home, 
Than growing by Society refin'd ----
Disgrace, Burlesque, and Ridicule our Kind. (171) 
Ridiculing one's own kind, which is exactly what satires on mankind set 
about doing, is a negative thing in Gould's eyes. Hithin the text 
Gould reveals his familiarity with those who do not have particularly 
high estimations of man and his place in the universe: he has read or 
is conversant with material which satirists on mankind conventionally 
employ. But he carefully dissociates himself from such positions. He 
maintains, for example, that men are obviously superior to animals. 
Thus, despite its title, and despite the fact that several critics 
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have listed or discussed Gould's poem as a satire on mankind, it ulti-
mately does not appear to be one. 
George Hind has claimed that the Fable of the Bees "stands 
1 . h M . . . d · i ,.l5 square y ~n t e en~ppean sat~r~c tra ~t on. Furthermore, Hind 
equates Menippean satire with satire on mankind: 
We might define the Menippean satire in its 'classical' sense as: 
an informal prose genre containing interspersed verses. It 
usually deals less with people than mental attitudes, and is par-
ticularly adapted to handling abstract ideas. Consequently, it 
often attacks pretentious philosophic systems and may offer a 
cynical or skeptical philosophy of its own, usually in the form 
of a dialogue or symposium. Sometimes it shades off into a 
serious moral discussion. The genre frequently makes use of 
comic scenes, fable, parable, and 'obscenity.' It has a loose, 
rambling structure which from time to time may incorporate almost 
any rhetorical or satiric device and may touch upon any topic, 
frequently resulting in long catalogs. The broad scope of the 
Menippean satire makes it nothing less than a 'satire on man-
kind.' 16 
The two terms that Hind equates here have not generally been recognized 
as synonymous. Hind is employing "satire on mankind" in a more general 
sense than I have been using the term. I think it more accurate to say 
that a given Menippean satire may well be a satire on mankind but that 
not all Menippean satires are satires on man. Hind has identified the 
Fable as a Menippean satire, and I presume his last remark above then 
identifies the Fable as a satire on mankind. 
For now, I will just say that as a whole the Fable is not a satire 
on mankind, though it does contain elements of the type, and that 
Mandeville is thoroughly familiar with the charges and strategies, that 
is, the materials of the satire on mankind. His announced intention of 
15 
"Mandeville's Fable£!_ the Bees as Henippean Satire," Genre, 1 
(1968), p. 309. 
16 H" d ~n ' p. 315. 
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showing man as he actually is, of course, is congenial to the satirist. 
Most writers, Mandeville says, "are always teaching Men what they 
should be, and hardly ever trouble their Heads with telling them what 
17 they really are." Naturally, the satirist will focus on man's nega-
tive traits, and this is perfectly acceptable to Mandeville. In his 
oft-quoted comparison of himself to Montaigne early in the Fable, 
Mandeville tells us that this is exactly what he will be doing: 
'Twas said of Montagne, that he was pretty well vers'd in the 
Defects of Mankind, but unacquainted with the Excellencies of 
human Nature: If I fare no worse, I shall think my self well 
used. (5) 
The satirist on mankind's favorite topic is man's failure to recognize 
these defects and his consequent pride. Mandeville's spokesman, Cleo-
menes, remarks that "We have not a more dangerous Enemy than our own 
inborn Pride: I shall ever attack and endeavour to mortify it, when it 
is in my Power" (II, 296). Earlier Mandeville had claimed that "gener-
ous Notions concerning the natural Goodness of Man are hurtful as they 
tend to mislead, and are meerly Chimerical" (I, 343). In the Fable 
Mandeville undermines many of those traits or concepts man has used 
either to build his self-image up or to provide himself with some 
solace. Mandeville also employs man-animal comparisons. Cleomenes 
levels the charge, in a couple of places, that man himself is the most 
vicious predator: "No wild Beasts are more fatal to our Species, than 
often we are to one another" (II, 238; and see II, 246). 
17 The Fable of the Bees: or, Private Vices, Publick Benefits, 
ed. F.B. Kaye, 2 volS (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924), I, 39. All 
citations are to this edition. 
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There are, then, some good reasons to call the Fable of the Bees 
a satire on mankind, yet I am reluctant to do so for several reasons. 
Though Mandeville continually makes use of the generic "mankind," still 
he does not in fact seem to be referring to all humans in every case; 
and he does allow for virtuous people, that is, for some exceptions. 
Cleomenes denies that he is speaking of all men: 
I never thought that there were no virtuous or religious Men; 
what I differ in with the Flatterers of our Species, is about the 
Numbers, which they contend for. (II, 336) 
In addition, Mandeville acknowledges that men do have some positive 
traits. He praises man's sagacity and perseverance in improving his 
condition upon earth and mentions some of his accomplishments in the 
arts and sciences (II, 128). God or providence is not attacked but 
given the benefit of the doubt • For Mandeville, as for Pope, "Whatever 
• 
is, is right." But the primary reason the Fable of the Bees does not 
appear to me to be a satire on mankind is that it seems designed to 
present and explore an economic proposition. To accomplish this, 
Mandeville does employ materials that satirists on man employ, but he 
does so to produce a different final effect. 
The Fable of the Bees has an economic core; it elaborates an 
economic paradox, the private vices-public benefits hypothesis. Mande-
ville states early in Part I, 
For the main Design of the Fable • • • is to shew the Impossibil-
ity of enjoying all the most elegant Comforts of Life that are to 
be met with in an industrious, wealthy and powerful Nation, and 
at the same time be bless'd with all the Virtue and Innocence that 
can be wish'd for in a Golden Age. • (I, 6-7) 
Or, as he phrases it in "A Search into the Nature of Society," "But the 
Necessities, the Vices and Imperfections of Man, together with the 
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various Inclemencies of the Air and other Elements, contain in them the 
Seeds of all the Arts, Industry and Labour •••• " (I, 366) He elabor-
ates on this in the penultimate paragraph of the same section: 
After this I flatter my self to have demonstrated that, 
neither the Friendly Qualities and kind Affections that are 
natural to Man, nor the real Virtues he is capable of acquiring 
by Reason and Self-Denial, are the Foundation of Society; but 
that what we call Evil in this World, Moral as well as Natural, 
is the grand Principle that makes us sociable Creatures, the 
solid Basis, the Life and Support of all Trades and Employments 
without Exception: That there we must look for the true Origin 
of all Arts and Sciences, and that the Moment Evil ceases, the 
Society must be spoiled, if not totally dissolved. (I, 369) 
Man flatters himself that he is virtuous and that his major achievement, 
society, is constructed to reward virtue, whereas in fact it runs on 
vice or evil. If this paradox, or something similar to it, is at the 
core of the Fable, as it seems to be, then it is difficult to maintain 
that the Fable is a satire on mankind. It certainly contains many of 
the materials we find in satires on mankind; but in connection with 
this central paradox, Mandeville does not assert that all men are guilty 
of believing that one can have both a good and thriving state. The 
number might be substantial and probably is, but nowhere does Mandeville 
claim that all are possessed of this idealistic illusion. And, if this 
were a satire on mankind, the main or unifying point of the whole would 
have to be illustrative of some defect in mankind. Paradox may be used 
to satirize mankind, but it does not seem to be employed for that par-
ticular purpose here. 
One discrete section of the Fable of the Bees, however, looks 
more like the satires on mankind we are accustomed to seeing. This is 
the Lion and the Merchant section, which Voltaire liked well enough to 
adapt into a poem, "Le Marseillois et le lion." 
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In Mandeville's version a merchant encounters a lion, who having 
just fed is not particularly interested in eating at the moment and so 
offers not to eat the man "if he could give him any tolerable Reasons 
why he should not be devoured" (I, 176). The man tries flattery first, 
but this gets him nowhere. The lion charges the man with speciesism, 
"why should you esteem your Species above ours?" (177) The rest of the 
Lion and Merchant section is devoted primarily to the lion's extended 
man-animal comparisons with the rather predictable conclusions. 
Man is weaker (177), and man indulges in massive onslaughts of 
aggression against his own kind (177-78). Furthermore, the various 
social classes not only do not care for each other. but are actually 
antipathetic, and this attitude is exhibited all the way up to the 
royalty as well, who are charged with responsibility for the public 
weal: "All degrees of Men despise those that are inferior to them" 
(178). Such irresponsibility, particularly on the part of the public 
leaders, has a deleterious effect on the quality of life and thus in-
directly affects everyone. The assertion that one's leaders, the 
guardians of the public weal, are incompetent, callous or downright 
hostile can therefore be used as material for satirizing mankind. 
Next, the lion indulges in a bit of wordplay which numerous 
satirists vn mankind have employed. The lion says that he is savage 
but not cruel, because he follows his instincts, whereas man does not. 
This can be seen easily in that man is the only creature who makes a 
sport of killing (178). Finally, as satirists on man have often 
pointed out, man is but a miniscule part of the creation. Man is not 
especially important to Nature: "If she had intended that Han, as Man 
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from a Superiority of Species, should lord it over all other Animals, 
the Tiger, nay, the Whale and Eagle, would have obey'd his Voice" 
(179-80). 
The lion then enumerates his own physical superiority over the 
human species. Overcome by the lion's argument and realizing that he 
is in a vulnerable position, the merchant does not have recourse to 
either side of the fight-or-flight syndrome, but instead faints, some-
thing no self-respecting animal would do of course. And so ends the 
story itself, though Mandeville does not let it drop there. 
To this point, the fable of the Lion and the Merchant has been, 
in terms of its indictment of mankind, pretty standard fare. But now 
Mandeville shifts the emphasis: 
The Lion, in my Opinion, has stretch'd the Point tqp far; 
yet when to soften the Flesh of Male Animals, we have by Castra-
tion prevented the Firmness their Tendons and every Fibre would 
have come to without it, I confess, I think it ought to move a 
human Creature when he reflects upon the cruel Care with which 
they are fatned for Destruction. (180) 
Mandeville has shifted the emphasis to the oxymoronic "cruel Care" with 
which animals are "fatned for Destruction." The detailed, graphic 
description which follows, of a large gentle bullock, attacks Descartes' 
animal-machine hypothesis (as the last sentence makes explicit) and is 
included to argue most forcibly that certain adjustments need to be 
made in man's way of looking at animals. At any rate, the scene does 
not seem satirical upon mankind while asking man to be more compassion-
ate. And, in fact, this passage, in capping the Lion and Merchant 
section, drains off some of the satirical effect of that section. 
After reading these passages, the reader might well say, "So Mandeville 
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wants us to think differently about animals." He asks us to assume 
different attitudes towards them, not towards man himself, or our-
selves. At least, this is how I interpret the following passage which 
concludes the Lion and Merchant section: 
When a large and gentle Bullock, after having resisted a ten 
times greater force of Blows than would have kill'd his Murderer, 
falls stunn'd at last, and his arm'd Head is fasten'd to the 
Ground with Cords; as soon as the wide Wound is made, and the 
Jugulars are cut asunder, what Mortal can without Compassion hear 
the painful Bellowings intercepted by his Blood, the bitter Sighs 
that speak the Sharpness of his Anguish, and the deep sounding 
Grones with loud Anxiety fetch'd from the bottom of his strong 
and palpitating Heart; Look on the trembling and violent Convul-
sions of his Limbs; see, while his reeking Gore streams from him, 
his Eyes become dim and languid, and behold his Strugglings, 
Gasps and last Efforts for Life, the certain Signs of his 
approaching Fate? When a Creature has given such convincing and 
undeniable Proofs of the Terrors upon him, and the Pains and 
Agonies he feels, is there a Follower of Descartes so inur'd to 
Blood, as not to refute, by his.Commiseration, the Philosophy of 
that vain Reasoner? (180-81) 
So animals do have "feelings." They suffer; and, at the very least, we 
should commiserate. Moreover, Mandeville does not assert that all 
men are guilty of Cartesian attitudes towards animals; he does not rule 
out the possibility of there being numerous animal sympathizers (even 
vegetarians) whose positions he would not be satirizing here. Thus, 
even this section of the Lion and the Merchant which appears most like 
a discrete satire on mankind, and which certainly contains materials 
which satirists on mankind utilize, has its satiric effect appreciably 
diminished by this final paragraph. It may, as a result, be less con-
fusing to label the Lion and Merchant section a fable within the Fable. 
Voltaire's "Le Marseillois et le lion," (1768) directly inspired 
by Mandeville's merchant and lion, is more readily identifiable as a 
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i . k' d 18 sat re aga~nst man ~n • Ralph Arthur Nablow calls Voltaire's poem 
"a witty fable in which the poet illustrates the dictum that might is 
ri&ht,"19 though this is certainly not the point of the poem. Nablow 
expands this to a closer approximation of what satirists on mankind do: 
"At a more intellectual level Voltaire assails as he does in Micro-
megas, the idea of man's inveterate vanity, reflected in the anthropo-
centric view of the universe."20 
The basic situation is similar to that in Mandeville. The lion 
will spare the man if he can give him some good reasons for doing so. 
The man begins with the traditional claims: 
Qu'au plus haut des degres des estres inegaux 
L'homme est mis pour regner sur tous les animaux; 
Que la terre est son trone, et que dans l'etendue 
Les astres sont form~s pour rejouir sa vue. (143-44) 
In man's estimation, all animals, the earth, even the cosmos itself 
were made for him alone. In a footnote designed to reinforce the 
satire against these ridiculous claims for mankind, Voltaire adds: "Il 
a fallu bien du temps pour detromper orgueil et notre ignorance •• II 
(144) Satires on man are designed to do precisely this: to disillusion 
man, to unveil his pride and ignorance and show it to him. 
The lion strips the man naked to have a better look at this 
formidable "ruler of the universe" (144). Voltaire is saying, let's 
18 
"Le Marseillois et le lion," vol. 10, Oeuvres Compl~tes, ed. 
Louis Moland (Paris: Garnier Freres, 1877), pp. 140-48. 
19 
"A Study of Voltaire's Lighter Verse," Vol. 126, Studies on 
Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century (1974), p. 62. 
20 Nablow, p. 62. 
188 
strip the specimen naked and examine it. \Vhat does unaccommodated man 
look like, stripped of his pretensions? Not much, of course! ~~n's 
naked physical self, along with his pretension of superiority, is 
attacked. 
The man, accosted by such undisputable facts, concedes that he 
cuts a sorry figure in this world, that he has been wrong, and that 
the lion is his superior: 
Ah! dit-il au lion, je vois que la nature 
Me fait faire en ce monde une triste figure: 
Je pensais ~tre roi; j'avais certes grand tort. 
Vous ~tes le vrai maitre, en etant le plus fort. (144) 
The man, however, claims to be made in the image and likeness of God. 
The lion responds, "Toi, l'image de Dieu! toi, magot de Provence!"(l45) 
The lion claims further that God does nothing in vain, and God gave 
the lion certain physical gifts which were designed specifically for 
destruction, mastication, and digestion of prey. So the lion is also 
superior here. Finally, the man admits, "Sire, je suis battu" (147). 
He concedes that he is inferior to the lion both physically and, at 
least in some ways, mentally. 
At the end, the man does not faint but shows he is a good merchant 
by making a deal with the lion. He will provide food for the lion, "rho 
will abstain from eating him. Here the emphasis is not shifted away 
from the satire as it is in Mandeville's version; here there is no 
rhetorical purpose overriding the satire. Therefore, it seems appro-
priate to label Voltaire's poem a satire on mankind. 
Both versions are extended man-animal comparisons to the detriment 
of man. Both assert that nan is unduly proud and attack his species-
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ism and anthropocentrism. The distinctions man claims between himself 
and what he thinks of as the lower orders are blurred and lessened. 
Man's claim that he has an immortal soul is demeaned by a joke. Both 
writers portray man as a comparatively weak creature physically, 
though Voltaire makes this much more specific than does Mandeville. 
And both claim that man is avaricious and foolhardy as a result of it. 
Both works subject man to assertions which would reduce him in the 
grand scheme of things, in his relationship with at least one other 
sentient part of creation; and both depict man as ridiculous and 
unduly proud. 
Despite these similarities, there are crucial differences. 
Mandeville's assertions seem designed for use as part of another 
argument, that man should in fact seriously consider his treatment-of 
animals, that his attitudes need readjusting towards them. The use 
of satire on mankind for a purpose in which the satire is subsidiary 
requires that we label the fictional product itself as something other 
than a satire on mankind. That product might be, for example, a 
sermon employing satire on mankind for the purpose of frightening 
sinning men into the arms of an angry God. In such a case, it would 
be more accurate to label it as a sermon employing satire on man 
rather than as a satire on mankind. In the Lion and Merchant section 
and in the Fable of the Bees as a whole, the satire on man is sub-
sidiary to an argumentative proceeding whose purpose is other than 
that of satirizing mankind. 
Tobias Smollett's Roderick Random is yet another work which has 
been labeled a satire on mankind. Smollett himself did the labeling. 
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In a letter to Dr. Alexander Carlyle, Smollett wrote that Roderick 
Random "is intended as a Satire on Mankind •••• " 21 Though several 
critics have cited this passage, none has carefully investigated the 
implications of Smollett's comment. Some obvious questions arise if 
we are to examine the work as a satire on mankind. Does Smollett have 
something particular in mind here, or is he merely using the term in 
the less precise sense that Bertrand Goldgar has mentioned: a work 
which paints "a dark picture of human nature"? 22 Is Smollett using 
the phrase in this vague way, or is he referring to the specific sub-
genre of satire exemplified by Boileau's "Eighth" and Rochester's 
"Satyr against Mankind?" 
Smollett employs animal imagery within the novel, but there is 
only one example of the kind we are accustomed to seeing in satires 
on man: 
A thousand times I wished myself a bear, that I might retreat to 
woods and deserts, far from the inhospitable haunts of man, where 
I could live by my own talents, independent of treacherous 
friends and supercilious scorn.23 
Most of the animal imagery in the novel, however, is of a kind usually 
not located in satires on man. I refer to the traditional use of 
animal imagery to debase individuals by likening them to any of a 
number of less attractive animals. In this type of imagery, men are 
21 The Letters of Tobias Smollett, ed. Lewis M. Knapp (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1970), p. 6. 
22 
"Satires on Man and 'The Dignity of Human Nature,"' PHLA, 80 
(1965), 535. 
23 Roderick Random (New York: Signet, 1964), p. 271. All cita-
tions are to this edition. 
compared to animals which are traditionally not well thought of, 
whereas in satires on mankind men are most often contrasted with 
animals in order to reduce man's pride in his species. 
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In using the term "satire on mankind," Smollett is probably re-
ferring to his exposition against man's treatment of his fellow man 
(a regular part, we have noted, of the satire on man) and to his ex-
position of man's lot in the world. 
In the preface to the novel, Smollett speaks of his intentions. 
He refers to "that generous indignation which ought to animate the 
reader against the sordid and vicious disposition of the world" (xvii). 
Part of his purpose, then, will be to expose this disposition of the 
world. One of his strategies to accomplish this will be to throw a 
young, helpless child into the world and then observe the effects. He 
says.he has "attempted to represent modest nerit struggling with every 
difficulty to which a friendless orphan is exposed, from his own want 
of experience, as well as from the selfishness, envy, malice, and base 
indifference of mankind" (xvii). We certainly do not have to look far 
to find these traits which he attributes to mankind. Roderick becomes 
a figure to pity almost ab ~' and he is subjected to an incredible 
number of injustices ,.,hich I need not enumerate here. 
Now we can view this endless chain of atrocities committed against 
Roderick in two different though closely related ways: as information 
about society or as information about man's lot. The society is, 
first of all, a vicious one; and its viciousness comes out in many 
forms. Perhaps the three most important ,.;ords in the novel, which 
recur again and again, give us some indication of the world embodied 
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in it. The words "mortification," "indignation," and "revenge" are 
repeated numerous times throughout the work and, in fact, often re-
solve themselves into a recognizable pattern: a character is mortified, 
becomes indignant, and then takes or attempts to take revenge. Morti-
fication can occur in any of a number of ways and can be physical, 
being hit with the contents of a chamber pot, or mental, having one's 
pride or pretensions deflated. Practically every character in the 
work is mortified at one time or another. Indignation is naturally 
the next step, the rousing of anger, which leads to the final stage of 
revenge. In fact, revenge is one of the prime motivations for action 
in the novel. 
By a slight shift of emphasis, and using the same "facts," we can 
consider man's lot in the world. Man's lot is that he is born defense-
less into this world which is inhabited by "mankind." He is born of 
necessity into mortification, into a furious, vengeful world, and life 
in fact is but a "paltry province." 
We might very well expect to find such kinds of assertions in a 
satire on mankind. But we find very little else in the novel that will 
enable us to identify it as an example of the type. Pride and presump-
tion are attacked, but not all are apparently guilty of them. We find 
no charges of anthropocentrism, no attack on man's pride in reason. 
Smollett does use the generic "mankind," but his is not a blanket in-
dictment. The reader is not made to feel as if he is one of the cul-
pable. 
Had Smollett left Roderick unrewarded, the satire might have held 
sway; but this, of course, is not the case in the novel. If the good 
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are ultimately rewarded and the bad punished, then those temporary 
pains and evils wrought on the good by the bad are not so serious. The 
satire against mankind is muted by the assertion that Poetic Justice 
exists. Mankind may still, for the most part, be heartless, base, 
ungrateful and all the rest, but the effects of these have been re-
duced by divine or authorial intervention. This may be just one of 
the problems Smollett creates by having his principal "victim" and his 
"hero" one and the same; he cannot save his hero without saving his 
victim. 
Smollett further mutes the effect of his satire by including good 
characters. Narcissa, to use the obvious example, is too good. Even 
Roderick is unable finally to curse society because of her: 
Not withstanding all I had suffered from the Knavery and selfish-
ness of mankind, I ••• should have blessed the occasion that 
secluded me from such a perfidious world had not the remembrance 
of the amiable Narcissa preserved my attachment to that society 
of which she constituted a part. (428) 
The savage indictment has mellowed considerably. Smollett, then, is 
apparently using the term "satire on mankind" in its more general 
signification. He is not using the term to refer to the specific 
tradition or strain of satire whose nature has been the subject of 
this study. 
I stated in my preface that I hoped to be able to offer a base 
from which we could proceed to identify specific works as either 
satires on mankind, or not, with more precision. If critics are going 
to be labeling works as satires on mankind (and, as we have seen, 
critics have been doing this), and if the label is to mean anything 
beyond that of a negative picture of human nature, then we need to 
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establish as nearly as possible what it is that we mean by the term 
when we as critics employ it. I have attempted to perform this task 
for the satire on mankind along the lines suggested by Robert C. 
Elliott (see my Preface). I have provided examples of the type, and I 
have considered works which might appear to be but which are ultimately 
not satires on mankind. Although I am arguing here for a more precise 
use of the term, I think my own use of it allows for some leeway and 
does not put any undue constraints on either critic or work. Granted, 
I am asking for more precise use of the term than it was often accorded 
in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; the term was obviously 
24 
employed loosely. Nonetheless, I think the subtype I have been 
delineating is a distinct, discrete variety or strain of satire which 
we may accurately and conveniently label the "satire on mankind." 
I also stated earlier that could we identify clearly one type of 
satire, chart the boundaries of one kind of satiric activity, this 
might have some ramifications for our attempts at defining the larger 
entity of "satire" itself. Our definitions of satire may need to 
become more inclusive to recognize this particular satiric activity, 
which acknowledged satirists have long engaged in and of which there 
exists a canon of noted examples. Some definitions of "satire" simply 
24 In the play The Stranger, the Baron is moved at witnessing a 
scene of gratitude for acts of charity. He is told by Hrs. Haller, 
"you satirize mankind, my lord." He does so by "supposing such scenes 
to be uncommon." Even the act of making certain suppositions is de-
scribed as satirizing mankind. The play is translated by Benjamin 
Thompson from Kotzebue's original play and can be found in Inchbald's 
The British Theatre, vol. 24 (London: 1808), p. 27. The OED records a 
figurative use of the word "satire" which seems to apply here: "A 
thing, fact, or circumstance that has the effect.of making some person 
or thing ridiculous." 
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do not take satires on mankind into account. 
If the definition of "satire" is restricted to (a) an attack upon 
an individual or individuals or (b) an attack upon the vices and 
foibles to be found in certain individuals or groups (and there is 
considerable evidence that at various times writers or critics have 
meant one or the other of these by the word), then satires on mankind 
are not in fact satire at all. Or, the critics and satirists have 
constructed their definitions without considering one minor though 
interesting subtype; and, therefore, their definitions fall short of 
giving a full account of satire. 
We have already considered Rosenheim's working definition of 
"satire" as "an attack upon discernible, historically authentic par-
ticulars."25 And Douglas Grant has concluded that "Satire is inspired 
b 1 . d 1 . 1' . " 26 y persona resentment; ~t ea s ~n persona ~t~es. We do find 
satirists who write particular and personal satire, but satire does 
not end here. Were we to assume that this was the only kind of satire, 
we would be unnecessarily limiting the term. As we have seen in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, attacks against particular 
persons were generally labeled lampoons and distinguished from satire. 
It seems more accurate to say today that some satire deals in per-
sonalities and attacks individuals. 
The major satirists in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
25 Edward W. Rosenheim, Jr., Swift and the Satirist's Art (Chica-
go: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1963), p. 25-.-----
26 
"Samuel Johnson: Satire and Satirists," The New Rambler, 3 
(June 1967), 17. 
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instead generally meant by the word "satire" an attack upon the vices 
or foibles of mankind. But general satire, as espoused and practiced 
by Addison, came under heavy attack for being simply ineffective. To 
stipulate that "satire" must be general satire is also an unduly 
narrow conception of satire. 
In contrast, one critic, I think, goes too far in the opposite 
direction. His conception of what constitutes satire may be too broad. 
In a spirited and insightful article, "Satire and St. George," Philip 
Pinkus argues that "Satire does not concern itself with the individual 
27 
as such." What satire presents is an image of evil beyond the 
individual. The "satire" that Pinkus presents or describes is close 
to the satire on mankind; and, in fact, he observes that sometimes the 
satiric target "is mankind, more bestial than the beasts and yet 
pretending to the dignity of man."28 Pinkus later extended his remarks 
on satire in a second article, in which he again discusses briefly the 
• 1 • d 29 sat~re on man~~n • What Pinkus has to say in these two articles is 
generally accurate about some satires--satires on man for example--but 
not all. 
Theoreticians and satirists have often put forth forceful and 
accurate descriptions of various types of satire. Trouble emerges 
when claims are made that a specific type or strain or mode of satire 
27 
"Satire and St. George," Queens Quarterly, 70 (Spring 1963), 
p. 39. 
28 Pinkus, p. 38. 
29 
"The New Satire of Augustan England," UTQ, 38 (1969), 136-58. 
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is the only legitimate or true kind. I argued in my second chapter 
that satire is an amazingly versatile weapon, capable of individual 
attack or mass destruction. A less unpleasant metaphor also applies. 
Satire, though its components are sometimes bitter to our taste 
or green or too strongly flavored, is still a marvelously diverse 
platter, which satirists have often not-too-graciously served up to us. 
We tend to forget, though, that despite its magical early stages 
(charted so ably by Robert C. Elliott), and despite its early associa-
tion with those rascally or malicious satyrs (well documented by 
Kernan), satire is probably the most civilized form of attack. Satire 
attacks with words in lieu of swords, fists, or our even less civilized 
technological agents of destruction. Satire may hurt more than some 
sticks and stones but is decidedly less harmful to civilization than 
the gun and the bomb. 
Though satires on mankind are distinct in the ways I have sketched 
in this study, they still share essential characteristics with acknowl-
edged satires and should be considered as legitimate although diminu-
tive portions of the mixed platter which is satire. Future attempts 
to define or characterize "satire" need to take into account this 
heretofore neglected and quite gamy ingredient within the variegated 
mixture. The satire on mankind is one discernible part of the whole. 
I only hope it is now a more recognizable portion of the platter. 
Satires on mankind attempt to clear a<vay the optimistic underbrush 
which has blocked our vision of the true nature of the beast that has 
emerged from the cave. Today, in our jungle of high technology and 
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so-called sophisticated weaponry, we still need the satirist's ancient 
art to denude us, in the manner of Voltaire's lion, of our all-
enveloping pretensions. 
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